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Title: Affect, Abuse, Transgression: Orienting Ambiguity in Early Modern Texts 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to articulate how early modern texts formalize their 
affective qualities in instances of ambiguity. Positioned within the recent turn away from 
humoral theories of the passions and toward the rhetorical underpinnings of affect in 
early modern criticism, my project offers an interpretive strategy that privileges the 
perspective of the text by attending to the vulnerabilities of first-person perspectives in 
ambiguous rhetorical structures and figures. I argue that these forms signal more than 
sites of critical debate encoded in the text, as Shoshanna Feldman has suggested; they 
also privilege textual perspective and reveal affect to be a feature of form. I argue that 
textual ambivalence may be approached through the logic of catachresis in order to 
examine how these instances may be read in ways that maintain the strangeness of their 
didactic and disruptive capability. Reorienting how one approaches ambiguity, I suggest, 
exposes the potential of often ignored textual elements and suggests that early modern 
literature models an interpretive agenda dependent upon vulnerable perspectives.  
Reconceiving the interpretive strategies solicited by each text, I argue that early 
modern literature embraces the benefits of individual and collective vulnerability. I 
examine how Marlowe’s Edward II disrupts the binary structure of the king’s two bodies 
in order to turn an accusation of weakness against authority itself. I turn to Donne’s 
	 v 
poetry and prose to argue that it models a hospitable interpretive method that uses form to 
manage ambiguity from the perspectives of his textual voices while orienting readers to 
welcome the strangeness of his contradictions. I then pursue an analysis of Shakespeare’s 
Henry IV, Part I that reorients Falstaff’s function in the play as its unlikely focal 
perspective, a position that stages a resistance to the play’s power structures. Finally, I 
briefly consider how my analysis bears on familial and rhetorical conventions in 
Shakespeare’s Tempest and Webster’s Duchess of Malfi.  
Attending to the formal practices that construct literary affect, this project 
reconsiders the ways in which early modern English literature navigates the intersections 
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SEEING STRANGENESS, READING WILDLY: THE POTENTIAL OF  
TEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
The name of watchmen belongs to our profession; thy prophets are not only seers, endued 
with a power of seeing, able to see, but watchmen evermore in the act of seeing. 
—John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions (94) 
As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know 
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. 
But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.  
  —Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon Press Conference, 12 February 2002 
This fellow is wise enough to play the fool and to do that well craves a kind of wit. He 
must observe their mood on whom he jests, the quality of persons, and the time, and like 
the haggard, check at every feather that comes before his eye. 
 
  —William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, or What You Will (3.1.59-64) 
At the present moment in early modern literary criticism, when critics historicize 
everything—from the material conditions of culture to the politics of marginalized 
individual identities to the ontology of objects—I am interested in justifying the practice 
of close reading.1 I am interested, moreover, in licensing a critical method that attends to 
the strangeness of early modern literature, that attends to textual instances critics have 
identified as ambiguous and incomprehensible. In this project I develop a set of ideas for 
how close reading can address the concerns raised by new historicist and other critics, 
concerns surrounding the problems of critical perception when reading texts from earlier 
																																																								
1 I acknowledge that close reading remains a practice of literary critics generally, especially New 
Formalists. I discuss their practices of close reading in detail below.  
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historical periods. To this end, I take seriously the provocation that each text has its own 
kind of perspective—present in what poststructuralists have called “the play of 
language”—that calls to be read closely.  I will suggest in this project that by attending to 
a third perspective—not the critic’s or the author’s, but the text’s—late modern readers 
can apprehend a text’s orientation to the culture in which it was produced and stand to 
learn something new about early modernity that has been hitherto foreclosed. As Frank 
Kermode suggests in The Classic, “the text is under the absolute control of no thinking 
subject,” neither the author nor the reader, and, further, it is “capable of saying more than 
its author meant” (80). The capablility of texts to exceed the agency of author and reader, 
I call textual perspective. I use the term not to suggest that texts have agency in the way 
that human subjects do, but to describe the actions of which a text is capable that result in 
meanings that exceed an author’s intent. The actions of a text may be both indicated and 
evoked, both literal and figurative, both intimately familiar and distinctly unexpected, 
both discernable in the denotations of words on a page and resonant in the connotations 
that vibrate around them.2 I intend the term textual perspective, then, to provoke a 
method of close reading that intersects author-focused criticism and reader-focused 
criticism to articulate a third way of approaching a text that attends to both the formal 
craft of writing as well as the practice of interpretation. I suggest that careful attention to 
textual perspectives helps illuminate the possibilities, the complexities, the ambiguities, 
the fabulous strangeness of language, especially the language of early modern texts.  
In contrast to some author-focused critics interested in form, and in contrast to 
some reader-focused critics interested in how readers reveal themselves in their analyses 
																																																								
2 David Willbern calls this textual force “poetic will.” See his book by that title.  
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or what feelings texts elicit in readers and thereby expose their interpretive and subjective 
vulnerabilities, I argue that moments of ambiguity privilege the perspective of the text 
itself and indicate how a text both protects itself from and is most vulnerable to 
interpretation. That is, when a text deploys ambiguous element that are incomprehensible, 
it prevents the reader from penetrating or interpreting that part of the text. Ambiguity 
functions as a barrier between the text and the reader, a barrier that I call a textual 
immune response. However, insofar as ambiguous textual elements also call for 
interpretation, the barriers they create are also sites of vulnerability, which may constitute 
a textual autoimmune response.3 I understand instances of textual autoimmunity in terms 
similar to explanations of the early modern English development of revenge tragedy. 
Like autoimmune reactions, revenge tragedies work from the inside out because the 
antagonist is part of—and often, in revenge tragedies, in charge of—the community in 
question, the revenger therefore has no official recourse toward defense or retribution 
which leads him to take matters into his own hands, the consequences of which are 
personally and often communally catastrophic.4  More than an artifact that “succeeds at 
its own expense,”  an instance of textual ambiguity stages a form of revenge (3).  
Moreover, I contend that instances of incomprehensibility unsettle the text’s 
cultural ventriloquism, or the ways in which either a text seems to reflect the world view 
of the culture in which it was produced or a culture’s values seem to speak through a text. 
Some interpretations, especially New Historicist, have come to expect and therefore take 
																																																								
3 I build upon Stanley Fish’s understanding of the self-consuming artifact in his book by that title and 
Christopher Ricks’s self-enfolded simile, examined in his Force of Poetry, to suggest that these concepts 
are caused by and perpetuate textual blind spots. 
4 See Catherine Richardson on the difference between and combined development of Elizabethan domestic 
and revenge tragedies (26). 
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for granted this mirroring relationship between texts and cultures. Texts certainly do 
mirror or ventriloquize the cultural narratives that have become commonplace, but to 
assume that texts do this, or only this, is to foreclose the possibility that they may also be 
otherwise oriented to their cultures. I am most interested in the potential for alternative 
textual orientations, especially insofar as texts reveal and conceal meanings in relation to 
their own orientations, how indicative and evocative textual elements can render a text 
immune to interpretation or autoimmune when it summons and succumbs to its own 
vulnerabilities.  
 
READING LIKE THE HAGGARD: FESTE AND WILD CLOSE READING  
Feste, Shakespeare’s fool in Twelfth Night, or What You Will, provides a useful 
example for testing the basic lines of my project’s methodology. In exposing the limits of 
first-person perspective—his own and Duke Orsino’s—Feste models an attempt to 
reorient how he thinks about what he thinks he knows, especially when what he knows is 
strange, counterintuitive, or incomprehensible to others. In her assessment of Feste, Viola 
articulates his aptitude for astute observation and interpretation of overlooked details.  
As Viola parts company with Feste after engaging with him in a street-side battle 
of wits, she ruminates on the wisdom with which Feste must see others in order to 
accomplish his jests. He is not only “wise enough” but also possesses a particularly 
noteworthy “kind of wit” required “to play the fool” (3.1.59-60). Defined neither by 
intelligence nor eloquence, this kind of wit requires Feste’s careful observation. Though 
he shares his folly through clever language, Viola understands Feste to develop his jests 
by observing the moods (the emotional energies or affects) of his fictional audience as 
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well as the circumstances of the immediate situation (the timeliness) and markers of 
social class. As she says, “He must observe their mood on whom he jests, the quality of 
persons, and the time” (3.1.61-2). To play the fool well, then, Feste must read his 
audience and his environment. He articulates a response based on his ability to read these 
elements that are evoked rather than indicated, elements that are inarticulate. Feste, Viola 
suggests, reads the frameworks of ideology, temporality, and affect.5  
Implying that Feste responds with sensitivity to these contexts and also like an 
outsider or one not altogether accustomed to his surroundings, Viola understands the fool 
to be “like the haggard.” As Maurice Pope explains the simile, the haggard and the fool 
both have to test and judge for themselves the potential threats and benefits of their 
environments (139-42).6 Viola suggests that Feste not only examines “every feather,” 
every nuance, every minor detail of his audience and his contexts but does so as a hired 
fool who is privy to the culture of his superiors for whom he performs without 
necessarily having the power to influence that culture.7 In other words, he has a 
perspective that is at both inside and outside of his context, both wild and close at hand. 
The inside-outside perspective is common among Shakespeare’s fools, but Feste also 
functions as a disrupting perspective, one that cannot be anticipated in advance and one 
that provokes others, with more or less success, to reimagine their own perspectives, 
																																																								
5 See below for a detailed explanation of how I understand the term affect.   
6 A haggard is an untamed, newly caught or uncatchable, often female, hawk (OED). Pope suggests that 
Feste is like a haggard in the process of becoming trained or accustomed to his surroundings because he 
“checks” or notices and responds to every feather.   
7 Moreover, Feste reads every detail, not just those that his audience might think significant. Roger Warren 
and Stanley Wells imply that this is the case a few lines prior to Viola’s assessments of the fool. In their 
Oxford World Classics edition of the play, they note that Feste even “sees through Viola’s disguise” as the 
young man, Cesario, when he prays, “Jove in his next commodity of hair send thee a beard” (3.1.44). See 
Warren and Wells’s note on this line (155). 
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attitudes, and roles.8 He takes license to criticize his fictional audience and does so at his 
own peril, should he speak too freely.9 Feste reads from a position that is not transcendent 
but ambivalent, at once powerful and vulnerable.  
Feste reveals the stakes of this ambivalent position at the end of the play when he 
confounds Duke Orsino with a counterintuitive analysis of the difference between friends 
and foes. Orsino expects the friends to help and the foes to hurt, but Feste has something 
stranger in mind. He says,  
Marry, sir, [my friends] praise me, and make an ass of me. Now my foes 
tell me plainly I am an ass, so that by my foes, sir, I profit in the 
knowledge of myself, and by my friends I am abused. (5.1.15-20)  
In this speech, Feste is concerned with perceptions: his own and those of others. Feste’s 
friends tell him what he either already knows about himself or would like to believe. 
They confirm or amplify his first-person biases and encourage a vain, unexamined first-
person perspective. Feste’s friends fail him because they allow him to remain ignorant of 
his faults. Feste reads the familiar and comfortable paths of their praise as abuse, yet he 
reads the uncomfortable abuse he receives from his enemies as profit. Feste seems to 
realize that he can benefit from examining those encounters he might rather ignore and, 
furthermore, that his friends confirm while his enemies refute what he would like to 
																																																								
8 He is successful, for instance, with Olivia when he shows her the folly of mourning her brother in the first 
act, but his logic in the final act, which I discuss in detail below, is lost on Duke Orsino.  
9 Consider, for example, the fool in Lear: he clearly and repeatedly judges Lear’s foolishness for his 
reaction against Cordelia, and Lear responds with threats of violence (see 4.90-172). The 2013 Oregon 
Shakespeare Festival production of Lear manages the fool’s disappearance from the play by suggesting that 
the king unwittingly fulfills his promised violence by accidentally killing him in a blind rage aimed against 
his daughters in scene 13.   
Falstaff, whom I discuss later in this project, takes similar license with Prince Hal. Falstaff is also punished 
once Hal takes the throne as King Henry V and publically rejects his old friend.   
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believe. His enemies tell him what he may not want to know about himself and present a 
perspective that challenges his own.  
 Feste benefits from the criticism of his enemies because they tell him straight that 
he is foolish, but he must be willing to hear this criticism. He profits, then, by knowing 
himself better, and he is better off than those who attend only to what they want to 
believe. Feste’s explanation reveals that he wants to know what he does not know about 
himself, and it is his enemies rather than his friends who are most willing to supply that 
knowledge. In both cases, Feste must read what is said and also what is not said, what is 
indicated and what is evoked. If he reads praise as abuse or abuse as profit, he cannot 
arrive at those readings by attending to content alone. He must also attend to the limits of 
what that content can say, to costs and benefits for himself and for those speaking to him, 
and to the moods implicated for himself and for others. In order to profit, Feste must be 
willing to entertain criticism, not just withstand it.  He must be willing, in other words, to 
make himself vulnerable.  
Though Feste does not explicitly state his willingness to entertain criticism, his 
speech implies that if he does take criticism seriously, he can benefit from it and avoid 
being made an ass even though he may nonetheless be called one. As a fool, Feste’s job 
is to be an ass, yet that is not the function Feste’s character tends to play in the text, and it 
is not a role that his character embraces. His response to Orsino implies that he does not 
want to be an ass because he reads as abuse the praise that he understands to be making 
him an ass. Rather than the role of ass, the function Feste’s character takes is one of 
disrupter, or, as he says, “corrupter of words” (3.134-5). Furthermore, his wit and 
seeming self-reflective tendencies discussed above do not lend to understanding his 
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character as clumsy, conceited, ignorant, or stupid, but the exact opposite of these 
defining terms of the proverbial ass.10 When his friends praise him, they certainly make 
him appear foolish, and therefore like an ass. In his counterintuitive understanding of 
friends and enemies, he causes himself to appear absurdly inconsistent to Orsino. But, as 
I show here, Feste’s contradictions create the circumstances by which he and others can 
come to counterintuitive and uncomfortable conclusions that lead to more nuanced 
understanding.   
Orsino cannot understand the reversal that Feste spins when he claims to profit 
from his enemies because Orsino refuses to take a similar risk. Feste, however, takes this 
risk a step further. When Feste recites for Orsino the example of his own conversion of 
vulnerability into power by way of his enemies’ abuse, he suggests a coded criticism of 
the play’s highest-ranking figure.11 Orsino has demanded praise and even praised himself 
in this play and is, therefore, in Feste’s estimation, an ass. This is not the only time Feste 
criticizes Orsino in this play. In a prior episode, Feste performs an “old and antic song” at 
Orsino’s request, after which he pronounces a benediction of judgment on the Duke:  
Now the melancholy god protect thee, and the tailor make thee a doublet 
of changeable taffeta, for thy mind is a very opal. I would have men of 
such constancy put to sea, that their business might be everything, and 
their intent everywhere, for that’s it that always makes a good voyage of 
nothing. (2.4.3, 71-77)  
Despite Orsino’s single-minded pursuit of love and despite his insistence that he is an 
incomparable lover, Feste suggests that the Duke is internally moody, externally variable 
																																																								
10 See the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of ass, n. 
11 Feste is not, after all, the Duke’s “allowed fool,” so Olivia’s claim that “there is no slander” does not 
apply (1.5.88-89). For Feste, then, to wield the power of his self-knowledge to criticize the Duke is to court 
his own undoing.  
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and unreliable, and entirely inconstant, that he makes his intentions everything and 
thereby renders them meaningless.  
 Orsino reads Feste’s strange analysis of friends and foes as nonsense. He 
respond’s to Feste in a way that refuses to understand Feste’s point, first when Orsino 
says “Just the contrary—the better for thy friends” (5.1.12). Identifying himself with the 
false, flattering friends, the duke confirms his misunderstanding. He tells Feste that his 
assessment is “excellent” thereby praising him and making an ass of him just as Feste 
complains his friends do. Feste denies this excellence and calls out Orsino for behaving 
like a friend when he responds, “By my troth, sir, no, though it please you to be one of 
my friends” (5.1.22-3). Orsino concludes the exchange by denying once again the logic 
of Feste’s original assessment, claiming “Thou shalt not be the worse for me,” and 
thereby exhibiting his ungracious, limited reading skills and his unwillingness to learn 
from perspectives that challenge his own (5.1.24).  
 Orsino demonstrates these deficits throughout the play. Consider, for instance, his 
insistent wooing of Olivia and refusal to hear her rejection from his ambassadors—first 
Valentine and then Viola disguised as Cesario—starting at 1.1.23 when he solicits news 
from Valentine who has been attempting to woo Olivia on Orsino’s behalf. He does, 
however, approach the vulnerable position of accepting influence from Viola in 2.4, but 
her own fear of vulnerable exposure thwarts his ability to learn from this experience. He 
shows marked change in attention to her story instead of his own superiority as a lover 
shifts in tone from condescending or scoffing (“What dost thou know?”) to curious (And 
what’s her history?”) to concerned (“But died your sister of her love, my boy?”) (2.4.104, 
109, 119). But Viola cuts off this scene in which she codes her love for him by explaining 
	 10 
her experience through a story of her hypothetical sister who loved a man, and Orsino 
once again takes up his fruitless pursuit of Olivia. While Feste can see the potential 
benefits of a vulnerable position, Orsino cannot.  
 The analysis of Feste and Orsino’s street-side scene, with its instruments of abuse 
and the ambiguous figures that respond and correspond to them, is just one example of 
the way this project addresses the concerns of interpretation and the orienting functions 
of textual perspective. What Feste shows is that he knows his perspective is limited and 
potentially flawed, and he arrives at self-knowledge by reorienting how he reads his 
friends and his enemies. In his encounter with Orsino, Feste provides a useful example of 
how I intend to read the potential threats and benefits available in early modern texts. In 
addition to exposing the limits of first-person perspective to reorient how he thinks about 
what he thinks he knows, Feste also abuses the interpretive sensibilities of Orsino 
because the duke finds the claim that Feste is “the worse for [his] friends and the better 
for [his] foes” incongruent and incomprehensible (5.1.21-22). Furthermore, Feste uses 
this strange assessment to expose his own defensive orientation to other instruments of 
abuse: false friends and faulty self-knowledge on the one hand, and the risk of self-
blindness entailed in ignoring one’s assumptions on the other. He not only defends 
himself against the abuses perpetrated by his friends—by whom he directly claims that he 
is abused. He also defends himself against himself and the biases of his own perspective 
by attempting to learn from the fact that he may not want to hear “plainly that [he is] an 
ass” and acknowledging that to entertain this abuse is to “profit in the knowledge of” 
himself. This implication is resonant in his explanation to Orsino, and it is the very 
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counterintuitive point that the duke not only seems to find ambiguous but also refuses to 
try to understand.  
Feste as both reader and corrupter of words bears on my project as a textual 
function rather than as a representation of a person. His embodiment as a character is 
formal rather than physical, marked by language of wit and riddle rather than physical 
description. His textual position transgresses the boundary between inside participant in 
the narrative of the play and outside observer. His textual form, then, is exactly like the 
haggard: able to engage within the confines of a set environment while nonetheless 
transgressing those confines. Even in service to others, like the haggard, Feste remains 
wild and strange. Yet Feste offers an interpretive protocol that models a method of close 
reading ambiguity for others within his own text. 
 
THE POTENTIAL OF EARLY MODERN PASSIONS: READING RHETORICAL AFFECT 
Though much of the critical work on early modern affect has hinged on 
assessments of humoral theory, a relatively recent and still under-theorized shift in early 
modern affect studies has seen a move away from embodied and medicalized treatments 
of emotion in favor of exploring affect’s rhetorical underpinnings for early modern 
writers.12 My project suggests a return to form in light of critical approaches that 
																																																								
12 Benedict Robinson, Daniel Gross, and Thomas Dixon are a few of the critics who have recently called 
for a rhetorical approach to early modern affect, in contrast to the work on early modern humoral theories 
of the passions by theorists like Gail Kern Pastor, Mary Floyd-Wilson, and others.  
Ben Saunders also approaches a formalization of desire in his Desiring Donne: Poetry, Sexuality, 
Interpretation. Saunders suggests that bodily responses are effected by the formalization of affect, that 
affect cannot be understood as something natural and existing prior to social order, which he says structure 
the ways in which affects may be available to be felt and articulated. Eliding affect with human feeling and 
the concept formal with what might be considered socially proper, he explains the ways in which language 
is related to affect by analogy, showing how the forms taken by eating rituals inform bodily feelings like 
hunger and disgust.  
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privilege the reader, body, identity, and context. In effect, my project reassesses W. K. 
Wimsatt Jr. and M. C. Beardsley’s concerns in “The Affective Fallacy.” In Wimsatt and 
Beardsley’s words,  
The Affective Fallacy is a confusion between the poem and its results 
(what it is and what it does), a special case of epistemological skepticism, 
though usually advanced as if it had far stronger claims than the overall 
forms of skepticism. It begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism 
from the psychological effects and ends in impressionism and relativism. 
The outcome…is that the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical 
judgment, tends to disappear (31, emphasis original).  
While I am skeptical of their distinction between what a poem is and what it does in some 
circumstances, I am sympathetic to their point that what a text makes a reader feel is 
beside the point of textual criticism. It is, perhaps, a cultural side-effect of their 
pronouncement that Fredric Jameson evokes when he claims that affect is waning in 
postmodernity, in his Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. While 
affect studies continues to face criticisms that expressly reject the vagueness of some of 
their assertions, the current vogue of Affect Theory suggests that Jameson was mistaken 
to disregard the ways in which affect impacts culture, such that newer texts in the field 
explicitly express the need to no longer even acknowledge Jameson’s pronouncement. 
Eugenie Brinkema, for instance, opens the preface to her recent project, The Forms of the 
Affects, with “Is there any remaining doubt that we are fully within the Episteme of the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
While I agree with Saunders, this is not the kind of affective form my project addresses. His project 
presupposes a human (or a representation of a human) subject managing human feelings, which my project 
distinguishes from both affect and emotion, concepts that other early modern critics also tend to merge. I 
discuss this distinction in greater detail below. My project attempts instead to understand textual affect 
through a text’s formal habits and orientations. Thus, I am not concerned with the destruction or 
preservation or transformation of feeling when it is translated into the forms of language.  
Also influential to my thinking about affect and form, Eugenie Brinkema’s work on form and affect in film 
asserts that this rhetorical shift in affect studies is happening in all kinds of textual criticisms that 
investigate affect, across period, genre, and medium.   
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Affect? Must one even begin an argument anymore by refuting Fredric Jameson’s 
infamous description of the ‘waning of affect’ in postmodernity?” (xi). My own concerns 
with the tendency of critical inattention to its own biases, as well as the concerns of most 
opponents to Affect Theory’s vague appropriation of readerly feeling as a useful critical 
tool, echoes the concerns of Wimsatt and Beardsley, who were reacting against similar 
tendencies in the prior generation of literary critics. Furthermore, I similarly contend that, 
when one interprets a work of literature based on readerly feeling or even on historical 
evidence that fills gaps left in the text, one does not actually interpret the early modern 
text but instead reads and interprets another reader reading a text. Thus my project 
responds to reader-focused theories of affect that more or less still read texts for how they 
make a reader feel, while also calling for renewed skepticism of the often implicit, but 
remarkably New Critical, insistence on the authority of the critic (or reader) that persists 
among early modern critics and that privileges the critic’s reading over the potential 
meanings of the text.  
While my project’s emphasis on ambiguous elements finds footing in the recent 
return to formalism among literary critics, I propose that a reconsideration of formalism 
by way of the affective turn in current early modern scholarship could further illuminate a 
text’s orientation within the culture in which it was produced.13 My project engages with 
the questions proffered by early modern critics interested in this turn, questions that 
																																																								
13 William Empson and Erich Auerbach are notable formalists who also attended to cultural and material 
contexts in the heyday of New Criticism, both of whom, in addition to the critics and movements named 
above, influence my project. As is clear from the attention to readerly and textual orientations sustained so 
far in this chapter, my return to form does not seek to ignore context nor to concretize formal readings 
according to a conservative agenda akin to that of early twentieth-century American New Critics. Instead, I 
deploy attention to form as a tactic for expanding the possibilities for readings while also preventing to 
possibilities from wandering too far afield from meaningful, critical examination.   
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Heather Dubrow makes plain in her forward to a recent Palgrave volume devoted to New 
Formalisms and Literary Theory:   
New Formalists pose questions about agency: To what extent is the author 
responsible? The audience? The culture? Similar questions arise as well in 
endeavors ranging from performance criticism to the recent interest in 
cognitive theory and the study of visualities. Debates about how form 
relates to historical and political pressures, the inquiry that many see as the 
core of a New Formalism, have been of interest to feminists, other 
students of gender, and, of course, materialist critics (viii).  
Focusing on textual perspectives, my project offers to early modern literary and affect 
studies a method of analysis that interprets affect in and as textual form rather than as 
readerly feeling. In other words, my project returns to formal analysis that attends to 
textual perspective on culture as it is mediated by what I am calling rhetorical affect.   
 Rhetorical affect neither captures the odd idea that a text itself has feelings nor is 
the term concerned with how a text elicits feelings in a reader. Instead, rhetorical affect 
refers to the evocative, suggested, but not directly stated, and often ambiguous meanings 
that underlie a textual perspective. To clarify, I differentiate the term affect from feeling 
and emotion following the delineations posed by two affect theorists: Brian Massumi and 
Eugenie Brinkema. Massumi supplies affect theory with a basic definition of these terms, 
but one that remains fluid enough that it risks rendering affect studies so open as to be 
meaningless. Brinkema, in The Forms of the Affects, combats the problem of 
formlessness in Massumi’s definition of affect that is not a problem for his delineations of 
feeling and emotion.14 His differentiation of affect from feeling and emotion is 
nonetheless useful for distinguishing the difference I will draw between bodily sensations 
and rhetorical affect.  
																																																								
14 I discuss Brinkema’s criticism of Massumi’s (and other Deleuzian theorists’) understanding of affect 
below. 
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Following Massumi’s basic delineations of these terms, I understand feeling as the 
individual, bodily encounters with sensations that one recognizes and names based on 
prior experiences. One names these experiences with terms like anger, fear, joy, and 
sadness. Thus, without language one does not have feelings because one cannot name 
them, but one can express emotions that may be interpreted by others. When others read 
these unarticulated expressions, they are not witnessing feeling but affect. Others, 
according to Massumi, interpret this affect based on their own prior experiences with 
their own feelings and with their interpretations of other emotional displays. Emotion is 
the display of these named bodily feelings that may be performed for and interpreted by 
others. Sometimes emotions express the feelings of a person, but sometimes emotions 
express the socially appropriate feeling response to a situation and do not correspond to 
actual feelings. Sincere or contrived, emotion is social, while feeling is personal; affect is 
neither personal nor social but pre-social.15 He defines affect following Deleuze and 
Guattari, and also Baruch Spinoza, as “an ability to affect and be affected;” it is not a 
personal feeling but “a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one 
experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in 
that body’s capacity to act” (xvi, emphasis mine). He defines affection as “each such state 
considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting body (with 
body taken in its broadest possible sense to include mental or ‘ideal’ bodies)” (xvi). 
Affect refers to the underlying potential of both feelings and emotions. Massumi 
proposes that affect is also preconscious and equates affect with intensities that one could 
eventually recognize and name as feelings (Parables 30). It mediates the relationships 
																																																								
15 This is Massumi’s insight articulated in his introductory remarks on his translation of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
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between individual people, societies, and environments. Eric Shouse explains, “affect is 
what makes feelings feel…In short, affect plays an important role in determining the 
relationship between our bodies, our environment, and others, and the subjective 
experience that we feel/think as affect dissolves into experience” (7, 11). Usefully, 
philosopher Matthew Radcliffe explains the concept of mood in similar terms. In “The 
Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life,” Ratcliffe argues that scholars have 
neglected the ways in which mood and emotion are terms that name different phenomena. 
Some moods, he argues, are not personal or subjective feelings, “not intentional states at 
all” but pre-intentional, “part of the background structure of intentionality and … 
presupposed by the possibility of intentionally directed emotions” (350). Moods are that 
through which we experience the world. He then goes on to argue that ‘deep’ moods, 
unlike emotions in this respect too, are pre-intentional, non-conceptual bodily feelings 
which provide “space[s] of significant possibility” (367). Affect, then, refers to 
something unknown, something that has been neither felt nor articulated, but something, I 
argue, that might be approachable from a textual subjective position by attending to 
instances of ambiguity that evoke something that cannot be anticipated. 
An oft-noted problem for Deleuzian-influenced affect theorists is that they tend to 
understand affect as a generality, as formless potential that can describe the ways in 
which literature, for instance, moves readers rather than transmits meaning. Eugenie 
Brinkema, however, suggests that the formlessness of these affective approaches causes 
them to lose not only specificity but also “the wild and many fecundities of specificity: 
difference, change, the particular, the contingent (and) the essential, the definite, the 
distinct, all dense details, and—[evoking just] the spirit of Deleuze—the minor, 
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inconsequential, secret, atomic” (Brinkema xv, emphasis original).16 She further argues 
that this loss results in tedious arguments, chiefly arguments based on abstractions akin to 
readerly feeling rather than on “any particular textual workings” (Brinkema xiii).17 She 
calls for a formalization of affect to combat this impulse in current affect theory, which, 
for her, “offer[s] all repetition with no difference” and therefore no meaning (Brinkema 
xiii). Grounding her work in a much older tradition of rhetorical theory, Brinkema argues 
that assigning a vocabulary of form to what other theorists have claimed is formless 
despite being textual helps affect theorists specify difference and transform textual affect 
“into something [neither] given in advance, [nor] apprehendable except through the 
thickets of formalist analysis” (xv).  In other words, Brinkema’s solution deploys formal, 
textual analysis to preempt the major criticisms of Affect Theory. By linking affect to 
textual form, Brinkema avoids a theory of affect that relies on readerly feeling, and 
therefore on the confirmation of biases already present in advance of reading, while also 
articulating an analysis of evocative meanings that have heretofore seemed 
unapprehendable because these meanings had been identified only as subjective readerly 
responses to intensity. Brinkema’s method instead grounds textual affect in rhetorical 
																																																								
16 Brinkema treats “affect not as a matter of expression, not as a matter of sensation for a spectator—in fact, 
not as a matter of spectatorship at all” but regards affect “as a fold, which is another way of saying that 
affect will be read for as forms” (36). 
17 Brinkema’s criticism here represents a major complaint common among other kinds of literary critics 
against the vague or contingent readings affect theory seems sometimes to produce. See, for instance, Ruth 
Leys’s “The Turn to Affect: A Critique” in which Leys interrogates the claims of recent affect theorists, 
such as Massumi, that affect exists separately from meaning. Other works that have been critical of affect 
theorists’ lack of specificity include Claire Hemmings’s “Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the 
Ontological Turn,” which responds with skepticism to both Massumi and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s affect 
theories;  Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard’s, “Biology’s Gift: Interrogating the Turn to Affect,” 
which specifically criticizes Massumi’s tendency toward confirmation bias when appropriating the insights 
of neuroscience in order to develop his theory of affect, and, more recently, Daniel Gross’s The Secret 
History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” to Modern Brain Science and  Martha Nussbaum’s 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. 
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form. Following Brinkema, my project examines the instances of textual affect that are 
potentially discoverable in occurrences of substantive and formal ambiguity.  
I am interested, then, in a text’s vacillation between what it knows, so to speak, 
but hides and what it does not know but nonetheless reveals. I discuss these 
epistemological concerns in detail below. In brief, what a text knows, it either directly 
asserts or else hides in figurative language; what a text does not know, it might reveal in 
patterns, sounds, cuts or other formal elements that do not necessarily articulate, but 
nonetheless suggest, meaning. These vacillations between what a text knows and what it 
does not are important because they suggest that textual ambiguity is one result of 
tensions in the thematic center of a text. Each text I examine in this study foregrounds 
ambiguity at the intersections of substantive crises of immunity and autoimmunity. By 
substantive instances of immunity and autoimmunity, I refer to the ways in which the 
narratives of a text are driven by plots that involve outside attacks—whether from outside 
of a community, a family, or an individual—that elicit defensive immune responses, or 
by plots that involve self-destructive autoimmune responses. Some textual narratives are 
driven by both kinds of plots. Such intra-textual crises threaten annihilation of 
communities from within kingdoms, from within families, and from within individual 
bodies: crises involving, for instance, the disruptive rule of inept kings, the presumed 
misrule imposed by the friends of new and future kings, the illness and finality 
approaching at the end of one’s life. The texts I write about include Christopher 
Marlowe’s Edward the Second, William Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, and John 
Donne’s Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions and select Songs and Sonnets. This project 
also briefly considers Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night and The Tempest as well as John 
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Webster’s The Duchess of Malfi. Each text in question evokes ambiguity in rhetorical 
forms and structures that frame these crises. The vacillations of ambiguity between form 
and thematics, I argue, suggest that each text’s affective orientations are themselves 
ambivalent: wavering between extremes of vulnerability and defense, attraction and 
repulsion.18 My analysis suggests, then, that each text orients itself to the culture in which 
it was produced by formalizing an ambivalent affect, namely disgust.  
Far from naming simply a rejection or repulsion, disgust simultaneously names an 
attraction or a desire.19 In “Sexual Disgust,” Jonathan Dollimore articulates the 
ambivalence of disgust through Freud and Bataille and argues that “the relationship 
between desire and disgust is especially significant in the arena of sexuality where 
complex responses are at once registered, concealed and indeed repressed in that 
misleadingly simple designation, ‘sexual preference’” (47). Dollimore picks up the 
problematic implications of Peter Stallybrass's and Allon White's influential assertion in 
The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, that “disgust always bears the imprint of 
desire,” in order to articulate a resistance to a simple Freudian understanding of this 
																																																								
18 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ambivalent as “having either or both of two contrary or parallel 
values, qualities or meanings; entertaining contradictory emotions (as love and hatred) towards the same 
person or thing; acting on or arguing for sometimes one and sometimes the other of two opposites; 
equivocal.” Though the word itself was not in current usage in the early modern period, the Oxford English 
Dictionary links ambivalence to synonymous words that were in use, and pertinent to my project, including 
ambiguity, doubleness, and indifferency. 
Though ambivalence is often not regarded as a useful textual feature, I discuss below how Stephen Orgel 
finds it useful. Furthermore, Amelie Rorty in “A Plea for Ambivalence” similarly suggests that 
ambivalence can be worth preserving and even constructive for greater civic good.  
Of course, texts can be oriented in relation to their cultures in many, and even contradictory, ways. This 
project is particularly interested in the ways in which textual orientations may be ambivalent. Therefore, it 
focuses on orientations within this frame. However, this project is also concerned with the ways in which 
orientations may neglect their blind spots. Thus, I acknowledge this focus as a blind spot within this 
project, one to which future projects may be better suited to attend.  
19 Disgust is also an affect concerned also with orientations, toward and against. Attending to the disgusting 
helps a reader see the blind spots involved in the turning of these orientations. 
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statement, a resistance that I maintain despite asserting a similar relationship between the 
two terms (Stallybrass and White 191; Dollimore 55 n. 7). In addition to these studies, 
newer projects highlight the ambivalence of disgust. In her editorial introduction to the 
special edition of the journal Film-Philosophy, entitled “The Disgust Issue,” Tina Kendall 
writes that disgust is “a form both of repulsion (inciting nauseated recoil and rejection) 
and attraction (sticky and contagious, it entices us to look, to linger, to tarry with the 
disgusting thing)” and that this ambivalence “makes it a particularly useful focal point for 
some of the questions that have concerned film theory and philosophy in recent years” 
(2).20 While Sianne Ngai expressly states in Ugly Feelings that disgust is an “intense and 
unambivalent negativity” and that disgust differs from desire, offering “an entirely 
different set of aesthetic and critical possibilities… and a different set of limitations,” she 
also acknowledges that “artists as well as philosophers have demonstrated that desire and 
disgust are dialectically conjoined” (353, 345, 332, emphasis mine). She turns to 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment to explain how desire and disgust are 
interdependent and, at times, interchangeable, suggesting despite her claims otherwise 
that her concept of disgust is in fact ambivalent (353).21  
In his study of disgust in early modern literature, “Disgust C. 1600,” Benedict 
Robinson emphasizes the ambivalence of disgust for early moderns. He understands 
																																																								
20 Appearing in the same issue, Jennifer Barker’s article, “Chew on This: Disgust, Delay, and the 
Documentary Image in Food, Inc.,” emphasizes that this documentary formalizes the ambivalence of 
disgust. Similarly, Brinkema deploys a formalist analysis of what she calls this “paradox of disgust” and 
credits Austrian phenomenologist Aurel Kolnai (in Der Ekel) with bridging the gap between two 
philosophical positions on disgust: “the prohibitive accounts of the eighteenth-century aestheticians and the 
revaluations of the twentieth-century anti-metaphysicians” (161, 166).  
21 This brief account of disgust’s ambivalent contours shows that disgust attracts and repulses similarly to 
the ways in which the kinds of literature that Derrida calls untranslatable in “Des Tours” both solicit and 
reject translation. Disgust, then, is formally aligned not only with the potential of affect generally but also 
the perspectival category of the unknown unknown, a concept discussed in detail below. 
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disgust as satiated desire, and the resulting repulsion for the once desired object and 
explores how disgust is an important and newly emerging word in English at the turn of 
the seventeenth century (554). Specifically naming the ambivalence of disgust, he writes, 
“At once desire’s opposite and a form of desire, disgust complicates the pursuit of clarity 
in the analysis of passion” (Robinson 555). My analysis of early modern disgust suggests 
that a disgust response is formalized in certain texts that display disgust in all its 
ambivalence, both attracted to and repulsed by the networks of power in their culture, and 
depicting both the vulnerability of individuals and their power to judge and influence 
their situations.22 The ambivalence of disgust signals a different orientation than a 
mimetic one of celebratory attraction or condemnatory repulsion that attempts to translate 
the text’s concerns into the familiar delineations of allegory, for instance. Textual disgust 
suggests instead a text’s defensive, even passively resistant, orientation to the concerns of 
the larger culture that are central to the environments of the texts in question.23 In The 
Transmission of Affect, Teresa Brennan understands affect to name an evaluation, a 
judgment, a discernment, an intuition, a perspective, and, in short, an orientation (5).  My 
project, then, is concerned with perspectives—a text’s, its culture’s, and its readers’—and 
their orientations relative to each other. 
																																																								
22 Ngai also attempts to formalize affect in relationship to orientation, reading for “a literary or cultural 
artifact’s feeling tone: its global or organizing affect, its general disposition or orientation toward its 
audience and the world” (28). However, as Brinkema suggests, “th[is] strength of Ugly Feelings is also its 
greatest limitation” (35). Ngai’s project proposes to read at affect as form, but, as Brinkema notes, it attends 
to forms “solely insofar as they explain the ugly feelings felt by a reader or spectator” (Brinkema 35).The 
problem is that Ngai is not reading affect as a formal element of a text, she is reading how texts elicit 
feelings in a reader.    
23 Brinkema reports that Kolnai similarly understands disgust “as an aversive or defensive reaction” (160).  
I first encountered the term “textual environment” in a poetics colloquium lead by Karen Ford. I follow her 
use to describe the text as an environment in which textual components are entangled in complicated 
codependent, contradictory, or other relative relationships.  
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THE PROBLEM OF TEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE: ORIENTING A METHODOLOGY  
Every orientation or perspective necessarily entails blind spots. Indeed, all 
individual perspectives are inherently flawed. In a nutshell, the problem with first-person 
perspective is that it is not only biased but vulnerable to being most likely to be wrong 
when it is most certain it is right. Dependent upon one’s own perspective, one risks the 
possibility that a first-person point of view could be deceived, that it stands as a limiting 
factor rather than a foundational starting point for reading anything: experiences or texts. 
Open to deception without knowing it is being deceived, a first-person perspective is not 
only blind to what it does not know, it is blind to what it does not even know it does not 
know. No perspective, critical or textual, escapes this vulnerability.24 My project 
investigates the ways in which ambiguous textual elements negotiate these shortcomings 
of perception in order to articulate a textually grounded interpretive method that 
acknowledges this vulnerability and, moreover, renders itself vulnerable when it cracks 
open the brackets that have limned critical debates.  
The infamous Donald Rumsfeld quotation with which I opened this chapter 
provides an unexpected frame for the project’s perspectival and epistemological 
concerns. Excerpted from a 2002 press conference in which Jim Miklaszewski, NBC 
																																																								
24 My own project is, of course, subject to this vulnerability. The vulnerability that I articulate here is not 
the same as the critical worry of New Historicist critics that one cannot apprehend the past because one can 
only interpret the past through a present perspective. See for example Lois Tyson’s point in Critical Theory 
Today: 
the inevitability of personal bias makes it imperative that new historicists be aware of and as 
forthright as possible about their own psychological and ideological positions relative to the 
material they analyze so that their readers can have some idea of the human ‘lens’ through which 
they are viewing the historical issues at hand” (289). 
The worry over historical distance is, obviously, an area of blindness that has been recognized as such. I am 
suggesting something different and perhaps simpler: that perspectives necessarily have blind spots that 
remain unacknowledged, and that lack of acknowledgment creates vulnerability. I am interested, 
nonetheless, in what has been obscured by these biases that emerge by virtue of one’s historical position.     
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Pentagon correspondent, asks what evidence the Secretary of Defense had that Iraq was 
funneling Weapons of Mass Destruction to terrorist organizations, Rumsfeld refuses to 
answer directly.25 His response has been maligned as a non-answer, as nonsense, as 
meaningless. Over time, though, this quip achieved higher status as a result of the 
contemporary sound-bite culture that extracts statements from their contexts, rendering 
this statement a “brilliantly pithy piece of popular epistemology” according to New York 
Times writer David A. Graham. Though Rumsfeld does not answer the reporters’ direct 
questions, he identifies the epistemological underpinnings of the correspondent’s inquiry. 
He articulates a simple way of understanding how one may be oriented to knowledge and 
perception, one that has been visualized for some time by theorists of group dynamics in 
a diagram called the Johari Window (see Figure 1.1 below), and, moreover, one that is 
useful for visualizing critical and textual perspectives. The Rumsfeldian/Joharian rubric 
offers a useful frame for understanding how literary texts may be oriented to the cultures 
that produced them and how critics may be oriented toward texts, and helps visually 
organize the potential readings available in what has been obscured by those 
orientations.26 Applied either as it was intended to the perspective of an individual or, as I 
suggest, to a textual perspective, each pane explains one perspective relative to the 




25 See Errol Morris’s opinion piece, “The Certainty of Donald Rumsfeld (Part 1),” published online in the 
New York Times March 25, 2014. 
26 My discussion of the Johari window is indebted to A. Samuel Kimball, who first acquainted me with the 
usefulness of this model for literary study. See his article, coauthored with Timothy Donovan and Jillian 
Smith, entitled “The Fog of War: What Yet Remains.”  
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Known to Self  Unknown to Self 
 
 Known to Others 
 
 Unknown to Others 
 
Figure 1.1 The Johari Window.  
 
Intended to describe how humans interact from different perspectives in a group setting, 
and named for its creators, Joseph Luft and Harry Ingham, the Johari Window is 
explained by Luft in Group Processes. This figure replicates Luft’s Figure 5.1 (60). 
 
 
The open pane contains what a person consciously knows about herself and what 
other people in the group know about her. These are, in Rumsfeldian terms, the known 
knowns that everyone can know, regardless of perspectival biases. These known knowns 
may be surface features (the observation, for instance that a person has red hair) or often-
displayed traits (like an observable tendency of a person to be shy around strangers). For 
textual perspectives, this pane includes the facts of the text: the plot, or the names of the 
characters, for example. Critics may address these textual elements in commentary, but 
the observable givens of a text are not necessarily debatable.  
Whereas the open pane involves the readerly practices of observation and 
commentary, the hidden pane involves the critical practices of analysis. The hidden pane 
contains what a person consciously knows about herself but keeps secret from other 










not know.27 For a person, these hidden elements might include, among other things, 
invisible ailments (like an intermittent mental illness or early stages of cancer) or 
personal history that one chooses not to share with others. From a textual perspective, this 
pane includes textual elements that are available in figurative language, elements that 
must be identified as such and analyzed, their referents often translated into what the 
critic herself already knows about the text or its culture. Critics tend to focus on the 
hidden pane, on the knowable unknowns that the critic recognizes are available for 
interpretation. The critic working in this category operates under the assumptions that the 
text reveals something about its context by replicating it in figurative language and that 
this coded replication is available to be translated.   
 Similarly, the blind pane is concerned with the ways in which individual 
perceptions may be coded and thus also may be initially, but not only, addressed through 
analysis and translation. The blind pane contains what a person does not consciously 
know about herself but what other people know about her. These are also known 
unknowns (known to others, but unknown to oneself) and may include unconscious 
habits or nervous tics that a person displays and that others can see, or pertinent 
information about a person that has not yet been revealed to her, like a medical prognosis 
prior to consulting with a doctor.28 For texts, the difference between the hidden and blind 
panes has to do with the perspective of the text and its blindnesses. In the hidden pane, 
																																																								
27 Others know, nonetheless, that these hidden facets of a person exist and that they may at some point be 
revealed.  
28 Information moves into the open pane from the hidden pane when a person shares secrets about herself, 
for instance, and from the blind pane when others reveal information about herself to her, as when parents 
tell their children the circumstances of their birth.  
	 26 
the text formalizes its objects of analysis in figurative language that may be mined by the 
reader; in the blind pane the text evokes or performs the elements under investigation. 
  If we were to think about this in terms of a third perspective, the author’s, the 
hidden pane contains meanings the author intended to hide and is aware are hidden in 
figurative language. Similarly, the textual perspective would be aware, so to speak, of 
these meanings because they are perceptibly stated as figures that may be named, 
categorized, and interpreted. The blind pane, in contrast, contains meanings that a reader 
might glean that the author did not know were available and that the text suggests without 
directly or even figuratively stating. These meanings are most often evident in formal 
structures and patterns. For instance, this sentence of mine evokes but does not directly 
indicate a gendered bias that remains at odds with the masculinized biases of at least my 
pop-cultural if not my professional context when it replaces “literary critic” with the 
pronoun “she” since no gendered orientation is implied by that title. For a literary 
example, take these lines of Edmund’s in Lear as an example in which formal elements 
amplify the textual content to evoke additional meaning:  
Here stood he in the dark, his sharp sword out,  
Warbling of wicked charms, conjuring the moon 
To stand’s auspicious mistress. (6.37-39) 
In this passage, meant to accuse the innocent Edgar of violent intent, the sounds and 
meanings of Edmund’s words work together to create an effect that the text does not 
directly articulate. The sibilant sounds—stood, his, sharp, sword, charms, stand’s, 
auspicious, and mistress—are enhanced by the alliterative H to facilitate an effect of 
hissing. This combined with the prolonged vowel sounds create an effect of thickness or 
heaviness. Add to this the heaviness of the repeated vowel sounds and Edmund’s speech 
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drags readers (and Gloucester) down into the gravity of his actions here. As soon as 
Gloucester is hooked, mid line (“But where is he?”) Edmund’s language need not persist 
with its evocative repetition. The passage evokes the sinister intent of Edmund’s story 
(which is false, as readers know, but Gloucester does not). The passage suggests 
meanings, then, that are available in but not directly articulated by the text. The literary 
critic might be working in this pane when she identifies something in a text that the text 
itself does not thematize but enacts, like unstated biases that may replicate, oppose, or be 
otherwise oriented to the biases of the culture in which the text was created. However, the 
critical work that uncovers these biases complicates the problem of blindness because it 
is particularly disposed to replicating the biases of the critic.29 Thus, this pane categorizes 
instances of a text and of the critic negotiating self-blindness, enacting but not necessarily 
acknowledging the problems of their own first-person perspective. The failure to 
acknowledge one’s own blind spots, I argue, often leads readers either to ignore or to 
resolve textual ambiguities rather than engaging with and reveling in their strangeness. 
Though some critics avoid or else tame ambiguity because they do not like it, their 
aversion is exactly the problem.30 Put differently, our own critical perspectives put 
blinders on us that often go unacknowledged. The critic caught in this pane risks not only 
replicating the problems of first-person perspective and confirmation bias, but also not 
realizing that these problems are thus redounded. My project navigates these risks 
explicitly in order to turn the risk into an interpretive benefit that can better approach 
																																																								
29 Of course, all critical work risks replicating the critic’s own desires and biases. In Desiring Donne, Ben 
Saunders investigates a similar idea of critical biases in his explanation of what he calls a reader’s 
interpretive desire.    
30 Below, I discuss a related problem—bracketing, or foreclosing discussion of certain textual components 
that are uninteresting to the critic or else irresolvable.  
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what a text evokes that may gesture towards potential meanings, according to this 
schema, in the unknown pane. 
The unknown pane visualizes the space of what Rumsfeld calls unknown 
unknowns that one can neither directly read nor necessarily intuit. In Derridean terms, 
which pick up on a much older mystical tradition, this pane contains the sacred (insofar 
as he understands it as unapproachable yet calling to be approached in his “Des Tours de 
Babel”). In psychoanalytic terms, this pane contains unconscious desires. Just as 
unconscious desires may be recovered in psychoanalysis, these unknowns may be 
recovered into either the blind or hidden pane. As the horizontal and vertical lines 
running through the two panes indicate, the unknown pane represents the intersection of 
the hidden and the blind. It contains information about a person’s potential, what neither 
she nor anyone else yet knows about her.31 For textual perspectives, the unknown pane 
contains the intersection of the text’s protecting itself from the critic’s interpretations on 
the one hand and revealing to the critic its own vulnerabilities on the other. Though the 
unknown pane may be approached through these intersecting perspectives, the unknown 
pane is different from both the blind and the hidden because its contents are, at least 
initially, unknown to both the text and the critic. If these contents may be teased out at 
all, they emerge into the blind pane in the form of either textual or readerly blindness or 
else they emerge into the hidden pane in the form of figurative language that a critic 
realizes has not been fully unpacked in ways that do not conform to readerly biases. The 
unknown pane approaches the most problematic aims of literature and of textual 
criticism: to reach the limits of what can be known, of what can be said, of what can be 
																																																								
31 Obviously each of these panes might suggest the potential readings of a text. What I am referring to here 
is specifically the potential meanings that are not yet known.  
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represented. While these aims are elusive, I argue that much criticism forecloses them 
altogether when it tames or else ignores ambiguities of textual content and form that 
might gesture toward these limits.  
 
EARLY MODERNITY AND A HERMENEUTICS OF AMBIGUITY 
Early modern texts are especially suited to an investigation of the intersection 
between the blind and hidden panes of perception because early modern texts often both 
thematize and enact the blindnesses of first-person perspective. Yet critics have oriented 
their investigations of early modern perspective to focus not on these blind spots but on 
more blatant assertions of selfhood and individuality, including subversive 
representations, in the period.  
Since at least the nineteenth century, it has been a commonplace that modern 
notions of the self first emerged during the Renaissance. Over the years, critics have 
offered a variety of explanations for this supposed change, ranging from the 
technological (the rise of the printing press and the attendant dissemination of 
knowledge) to the theological (the Protestant Reformation) to the ideological (the 
replacement of feudalism by the state and the spread of capitalistic structures of 
commerce and consumerism).  The precise nature of this modern self has also been 
extensively debated.  The degree of agency ascribed to it has varied considerably from 
commentator to commentator. Jacob Burckhardt identifies the self as a work of art that 
one could fashion or change as one changes clothes. Stephen Greenblatt rewrites 
Burckhardt’s insight, insisting in Renaissance Self-Fashioning that the self is not the 
agent but the object of any act of fashioning. More recently, influential critics such as 
	 30 
Gail Kern Paster and Michael Schoenfeldt have drawn out the paradox of a psychological 
self at war with a physical self; in their work, “self-fashioning” seems to mean something 
like controlling the passionate imperatives and excesses of the body. Although quite 
diverse in their methodologies and conclusions, these theorists nevertheless share 
common presumption: each assumes that it is possible to offer a diachronic explanation 
of subject formation over time. 32 
My project returns to early modern literature not because I see a paradigm shift in 
this era toward the modern human subject but because early modern texts grapple with 
the problems of first-person perspective in ways that various schools of twentieth- and 
twenty-first- century critics have overlooked, fallen victim to, or both.33 If New Critics 
asserted the authority of their own first-person perspectives as translators of texts, 
theorists of the late twentieth century have reacted against their assertion by multiplying 
and extending the biases of first-person perspectives or else by seeming to ignore these 
																																																								
32 Subjectivity remains a concern in current early modern criticism. In the words of David Hawkes in his 
Winter 2013 “Recent Studies in the English Renaissance” in SEL, “The politics and poetics of subjectivity 
continue to provide the basic matter for a sizable percentage of this year’s publications” (228). But as the 
medievalist David Aers noted in a sharply worded article some years ago, the supposedly “modern” aspects 
of self these and other critics find emerging in the Renaissance can also be located in earlier texts. 
Subjectivity has long played a role in explaining a variety of distinct historical breaks and paradigmatic 
shifts. See Aers’s “A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists; Or Reflections on Literary Critics Writing 
the ‘History of the Subject.’”  
33 While the remarks about major critical schools that follow are not intended to gloss these large and 
varied movements into monoliths, the broad strokes with which I paint their orientations to perspective can, 
I think, be recognized in representative samples of critical works across movements. Obviously, there are 
exceptions. Those to which my project is indebted are cited over the course of my argument.  
Furthermore, my approach is not meant to replace one polemical method of reading for another but to 
suggest the ways in which the shortcomings of seemingly oppositional methods neglect similar problems, 
in order to energize critical discussions that transgress the debates established by methodological 
boundaries. I do not mean to render their differences meaningless but to suggest ways in which their 
differences could be deployed to enrich the study of early modern texts. What I term yes, and thinking on 
this subject—similar to Heather Dubrow’s when she evokes Linda Hutcheon’s “both/and” model—offers a 
more collegial pursuit of intellectual aims that may help to invigorate the study of literature and the 
humanities in general (Dubrow xiv). My approach, then, has practical consequences for reorienting the 
ways in which critics attend to their own critical and pedagogical practices.  
	 31 
biases altogether. Structuralist and Poststructuralist critics seem to avoid first-person 
perspectives by sidestepping the role of authorial and critical intention insofar as they 
destabilize all human subjectivity as something constructed in discourse and focus 
instead on the constructedness of language and form.34 Sometimes critics claim that 
meaning exceeds intention, but sometimes the two words seem to be used synonymously. 
However, as Annabel Patterson notes, in regard to the rise of literary theory in general 
but also of Poststructuralism in particular, “the concept of authorial intention has come in 
for a new and potent form of disesteem, as a result of the convergence of a number of 
disparate attacks on the related ideas of human subjectivity, of selfhood, of the individual 
as a locus of subjectivity or an (even partially) free agent capable of having intentions” 
(143). Making a case for the inescapability of intention, Stanley Fish suggests the 
possibility that other entities besides the author and the reader possess a kind of intention 
and a biography. He contends that “the spirit of an age or a literary tradition or a culture 
or language itself” can be “the sources of agency” (“Biography and Intention” 12-13).   
Reader- and Affect-focused theorists react to this formalism by asserting the authority of 
the reader—and therefore the reader’s first-person perspective—thereby entrenching their 
																																																								
34 Though I realize my stance is not commonly acknowledged, I understand Poststructuralism to be a 
philosophically inflected continuation of Structuralism rather than a clearly separate body of theory, that is, 
in a relationship of continuity with its predecessor. I recognize that Derrida’s "Structure, Sign and Play in 
the Discourse of the Human Sciences" has been identified as demarcating the line between Structuralism 
and Poststructuralism. Furthermore, I understand that Roland Barthes’s work has been divided into early 
and late periods that could be categorized as Structuralist and Poststructuralist, respectively. I nonetheless 
suggest that the later theorists (designated Poststructural) continue to work through and extend the ideas 
begun by earlier theorists (designated Structural). Furthermore, I assert that this division between the two 
has been arbitrarily assigned as a point of origin for Poststructuralism. 
Indeed, intention is also a complicating and destabilizing factor in the foundational text of Structuralism, 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, in which Saussure’s intentions may or may not be 
represented by the intentions of the redactors of his material and his student’s notes. Though I refer to 
Course as Saussure’s text, I do so in full knowledge that its origins are suspect because the text is an 
amalgamation of student and lecture notes that were compiled and published after Saussure’s death, with 
neither his knowledge nor consent. 
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analyses in the acceptance of multiple first-person points of view and, thus, multiplying 
biases.35 Historicist, Materialist, and other critics of culture or identity politics have also 
extended the application of first-person perspective in order to understand contexts, 
showing that culture ventriloquizes the first-person voices of a text. In other words, for 
these critics, the culture is available to read by way of a metonymic link to a text’s first-
person voices, implying that elements of a text can stand as part of larger cultural 
perspectives.36  
																																																								
35 Take, for instance, both early and later works of Stanley Fish. Fish posits, in Surprised by Sin: The 
Reader in Paradise Lost, that “if we transfer the emphasis from Milton’s interests and intentions which are 
available to us only from a distance, to our responses which are available directly, the disparity between 
intention and execution becomes a disparity between reader expiation and reading experience…In this way 
we are led to consider our own experience as part of the poem’s subject” (3). His point bears on the entire 
project of his book and serves to transfer the primacy of perspective from the author to the reader, thereby 
covertly privileging the perspective of the reader as such and as critic. He amplifies this point in Self-
Consuming Artifacts when he claims that the execution of his methodology “involves an analysis of the 
developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one another in time” (387-88). 
In a later project, Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, Fish amplifies 
the role of the reader further by extending it from the individual to what he calls the interpretive 
community. He says: “meanings are the property neither of fixed and stable texts nor free and independent 
readers but of interpretive communities that are responsible for both the shape of a reader’s activities and 
for the texts those activities produce” (322). The position of the reader is also crucial for his argument in 
Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and The Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies, 
when he differentiates between a reader “thinking with” and a reader “thinking within” a particular 
interpretive practice, which is, in brief, the difference between understanding one’s perception as it is 
informed by a particular practice on the one hand, and understanding one’s perception as natural to oneself 
on the other (386-87). In either case, he still refers to the perspective of the reader.    
36 Jonathan Dollimore is one such critic who implies that a text ventriloquizes its culture when he argues, in 
“The Cultural Politics of Perversion,” that texts such as Milton’s Paradise Lost or Shakespeare’s Othello 
replicate “a much longer metaphysical tradition privileging dominant social formations, sexual and 
otherwise, in terms of essence, nature, teleology and universality,” suggesting that these texts replicate a 
much larger and long-standing western, cultural perspective (193). Likewise, when Dollimore describes 
textual perversion, he continues to discuss how a subversive perspective is replicated in the voice and 
actions of Eve or Iago or Desdemona as characters to show that “the perverse remains inscribed 
irreducibly within the same tradition” (193). Put differently, Dollimore’s argument shows that early modern 
texts mirror (or ventriloquize) cultural positions of all kinds. Similarly, Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, 
in The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, propose that their “‘poetics of transgression reveals the … 
self-representation of that culture” (202). In contrast, my project attempts to see how a text orients itself to 
cultural perspectives rather than simply replicating them. My project is nonetheless indebted to the inroads 
that cultural materialist critics have made against the assumptions readers may make, especially when 
reading early modern texts. The cultural materialist investigations of transgression are particularly pertinent 
to my argument. 
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Each of these critical stances on interpretation— structural, readerly, cultural, and 
historical—tries to overcome the problems that first-person perspectives introduce into 
textual and cultural analyses, but each stance tends to exacerbate these problems.37 These 
analytical agendas fall especially short, I argue, when they attempt to tame ambiguities in 
early modern texts that seem incomprehensible to late modern readers. It is in these 
strange or ambiguous or incomprehensible textual elements and the critical assumptions 
and brackets that surround them that my project is most interested. 
While my project cannot escape the problems of first-person perspective, by 
acknowledging this problem inherent in all critical analysis, I can begin to offer a method 
of reading that seeks always to learn what I do not (yet) know rather than to confirm what 
I already understand. Building upon Shoshana Felman’s now decades-old insight—that 
texts offer clues to their own interpretive impasses—I suggest that texts not only contain 
the conflicts that cause their interpretive debates but also offer intra-textual lenses 
through which to understand these interpretive impasses from the text’s perspective as an 
inroad to managing ambiguity differently.38 Whereas some critics have attempted to 
																																																								
37 I do not mean to suggest by this, admittedly, broad assessment of the critical tradition that critics do not 
worry about the problems of perspective. Obviously they have and they do. In fact, I explicitly state here 
and elsewhere in this chapter that a major project of critical literary interpretation has been the attempt to 
overcome these very problems. Neither do I mean to suggest that authorial intention as meaning is 
impossible or irrelevant, or that the act and experience of reading and interpreting is without merit or value. 
I contend, nonetheless, that even as critics have tried to work through issues caused by perspective, bias, 
historical and cultural position, they have also tended to exacerbate the problems they mean to address and 
perhaps resolve. The critical methods that destabilize subjectivity, as I have asserted above, at the same 
time destabilize perspective and avoid addressing its problems. The critical methods that amplify first-
person perspective present problem shared by inductive reasoning: whereas one perspective cannot 
logically extrapolate to cultural perspective, and a collection of perspectives offers a more reasonable 
assumption about the cultural perspective, it remains a collection of first-person perspectives, caught in the 
same propensity toward confirmation bias, which either attempts to translate or else avoids what it does not 
understand. 
38 Felman has usefully explained that when critical responses to a text are divided, the division may be 
traced to divisions in the text itself in “Turning the Screw of Interpretation.” Following Felman, Saunders 
has suggested that critics of John Donne have been thus divided in their readings of Donne’s desire because 
they mirror Donne’s own divided attempt to represent desire in his poetry.  
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manage ambiguous figures by imposing methods of interpretation that translate, define, 
or resolve ambiguity, Stephen Orgel has argued that such tactics aimed at resolution may 
be impossible, that ambiguity in a text may be intentional, and that critics who aim to 
delineate the potential of ambiguous textual elements do early modern texts a 
disservice.39 Though he targets key instances of ambiguity in The Winter’s Tale, Orgel’s 
point applies broadly: he writes, “modern interpretation represents an essentially arbitrary 
selection of meanings from a list of diverse and often contradictory possibilities and does 
not so much resolve the linguistic problem as enable us to ignore it” (432, emphasis 
mine). Orgel argues that how critics interpret “obscurity…is the real textual question, and 
it remains an open one,” ultimately suggesting that “we do it [a text] wrong when we 
deny that it is problematic and has always been so, and reduce it to our own brand of 
common sense” (437). Similarly, Stephen Booth takes on a methodology in his edition of 
Shakespeare’s Sonnets through which he refuses to shape the reader’s interpretation but 
instead offers every possible interpretation he can muster. Booth and Orgel both pick up 
the threads of older investigations of ambiguity like Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity 
and Rosalie Colie’s Paradoxica Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox, and 
the more recent work of close readers like Heather Dubrow, Christopher Ricks, and 
Helen Vendler. While I agree with the impulse to privilege the text itself over the critic’s 
often arbitrary reading, my project works toward a method of articulating both the formal 
and affective capabilities of these incomprehensible elements that avoids the imprecision 
																																																								
39 See “The Poetics of Incomprehensibility,” which takes on the editorial tradition since the eighteenth 
century in order to suggest that readers take for granted the meanings, interpretations, and resolutions of 
ambiguity glossed by editors. Orgel’s purpose “is not to propose a new reading or to announce the matter 
[of textual ambiguity] resolved” (434). Instead, he intends to highlight “how little attention the editorial 
tradition has paid” to the fact of ambiguity in texts The Winter’s Tale, observing for instance that “few 
commentators get beyond Pafford’s observation [in the Arden Shakespeare (1963)] that ‘the speech [of 
Leontes when he suspects Hermione of infidelity] is meant to be incoherent’” (Orgel 434, Pafford 166).  
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implied by affect theorists’ readings of ambiguity as simply potential without attention to 
form. Working in the lineage of formalist practices of careful reading and willingness of 
certain critics to remain open to irresolvable ambiguity, I argue that when we ignore or 
tame what we do not already know or understand, we foreclose potential meaning 
available in early modern texts.40   
Thus, I am wary of critical methods that aim to resolve ambiguity, especially 
methods that resemble or rely on translation—or at least translation as it is commonly 
understood—because translation presupposes a teleological approach to conveying what 
one already knows rather than orienting one’s encounter with a text with the intent to 
learn something new.  By way of explaining translation as it is commonly understood, 
consider, for example, the literal translation of a text from one language to another. In 
order to accomplish this kind of translation, one must be able to read and write in both 
languages. In other words, one must already know, or assume, or impose in one’s 
translation what a text says in one language and then simply report that knowledge in the 
second language. In “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation,” Roman Jakobson calls this 
“translation proper,” or interlingual translation. He distinguishes interlingual translation 
from intralingual translation, or the rewording or interpretation of language using that 
same language. Paraphrase is, obviously, an example of intralingual translation.41 
Metaphor (translatio), and figurative language generally, is also a kind of intralingual 
translation. As Derrida points out in “Des Tours de Babel,” both of these kinds of 
																																																								
40 While I agree with Orgel’s impulse to privilege the text itself over the critic’s often arbitrary reading, my 
project works toward a method of articulating the formal capabilities of these incomprehensible elements 
that avoids the imprecision implied by simply reading ambiguity as affective potential without attention to 
form.  
41 The Oxford English Dictionary identifies this definition, “to express in other words, to paraphrase,” as 
the chief current sense. 
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translation depend upon the assumption that the translator already knows the limits of 
both sides of the translative equation (198). Insofar as my project is concerned with the 
problems and biases of textual and readerly perspective, I follow Derrida to explore 
Jakobson’s third category of translation: intersemiotic translation or transmutation, 
which, Derrida explains “interprets linguistic signs by means of systems of nonlinguistic 
signs” (198). Derrida rightly argues that while translation is a valuable and productive or 
re-productive task that extends the life and perhaps guarantees the survival of original 
texts, translation cannot be accomplished without the translator’s own imposition on the 
text. Jakobson’s concept of intersemiotic translation includes the surplus of the 
translator’s own creative act as well as the unapproachable call always to translate that 
Derrida sees happening in both sacred and poetic writing. In this way, in its necessary 
impossibility, translation is itself a kind of abuse.  
The problem I see with tactics of translation is the very problem that became 
associated with New Criticism and against which theorists focused on the reader and on 
identity politics react: the critic becomes the authority who translates the secrets of the 
text for other readers. This problem, the privileging of the critical authority, covertly 
proliferates even as it is criticized in the movements of literary criticism in the late 
twentieth- and early twenty-first- centuries. Even critics who have questioned the idea of 
critical authority as part of their projects for reading against oppressive societal norms—
like feminists, queer theorists, post-colonial theorists, and theorists of race and disability, 
to name a few—nonetheless proffer, as a consequence of identity politics in some cases, 
the right to speak as critics under their own authority. While I do not mean to suggest 
that critics speaking from marginalized perspectives do not have or deserve this critical 
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authority, it is nonetheless a kind of critical authority, one that is particularly fraught by 
virtue of being tied to advocating for the rights and the voices of people who have been 
violently marginalized, oppressed, and abused. 
The issue I take with a translational method in the face of ambiguity, then, is that 
one must already know how to read or how to resolve or how to explain those textual 
components that critics have identified as unreadable, unresolvable, inexplicable. Carla 
Mazzio, for one, has suggested in her recent book, The Inarticulate Renaissance: 
Language Trouble in an Age of Eloquence, that scholars have not attended to the 
unreadable in early modern texts. She claims in contrast what is unreadable because it is 
“‘inarticulate’ [is] a central dimension of developing language practices and ideologies in 
the culture and drama of the period” (Inarticulate Renaissance 1). In one of many 
examples, Mazzio identifies as unreadable and unresolvable Hamlet’s “poorly composed” 
profession of love to Ophelia, which includes phrases like “to the celestial and my soul’s 
idol, the most beautified Ophelia” and which even Polonius identifies as vile (177, 
2.2.109-11). She discusses the “acute awareness” and importance for early modern 
Protestant writers of “the phenomenon of mumbling” (21). She explains that mumbling 
combines “inaudibility, incomprehensibility, and undistinguished syllable formation” and 
“suggest[s] (at best) inaccessible content, (at worst) no content, and (either way) a 
passive or active resistance to norms of community and communicability” (22). In John 
Donne’s Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, for instance, the speaker of the tenth 
station is quite concerned about how murmuring identifies “the greatest mischiefs, which 
are least discerned” (51). Similarly, Benedict Robinson identifies the importance of 
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unreadable words for understanding early modern understandings of disgust. He writes 
that  
if strong feeling sometimes carries us beyond language, disgust does so in 
a particularly intense way, generating a repertory of sounds that linger 
somewhere between speech and gesture: in the early modern period, 
“foh,” “faugh,” “and “fogh” …theater can perform disgust in a way no 
written text can, although the theatrical script has to find some written 
equivalent for these sounds. Such expressions—are they words?—can 
carry a wide range of meanings. (559)        
To Robinson’s example of King Lear’s “verbal paralysis” and “radical loss of language” 
when Lear’s discussion of female sexuality ends with “fie, fie, fie, pah, pah,” I add 
Viola’s description of her interaction with Olivia: “methought her eyes had lost her 
tongue, for she did speak in starts, distractedly” (560, Lear 20.124, Twelfth 2.2.20-21). 
While Lear’s inarticulate sounds find equivalents in written expression, Olivia’s 
distracted starts do not. Yet her inarticulate orientations toward Viola make meanings that 
bear on Viola’s, and our, interpretations of Olivia’s character. Following Mazzio, 
Robinson, and Orgel, who also call renewed attention to the strangeness of ambiguity, I 
am interested in navigating ambiguity differently by reorienting the ways in which 
readers attend to troubling elements early modern texts. I attempt to read each text on its 
own ambiguous terms rather than cling to the assumptions of prior critical readings of the 
texts I examine. Ultimately, this project argues that ambiguous textual elements invite the 
strangeness of each text to speak, that via ambiguities modern readers can approach what 
a text both obscures and reveals about the contexts that frame it.42 Furthermore, attending 
																																																								
42 This is not to suggest that a text can speak for itself, that is, as if language could somehow make meaning 
outside of or apart from interpretation. I am simply advocating for a stay on the tendencies of critics to 
tame, translate, resolve, or ignore textual strangeness in ambiguous figures and structures.  
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to what has been bracketed will enable a reading that is hospitable to the perspectives and 
orientations of individual texts.  
My thinking about orientation and blindness toward and within texts is indebted 
to Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology. Ahmed deploys the tactics of phenomenological 
discourse to emphasize the importance of one’s literal and figurative orientations toward 
objects of inquiry, highlighting how orientations are formed through habitual action.43 
She argues that orientation is as much about finding one’s way as feeling at home and 
that the paths a person tends to take are familiar ones set out by others. Ahmed turns her 
attention to the orientations of her own discipline and its primary texts, investigating how 
objects of inquiry are presented to her field (phenomenology) and which paths of analysis 
it tends to take.44 Interrogating phenomenology’s practice of bracketing—a practice that 
formalizes the act of ignoring what one does not want to analyze—Ahmed asks us to look 
at what has been intentionally overlooked. Of course, the impulse to draw attention to 
what others have overlooked is shared by other queer critics and, to some extent, by all 
other critics. However, Ahmed’s project is important and also relevant to mine insofar as 
she mounts a critique of various kinds of orientations—queer, racial, gendered, to name a 
few—and the different ways these orientations may affect each other as well as the kinds 
of marginalization that they each sustain or prevent. Following Ahmed, then, my project 
examines the habitual actions of early modern criticism in order to reconsider what has 
been bracketed or overlooked or ignored in primary texts.  
																																																								
43 Considering phenomenological practices alongside queer theory, Ahmed’s project focuses on the 
orientations of human bodies. She proposes a model of how bodies become oriented in intersections of 
gender, sexuality, and race.  
44 Ahmed considers the blind spots in phenomenology that prevent it from seeing, for instance, the 
gendered and labor practices and structures that enable it to take the paths it takes and orient itself as it 
does. She also considers how other kinds of social orientations intersect with and shape each other. 
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Jonathan Dollimore and Ben Saunders have similarly and explicitly called for 
attention to the blind spots of critical practice. Dollimore understands censorship as a 
kind of bracketing and even proposes that “an exaggerated respect for [art] becomes a 
way of not seeing” (Sex, Literature, and Censorship xi, emphasis mine). Articulating the 
practices that enable critics to bracket their own interpretive desires, Saunders suggests 
that “the injunction to ‘always historicize’ and the concept of the interpretive community 
can both be construed as evasions” (Desiring Donne: Poetry, Sexuality, Interpretation 4). 
In response to such evasion, Saunders argues that “at some level we must make [texts] 
speak for us, of our desires, and not only our desires as individuals but also the collective 
desires that percolate and bubble within the osmotic boundaries of interpretive 
communities, desires that we sometimes call ‘ideological’” (4). While my project finds 
affinity with his in the call to attend to personal and ideological orientations, my project 
differs from his insofar as I call for specific attention to the blind spots implicated in not 
only one’s own desires, habits, and perspectives be they personal or cultural, but also 
those of the texts one studies.  
Though my project is also indebted in many ways to Dollimore, I find Saunders’ 
approach to critical blindness more helpful because his project is interested in 
interrogating its own assumptions. Dollimore, who also calls for attention be paid to 
others’ critical blindnesses, nonetheless responded defensively when his own critical 
orientations come under attack in Neema Parvini’s critique of cultural materialism.45 
Having himself been “attacked repeatedly and viciously by various old liberal humanists 
																																																								
45 See Shakespeare and Contemporary Theory and Shakespeare’s History Plays: Rethinking Historicism 
both published in 2012, and see Dollimore’s reaction to both in “The Legacy of Cultural Materialism” and 
“A Response to Neema Parvini.” 
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for simply not ‘getting’ humanism,” as Parvini rightly points out, Dollimore recycles this 
academic culture of exclusion for a new generation of critics when he, with an overt tone 
of disdain, refuses to see the younger scholar’s analysis as valid and even approaches ad 
hominem attacks (“A Reply” 725). 
In addition to these more recent projects, my thinking is also influenced by 
Michel Foucault’s agenda in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison and The 
Archaeology of Knowledge. His work similarly tries to discover, in opposition to 
dominant discourses, what those dominant discourses are not saying and how their 
silence upholds their dominance. In Archaeology, he writes that all discourses are 
“composed of signs; but what they [discourses] do is more than use these signs to 
designate things. It is this 'more' that renders them irreducible to the language and to 
speech. It is this 'more' that we must reveal and describe” (53). My project attends to “this 
more,” to those elements of texts that are formalized, and not necessarily articulated, in 
order to attempt to read a text’s affective orientation to the discourses of its culture. To 
this end, my project examines formal textual patterns, for these constitute the habitual 
actions of individual texts.    
 This attempt to read ambiguity differently is an attempt also to interpret the gaps, 
the cuts, the silences that underpin the ambiguity in these texts, some of which may be 
intentionally ambiguous as Orgel suggests, some of which may not have been ambiguous 
to early audiences and readers, and all of which conceal information from postmodern 
readers. In an unpublished talk entitled “Rethinking Cuts in an Age of Distraction,” 
Bruce Smith made a similar point in favor of attending to the ways in which cuts, breaks, 
and silences are instrumental for our ability to process meaning in texts, arguing that 
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critics should not be so quick to fill the spaces they leave in a text. He noted that all 
perception operates in consequence of cuts; all seeing is literally facilitated but the 
usually imperceptible cuts caused by the blinking of one’s eyes. Smith calls for the need 
of a phenomenology of cuts, understanding bracketing itself as a habit of cutting (Smith 
“Rethinking Cuts”). Making a similar point, Mazzio argues “for the affective and 
conceptual potential of the disabled [or linguistically incomprehensible] utterance” and 
aims “through a historical analysis to give the inarticulate a place in our understanding of 
Renaissance culture” (2). Thinking through instances of ambiguity alongside a critical 
trajectory and tradition that attempts to read the inarticulate, the incomprehensible, the 
gaps, the spaces, and the silences of early modern literature, my project attempts to 
approach the unknown by way of textual perspective in an effort to capture the evasive 
and problematic elements of both the hidden and blind categories and to reorient the ways 
in which texts may be read before their gaps are filled by historical or other contexts. One 
route to accomplishing such a reading is by attending to textual elements that readers may 
not even know had been missed.  
Reading ambiguity, then, is not initially an act of analysis and dissection but an 
act of attention and orientation. Indeed when we attend to orientation, to how we are 
positioned both physically, temporally, historically, and ideologically, we may begin to 
see what we are not attending to, what we have turned our literal or figurative backs on. 
Attending to one’s own orientations to early modern, or other historically distanced, 
literature is important because, as Ahmed writes, “orientations involve different ways of 
registering the proximity of objects and others” (3). Though late modern readers are not 
historically proximate to early modernity, attending to one’s own orientation can help one 
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see “different [textual] objects, those that are ‘less proximate,’” those that are also 
indicative of a text’s own orientations (Ahmed 3). Texts themselves become the 
“orientation devices” by which late modern readers can apprehend how texts may 
foreground or foreclose their possible interpretations. Ahmed concretizes this path from 
attending to one’s own orientations to approaching alternative perspectives of one’s 
orientation devices by deploying the physical example of a philosopher’s desk from 
which she can explain more clearly abstract ways of thinking about the orientations of 
perspective. She explains that for philosophers “tables are ‘near to hand,’ along with 
chairs, as the furniture that secures the very ‘place’ of philosophy” yet this necessary 
space of writing goes largely unnoticed, receding to the background of the task at hand 
(3). Ahmed’s task, like mine, is to bring “what is ‘behind’ to the front…creating a new 
angle, in part by reading for the angle of the different ‘slant’ to the concept of orientation 
itself” (4). In other words, my project attends to the less proximate perspectives of the 
text that have receded into the background but that are not only vital to reading early 
modern literature but also supply additional orientation devices for late modern readers. 
Ahmed’s argument takes on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s account in Phenomenology of 
Perception of how “the intellectual experience of disorder…the vital experience of 
giddiness and nausea” may be overcome, or tamed (Merleau-Ponty 296). She suggests 
instead that “if we stay with such moments then we might achieve a different orientation 
toward them; such moments may be the source of vitality as well as giddiness. We might 
even find joy and excitement in the horror” (4). Similarly, my project lingers with and 
finds vitality in the strangest components of early modern texts.     
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My project suggests that attending to what I call rhetorical affect in instances of 
ambiguity can disclose the potential readings that texts both proffer and attempt to 
prevent. It attempts to read the strangeness of strangeness, the ambiguity of ambiguity, by 
reading each ambiguous instance in relation to the open frame of each text’s perspective, 
that is, on the text’s own terms and as literally as possible.  This is, of course, a tactic of 
close reading, but the difference between reading literally and reading closely is that the 
practice of close reading also involves reading figuratively. Part of the purpose of my 
project is to tease out what figurative language and figurative readings obscure in an 
individual text, not just what they foreground and enable. For example, consider Prince 
Hal’s monologue in the first act of Henry IV, Part I. He says, “I know you all, and will 
awhile uphold the unyoked humour of your idleness” (1.2.182-3). One may read the 
opening line figuratively as apostrophe directed at his Eastcheap companions who are 
absent from the stage. In this reading, Falstaff and company are the “you all” with 
unyoked idleness whose impending rejection Hal foreshadows. But if we read this 
passage literally, it reveals something quite different. A literal reading exposes an 
alternative understanding of how this play may be oriented. Alone on stage, Hal’s 
character literally addresses either himself or the literally present audience. Addressing 
himself as you seems less fruitful and does not jibe with the monologue explaining what 
Hal’s character as an I will do. Reading this line, indeed the whole monologue, as 
addressed to a “you all” that is the audience suggests a far more sinister intent on Hal’s 
part and a far more vulnerable position for his future subjects once he is king. Hal knows 
this audience, literally sees them. As Chris Fetter writes, this kind of seeing articulates “a 
warfare of the deadly gaze [that] accurately figures a world of hostile espials, of 
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potentially lethal social penetrations, active at the heart both of the play, and of the 
political climate of contemporary London” (99). In his sojourn in Eastcheap that enables 
his surveillance of his subjects, Hal penetrates the common culture and takes a 
threatening stance against it in his plan no longer to uphold their present idleness. And 
this audience is literally, presently idle, engaged in the entertainment of play-going rather 
than in working. In effect, Hal’s line plainly reveals the tenuous position of common 
subjects to the whims of those in power. Reading this line as figuratively addressing “you 
all” in fictional Eastcheap misses this point that reorients the play to warn the audience of 
political rhetoric and espionage.   
A tactic of reading literally, then, reads closely while attending to what is openly 
available (to again deploy the language of the Johari schema) in figurative language. The 
strength of this approach lies in the ability to reorient oneself as a reader to what one has 
taken for granted, for what may be obvious but has been ignored in other readings of a 
text. This method reorients readings by asking the reader to examine her own 
assumptions—those informed by her contemporary culture, by her understanding of the 
historical and material contexts of the text in question, by the critical interpretations and 
disputes of others, by her own prior readings of a familiar narrative—in order to attend to 
the potential of literature to reveal an orientation that one cannot anticipate.  
 
SEEING STRANGENESS, READING WILDLY: THE POTENTIAL OF TEXTUAL ORIENTATIONS 
In the remaining pages of this introduction, I sketch the contours of the project as 
a whole. In each of the following chapters, I present ways of thinking about close reading 
that take account of the assumptions and risks entailed in any act of interpretation and 
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that specifically attend to instances of ambiguity in order to articulate the interpretive 
potential of textual perspectives.46 I argue that ambivalent formal elements signal more 
than sites of critical debate encoded in the text, as Felman has suggested; they also 
privilege textual perspective and reveal the affect called disgust to be a formal feature of 
certain early modern texts.47 I suggest that textual ambiguity may be approached through 
the logic of rhetorical abuse, not in order to identify instances of ambiguity as 
catachresis, per se, but to examine how readings of ambiguity may be oriented using the 
logic of this trope in ways that maintain the strangeness of a text’s pedagogic and 
disruptive capability. I argue that reorienting one’s approach to ambiguity exposes the 
potential for meaning in often ignored textual elements and suggests that early modern 
literature models a way of reading that is at once hospitable to and dependent upon 
vulnerable perspectives.  
Vulnerability is a crucial component of early modern orientations to culture. I 
have offered one example from Henry IV, Part I of the play’s potential orientation to 
threatening political rhetoric and machinations within the boundaries of the emerging 
nation. In The Pain of Reformation, Joseph Campana explains that vulnerability is a vital 
concept for early modern England, what with the uncertain line of succession to the 
throne, stemming from the War of the Roses, threatening from within, as well as England 
being a nation-state geographically vulnerable to invasive enemies, like France and 
Scotland, threatening from without. The early modern preoccupation is legible in tropes 
																																																								
46 My project specifically looks at disruptive components of texts that signal dissolutions of meaning, 
components that have created critical impasses for readings of early modern texts, components that threaten 
interpretation with incomprehension. 
47 See the discussion of Felman’s point above.  
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of vulnerability, he writes, like Spencer’s bleeding trees, and in defensive stances on 
chastity, masculinity, and nationalism (6). Deployed in defense of vulnerability, the hero 
encased in armor as well as his discourse on honor stage immune responses to threat that 
repeatedly fail and are repeatedly questioned by the literature of the period (6). Also in 
defense of vulnerability in early modernity, James Kuzner, in Open Subjects, looks to the 
poststructural perspective on vulnerability, which  
find[s] therapeutic and political value in being unbounded, whether by 
embracing human existence as one defined by a deep vulnerability to 
words, by taking on the (at times terrifying) openness of pure hospitality, 
or by seeking to become exposed and so undone by being with others as to 
become utterly incapable of possessiveness. (4-5) 
He sees these late modern perspectives in direct conversation with early modern 
republican ones. Furthermore, he notes that vulnerability is tellingly ambivalent, an 
ambivalence which was  
familiar to early modernity but supposedly obsolete now (or so states the 
Oxford English Dictionary): namely that ‘vulnerable’ initially indicates 
not just… ‘susceptible of receiving wounds,’ but also ‘wounding’ or 
‘having power to wound.’ (102)  
Kuzner is also interested in how “we are oriented—how we can be averse but also 
attached—to our vulnerability” (2). I call this a disgust response to vulnerability that 
signals an ambivalent or passively resistant orientation to early modern ideological 
networks of power. Vulnerability, then, informs the possible orientations a text may take 
toward cultural threats related to the political, religious, and personal forms of power.  
Picking up threads of both personal and political vulnerabilities, Chapter II 
investigates how Marlowe’s Edward the Second disrupts the binary structure encoded in 
the familiar trope of the king’s two bodies in order to critique sovereign authority itself. 
The text is marked by substantive disgust for weakness in the king and for the upstart 
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economic climber Gaveston. But this explicit disgust conceals textual disgust directed 
toward cultural understandings of sovereignty itself, especially in the parallel rise to 
power of Mortimer, against whom the same criticisms of ambition apply but are not 
levied. The play deploys structural elements that seem to reinforce the power of 
sovereignty even as it undermines it. Edward illustrates how easily ambiguities left by 
textual silences lead readers to make assumptions and to lean on extra-textual material in 
order to fill in the gaps, while showing that these interpretive problems are already 
apparent in the ways in which the text thematizes the reading of inarticulate emblems and 
body language. The play’s orientation toward deciphering the inarticulate informs this 
chapter’s ultimate argument: that Marlowe’s text criticizes the nature of authority in 
general and disrupts the expected succession of kings to privilege a vulnerable space of 
hospitality to the outsider as well as the uncertain space of textual silences and 
ambiguities.  
Whereas my readings of Marlowe expose the vulnerability of dominant political 
discourses and model ways in which those in positions of weakness may exercise 
strength, I turn to John Donne’s Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions and select poems 
to investigate vulnerability before the unknowns related to death, afterlife, salvation, the 
nature of the sacred. Chapter III argues that Donne’s poetry and prose models a radically 
hospitable interpretive method that uses large and small-scale formal elements to manage 
ambiguity from the perspectives of Donne’s textual voices while orienting readers to 
welcome the strangeness of his signature contradictions. Donne’s narrative and poetic 
voices confess an orientation of fear but the structural elements he deploys to express this 
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fear suggest an irresolvable orientation of ambivalence that exposes the speaker’s 
vulnerable position of repulsion and attraction to his unknowable future.  
Chapter IV picks up the political and personal threads of the other chapters, 
turning to Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part I to pursue an analysis that reorients Falstaff’s 
function in the play as its unlikely focal perspective, a perspective which stages a kind of 
confrontation with the play’s power structures. Like Feste, Falstaff demonstrates how to 
be a better reader of himself insofar as he relies not only upon knowledge of his own 
faults but also on knowledge of how other people interpret him. Falstaff deploys a 
reading method that extends beyond Feste’s into a still more vulnerable position, turning 
his own weaknesses into strengths when he uses them to reveal fissures in the play’s 
dominant discourses of power, especially those verbalized by Prince Hal. For example, 
Falstaff uses against Hal the prince’s deception at Gad’s Hill which illuminates both the 
play’s orientation toward honor and the deceitfulness of Hal’s plan to throw off “loose 
behavior…and pay the debt [he] never promised” in order to take power. Falstaff thereby 
shows that Hal is not only blind, but blind to that blindness. In effect, Falstaff deploys a 
reading method that resembles a passive resistance to Hal’s monopoly on interpretation in 
this play.48 Though this play’s substantive focus on disgust for the body and appetite 
seems to overshadow Falstaff’s no less persistent disgust for honor, the play suggests that 
the honor is itself nothing but appetite, rendering honor itself the very thing that disgusts 
those who desire to be honorable. The fundamental orientation of the play is ambivalent, 
attracted to and repulsed by the terms of a system that carries the seeds of its undoing in 
its own defensive rhetoric.     
																																																								
48 As I show in the fourth chapter, I see Hal’s monopoly on interpretation in the readings of critics who 
position themselves on Hal’s side as well as in the readings of critics understood to be on Falstaff’s side.  
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Finally, I argue in a brief coda that Shakespeare’s play The Tempest and John 
Webster’s play The Duchess of Malfi suggest ways in which textual affect may be 
oriented to familial and dramatic conventions. I argue that when affect turns within the 
family or within the text, a text not only offers its perspective on these conventional 
structures relevant to early modern culture, its affect also becomes textually contagious, 
infecting and unraveling the structures of each play with the transgressions they 
thematically attempt to contain and control.  
*** 
The figure of a watchman is a useful way to think about the interests, methods, 
and goals of this project. A watchman is spatially positioned to be a liminal figure, 
located on the border between the inside and the outside of the city, watching the territory 
without in order to protect the city within. Thus, a watchman, the first to see and be seen 
by approaching threat, is at once powerful and vulnerable. Though watchmen may take a 
variety of posts, I imagine the image of the watchman on the ramparts, like Marcellus and 
Barnardo literally on the border of the castle, keeping watch over Elsinore, and 
encountering the inexplicable and the strange in Hamlet’s opening scene. Both and 
neither inside and outside, at once exposed and protected, a textual watchman stands at 
the intersection of a text’s immunity and autoimmunity, its methods of resisting 
interpretation and the ways in which it opens up interpretation and even undoes itself, its 
hidden and unknown panes on the one hand and its open and blind panes on the other. 
Donne names himself and presumably his priestly peers, if not all of humankind, 
“watchmen” in the Devotions. When he writes “the name of watchmen belongs to our 
profession; thy prophets are not only seers, endued with a power of seeing, able to see, 
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but watchmen evermore in the act of seeing,” he not only thematizes the liminality and 
vulnerability of his text’s perspective (Devotions 94). He also names its strength in 
seeing. Donne’s watchman, like the other textual features examined in this study, is an 
ambiguous figure that attends to seeing what others do not, that both exposes and protects 
a text’s ambivalent perspectives and orientations. This introduction has examined Feste 






REVEALING SILENCE, AMBIVALENT GAPS, AND THE KING’S THREE BODIES IN  
MARLOWE’S EDWARD THE SECOND 
 
 
As every reader of early modern literature knows, a single king’s body is already 
multiple. As a man, a king has a natural body, which exists physically in time and is 
obviously vulnerable to decay and death. As the embodiment of the state, a king has a 
supernatural body, which is not physical but eternal, a rhetorically constructed body that 
establishes the unending supremacy of the king, which thwarts the decay of the natural 
body and unifies the commonwealth. Elizabethans understood the power this doctrine 
offered as well as its limitations. Edmund Plowden offers a concise, contemporaneous 
description:  
Altho’ the natural Body of the King is subject to Infancy, yet when the 
Body politic is conjoind with it, and one Body is made of them both, the 
whole Body shall have all the Properties, Qualities and Degrees of the 
Body politic which is the greater and more worthy, and in which there is 
not nor can be any Infancy. (217)1  
 
The body of a king, then, is glorified by the incarnation of kingliness, identified with the 
body politic. The doctrine enables kings to rule by virtue of this incarnation, but it also 
limits their rule within the bounds of what amounts to precedent: because the king’s 
decisions, like his political body, are eternal, one king cannot overturn the ruling of a 
																																																								
1 Edmund Plowden. The commentaries, or reports of Edmund Plowden, of the Middle-Temple, Esq; and 
apprentice of the common law, Containing divers cases upon matters of law, argued and adjudged in the 
several reigns of King Edward VI. Queen Mary, King and Queen Philip and Mary, and Queen Elizabeth. 
Originally written in French, and now faithfully translated into English, and considerably improved by 
many marginal notes and references to all the books of the common law both ancient and modern. To 
which are added, the Quæries of Mr. Plowden, now first rendered into English at large with references, 
and many useful observations. In two parts. With two new tables, more compleat than any yet published; 
the one, of the names of the cases, the other of principal matters.   
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prior king. 2  Of course, the doctrine in practice was far more malleable than this gloss 
suggests.  
Multiplying the king’s body gives a king an odd, theoretical relationship to other 
minds, to other bodies, to time, and to perspective itself. The perspective of a king is 
strange. On the one hand, a king’s body and mind are always plural. The king is unified 
with kings throughout history and, through the body politic, enjoys a kind of eternal life 
and a kind of unified mind. Thus kings extend exponentially into the future of kings who 
will share in this unified plurality. A king’s body is also plural insofar as his subjects 
participate in his body politic. Subjects identify themselves as such within bounds of the 
nation, which is in turn represented by the king’s eternal and invulnerable body politic. 
On the other hand, a king is also always singular. Of course, he has only one physical 
body, only one mind, only one lifetime. He is also socially singular, set apart from the 
noble peers as peerless. He alone stands for the nation: the one man who stands for many. 
A king, then, is logically equivalent to, and therefore poised to be, both the representative 
and the scapegoat of a nation. The rhetorical maneuvering that constructs the body politic 
conceals this vulnerability faced by an individual king’s body natural in order to protect 
the state and the individuals who depend on it. The doctrine of the king’s two bodies 
establishes a binary system that unifies kings but divides not only king from himself and 
from his subjects, but also one from many, strength from weakness, time from eternity, 
life from death. It is the strangeness of this doctrine with respect to time, bodies, and 
minds that enables the phrase, “the king is dead; long live the king” ⎯ a paradoxical 
																																																								
2 For a complete explanation of the king’s two bodies, see Ernst Kantorowicz’s seminal text The King’s 
Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. For current views on the legacy of Kantorowicz’s 
work, see Lorna Hutson, ed. Special Forum: Fifty Years of The King’s Two Bodies.  
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formulation which preserves the continuity of the body politic despite the interruption of 
a king’s physical death.  
This strangeness is evident from the outset of Marlowe’s play, Edward the 
Second. Edward’s treatment of the king’s two bodies ties the doctrine and the problem of 
sovereign rule by primogeniture to the problem of bias in interpretation. The opening 
lines set into motion the crisis of the primogeniture of the body politic surrounding the 
king that ignites the plot with Edward’s line “‘My father is deceased…’” (1.1.1). These 
words evoke the familiar ring of “the king is dead…,” but the familiarity ends 
immediately. Rather than following with “long live the king,” this play disrupts and 
delays the natural conclusion wherein one king succeeds the next. In the world of this 
play, the prior king has died, his body natural decays. What generally happens next, at 
least according to the ideology explicated by Ernst Kantorowicz, is the natural succession 
of the next king with the mystical transference of the body politic to the new king’s 
natural body. But Marlowe is uninterested in the metaphysical significance of the body 
politic.3 Instead, his play explores the real-world consequences of the doctrine. What 
happens in this play is not the mystical succession of Edward II, who will enjoy his 
father’s established authority as king. What happens, in the punctuation of this opening 
line, is a pause, a pause his noble peers claim will be the ruin of the commonwealth.4 In 
this pointed gap, the prior king is dead, but the body politic has not yet inhabited the 
person of the new king.5 One might even suggest that the entire play, in a sense, takes 
																																																								
3 In his introduction to Marlowe’s play, Charles Forker highlights this very difference between Marlowe 
and Shakespeare’s treatment of wealth and power (23).  
4 The punctuation here is consistently a comma in all of the existent early modern printings of the play.  
5 Edward’s peers refuse to be a part of what they (and most readers) perceive as the king’s bodily-focused 
desires.   
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place within this pause in which the king has not taken possession of (or been possessed 
by) body politic but instead lingers in his body natural.  For Edward establishes a 
different understanding of sovereignty when he writes, “‘…come, Gaveston, and share 
the kingdom with thy dearest friend’” (1.1.1-2). In the new Edward’s kingdom, the king 
will share his bodies, redoubling the vulnerability of the body natural and exposing the 
same vulnerability in the body politic. Clinging to his desire for his companion rather 
than attending to his duty as king, Edward exposes and reverses the ordinary hierarchical 
ordering of the king’s bodies (political before natural, now natural before political) when 
he pauses to share with his friend.  
Edward’s dalliances with Gaveston identify what most readings of the play have 
suggested is the heart of Edward’s weakness as king: he is more interested in his own 
desire than in the good of the nation.6 Since the early 1990s, much of the criticism of this 
play has investigated Edward’s relationship with his favorite, considering various aspects 
of the king’s weaknesses as king in terms of his homoerotic relationship with Gaveston 
either as a problem of sexuality or as a problem of Gaveston’s low status.7 These readings 
levy the early modern discourse of sodomy as a tool for analyzing Elizabethan legal 
practices as well as critiquing the heterosexist readings of earlier critics. All of these 
readings depend upon the assumption that Edward and Gaveston’s relationship is indeed 
																																																								
6 Forker identifies two, related controversies in the criticism of Marlowe’s play. The older question is one 
of genre: is this a history play or a tragedy? In other words, critics debate whether or not the play focuses 
on the torment of one man or else on the nation that suffers as a result of his irresponsible rule. The more 
recent question inquires into Marlowe’s perspective on homosexuality, whether or not the play celebrates 
it, condemns it, or does not address it at all (85). 
7 Crucial criticisms of this play along these critical lines include the following: Emily Bartel’s Spectacles of 
Strangeness: Imperialism, Alienation, and Marlowe, Gregory Bredbeck’s Sodomy and Interpretation, 
Marlowe to Milton, Mario DiGangi’s The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama, Jonathan Goldberg’s 
Sodometries: Renaissance Texts, Modern Sexualities, and Bruce Smith’s Homosexual Desire in 
Shakespeare’s England. A Cultural Poetics.  
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homoerotic, and they all consider the ramifications of a weak king, subject to his subjects 
and to death at their hands. However, the play also stages a crisis of interpretation that the 
play’s critical history depends upon but largely ignores: when information is missing, 
interpretation tends to depend upon assumption.8 Indeed, the interpretative history of this 
play in particular depends heavily on the very practice of reading what is not there in the 
text.9  
Alan Bray and Stephen Orgel are rare but unmistakable exceptions in the critical 
history of Edward the Second. They too have identified and disputed instances in which 
others have based their interpretations of Marlowe’s play on assumption. Bray, for 
instance, is wary of the pervasive assumption that Edward and Gaveston’s relationship is 
obviously homosexual, suggesting instead that this assumption constitutes a modern 
misreading of Elizabethan friendship practices, which may well include “intense 
emotion” and “passionate language” without necessarily signaling “a sodomitical 
relationship” (Friend 187). Similarly, Orgel disputes critics’ assumptions that Edward’s 
murder in this play conveys obvious homosexual undertones. In fact, Orgel charges most 
critics with “‘correcting’ Marlowe by reference to Holinshed” when critics, critical 
editions, and performances alike “construe the murder scene as an anal rape with a hot 
spit or poker” (Impersonations 47). Orgel and Bray excluded, most modern criticism of 
																																																								
8 This is obviously true in pseudohistorical accounts of Shakespeare’s biography, for instance. See Stephen 
Greenblatt’s Will in the World.   
9 As I explain below, I see the tendency to depend on historical documents to fill the gaps left by missing 
content in the play to be different from hearing “the king is dead” in the opening line because the opening 
line evokes the extra-textual content but the play does not evoke texts like Holinshed, which are wedged 
into the gaps to create a kind of narrative continuity that the play itself neither suggests nor requires.  
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this play hinges on the assumptions that critics make in order to fill particular gaps and 
silences in the text, based on what they think they already know.10  
Rather than confirm the affective weakness of the historical Edward II, and rather 
than locate him as a failure in terms of the usual hierarchy apparent in the binary of the 
king’s two bodies, I argue that Marlowe’s play disrupts these binaries in order to turn the 
accusation of weakness against the ideology of authority itself. The play suggests that its 
thematic conflict depicted between Edward and his peers is not that Edward attends to the 
wrong one of the king’s two bodies and ignores the other. Instead, in both thematic and 
structural elements, the play suggests that the conflict is that the concept of the king’s two 
bodies introduces ambiguity and vulnerability into the very construct intended to 
delineate power and protect the nation.  
Edward reconfigures the ideology of national power and autonomy that is tied to 
the doctrine of the king’s two bodies by exposing not only the vulnerability of the body 
temporal but also the vulnerability of the body politic, effectively amplifying the 
experience of vulnerability from the individual subject to an entire nation. The play 
accomplishes this, as I have suggested, by arresting time in the gap between “the king is 
dead” and “long live the king” with the deferred though expected conclusion evoked in 
the opening line. Moreover, the play turns the doctrine of the king’s two bodies against 
itself in three ways. First the play deploys structures that function through a disruptive 
logic, similar to catachresis, in the repeated use of grammatically symmetrical lines that 
expose their incongruity as well as in the exposed vulnerability of speakers whose lines 
should denote strength. Scaffolded by its thematic and structural ambiguities related to 
																																																								
10 This practice replicates a logic of allegory, which similarly depends upon what one thinks one knows. 
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vulnerability, the play presents three focal perspectives, ultimately privileging the most 
ambivalent one and thereby signaling the the play’s potential both for embracing 
vulnerability and for avoiding it. Finally, the play suggests a method of harnessing this 
ambivalent perspective in order to read differently the gaps and silences of the play that 
critics have scrambled to fill with details from other texts.  Edward the Second, then, 
offers more than an allegory or a cautionary tale of sovereignty. It offers more than an 
account of early modern friendship practices. The play offers an ambivalent textual 
orientation to the nature of authority.  
 
ORGANIZING AMBIGUITY, PART ONE: THE FORM AND POTENTIAL OF CATACHRESIS 
The concept of the king’s two bodies at play in Edward lends itself to allegorical 
interpretations because the two bodies create a mystical analogy that designates and 
perpetuates the authority of the king. But I have suggested the text provides a stranger 
orientation to political authority that may not be available to allegorical readings. 
Allegory, by definition, operates analogically; it compares two things based on their 
similarities. An allegory, in other words, takes something that one already knows and 
maps it onto another thing that one does not know—or, more likely another thing that one 
also already knows and wants to teach to others—by emphasizing how the two things are 
alike.11 The problem with an allegorical method of interpretation is that it creates a 
circular pattern of reading that operates by way of confirmation bias. This problem, true 
of inductive reasoning generally, is a key vulnerability of literary criticism, especially for 
																																																								
11 M.H. Abrams defines allegory as “a narrative, whether in prose or verse, in which the agents and actions, 
and sometimes the setting as well, are contrived by the author to make coherent sense on the ‘literal,’ or 
primary, level of signification, and at the same time to signify a second, correlated order of signification” 
(A Glossary of Literary Terms 5). 
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critics who study early modern texts and worry about their late modern perspectives and 
biases. Allegory specifically, and analogy generally, is unhelpful for reading textual 
instances of ambiguity, especially instances that are occupied by cuts, gaps, and 
incongruous comparisons, like when Mortimer abruptly changes his mind and Lancaster 
accuses him of “making white black and dark night day” (1.4.247, 249).  If allegory and 
analogy, as strategies of interpretation, depend on similarity, with an eye to resolution or 
reconciliation with the familiar, interpretations of difference or ambiguity require a 
different strategy.12 In contrast to translative strategies that rely on allegorical readings, I 
suggest a reading of ambiguity that deploys the logical structure of catachresis in order to 
approach the potential of literature to say something unexpected, to see past what one 
(thinks one) knows, and to approach instead what the text itself knows. Making a 
distinction between translative tropes and catachresis matters because, as I will show, 
catachresis offers alternative, and often unconsidered, ways to orient readings of 
ambiguous textual elements.    
The logical structure of catachresis, more so than other tropes, can approach new 
textual perspectives because it is abusive of the reader’s perceptions and expectations. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines catachresis, the Greek form of the Latin word 
abusio, as the “improper use of words,” the “application of a term to a thing which it does 
not properly denote,” and the abuse or perversion of a trope or metaphor.” Similarly, 
Richard Lanham identifies catachresis as “misuse, misapplication” and “abuse,” 
																																																								
12 Analogy and allegory require a logic of translation or transference. Indeed, allegory is generally 
understood by textual critics as metaphor extended into narrative. Metaphor derives its name in both Greek 
and Latin from the respective words for transfer—metaphora, Latin for  “carrying over,” which derives 
from the Greek µεταφορά (metaphorá), meaning “transfer” and itself deriving from µεταφέρω (metapherō), 
“to carry over”, “to transfer”—and operates by way of translating one thing into another (see Henry George 
Liddell and Robert Scott’s A Greek-English Lexicon for this etymology).  
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extending his definition into two parts: 1) “implied metaphor, using words wrenched 
from common usage” and 2) “an extravagant, unexpected, farfetched metaphor” (136). 
Lanham’s definition fits into a long lineage of similar understandings that identify 
catachresis as a kind of metaphor. I suggest, however, that catachresis is, paradoxically, 
the proper term for the originary or primary figure for the set of figures that includes the 
translative tropes. Though the taming of catachresis under a rubric of metaphor is 
certainly evident across the history of rhetorical considerations of the trope, the primacy 
of the catachresis over metaphor is also exists in the same classical and later texts.  
My assessment of classical, medieval, and early modern definitions of catachresis 
is informed by Judith Anderson’s analysis of primary rhetorical texts from those periods, 
though my analysis of the same content arrives at a different conclusion.13 Anderson 
orients her focus on metaphor as the primary tropic category in order to challenge an 
exclusively negative emphasis on deficiency, dissimulation, and rupture in the Roman 
rhetorics and instead to explore their broad sense of propriety and their balanced 
discussions of metaphor, even including forms of catachrestic metaphor, as productive 
and creative.14 I agree with her conclusions that metaphor is potentially transgressive and 
catachresis potentially productive, but Anderson’s organization of catachresis under a 
rubric of metaphor is problematic because she repeatedly reveals the impropriety or the 
abuse or the catachresis at the heart of metaphor and, by extension, at the heart of all 
tropes. Although she is also critical of the problems with translation, Anderson names 
																																																								
13 See her recent study, Translating Investments: Metaphor and the Dynamic of Cultural Change in Tutor-
Stuart England.  
14 Harry Berger, Jr., in his recent investigation of metaphor (Figures of a Changing World: Metaphor and 
the Emergence of Modern Culture), similarly articulates the strangeness of catachresis but continues to 
privilege metaphor as the master trope. His analysis of metaphor similarly depends upon the abusive 
strangeness typically associated with catachresis.   
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metaphor the arch-trope and catachresis a subset within the category of metaphor, along 
with the more translative tropes simile, metonymy, and dead metaphor. Yet she goes to 
great lengths to explain that metaphor itself is generative, creative, transgressive, 
improper, and even abusive. Thus, I submit that her project also identifies catachresis as 
the arch-trope and metaphor as its translative subset. Anderson herself acknowledges that 
catachresis is “something of a master trope” in certain theological contexts (129, n. 2).15 
As I will argue in a later chapter, catachresis and parable share a logical structure, and 
parable has been wrongfully tamed under a rubric of allegory thanks to the privileging of 
Greek rhetorics, especially Aristotle, over the Semitic origins and uses of parabolic 
language.16  
The classical, Latin understandings of catachresis are marked by impropriety and 
inexact usage of language by misuse and boldness or audacity, and by adaptation based 
on proximity or nearness in response to lack.17 The impropriety is taken up by medieval 
and early Renaissance texts to emphasize the ambivalence as well as the overstepping of 
bounds, or usurpation, inherent in catachresis.18 In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, usurp can mean something quite similar to the function of figure generally: “to 
take (a word or words) into use; to borrow or appropriate from another language, source, 
																																																								
15 Anderson’s insight here informs my discussions of parable in subsequent chapters.  
16 For centuries, western classical scholars ignored or suppressed the Afroasiatic—including Semitic and 
Egyptian—influences on Greek language and culture, influences acknowledged by the ancient Greeks 
themselves. Martin Bernal’s seminal study, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, 
forced a reassessment of scholars’ prior, racists assumptions about western culture.   
17 See Rhetorica Ad Herennium, Cicero’s Orator and De Oratore, and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria.  
18 See, for example, (in Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine and in Erasmus’s De Copia). Lisa Freinkel, in 
Reading Shakespeare’s Will, understands Augustine’s use of the word usurpantur in relation to figurative 
language as simply “taken up” but then, more precisely, as a rhetorical “transfer of power and function” 
(Shakespeare’s Will 162). 
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etc.; to employ use.”19 Philip Melanchthon develops the reputation of catachresis for 
being disruptive in relation to usurpation.20 He also identifies contradiction associated 
with catachresis, as when vices are called virtues.21 Similarly, English Ramist Dudley 
Fenner emphasizes the strangeness, the ambiguity, the misdirection, and significantly the 
violence of catachresis.22 He links catachresis explicitly to tropes like audacia and 
hyperbole, connecting excess to the unwanted and bold swerving from propriety. Other 
English rhetoricians pick up descriptions of catachresis familiar in the older, Latin 
rhetorics including the impropriety, abuse, misuse and substitution based on proximity.23 
Puttenham, following Quintillian, identified catachresis as “the figure of abuse” and 
understood it in terms of improper use, specifically use without proper return. Following 
Puttenham, Freinkel, in Reading Shakespeare’s Will and “The Use of the Fetish,” 
understands catachresis as a paradoxical but necessary figure that abusively compensates 
for the lacks in propriety itself, that has no firm or proper origin and no disciplining 
teleology to ultimately “set right” its impropriety. These understandings of catachresis 
resonate with Sarah Ahmed’s description of the ways in which orientations become taken 
as proper, ingrained, expected, and eventually ignored or taken for granted, versus those 
orientations that upset expectations and overstep the bounds of so called proper 
																																																								
19 Erasmus uses the word in this sense in De Copia, as does Ben Jonson in Poetaster and John Milton in 
Eikonoklastes. 
20 This is Judith Anderson’s assertion in Translating Investments. 
21 See his Elementorum Rhetorices. English teacher Richard Sherry similarly ties catachresis to usurpation 
in A Treatise of the Figures of Grammar and Rhetorike. 
22 See Fenner’s Artes of Logike and Rhetorike, which is a translation and adaptation of the Latin text 
Audomari Talaiei Rhetorica by Omer Talon, a colleague of Pierre de la Ramee.  
23 See Thomas Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique, Henry Peacham’s The Garden of Eloquence, and George 
Puttenham’s Art of English Poesie. 
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perspective. Just as Ahmed’s queer trajectory has no intention of returning to the familiar, 
normative, and originary path, catachresis announces its nonreturn, its nonrepayment to 
the terms out of which it creates itself as if it created itself from nothing.24 If catachresis 
generates from nothing, it is neither created by nor a subset of metaphor.   
I posit that catachresis names a primary or originary tropic category that is 
capable of approaching textual unknowns that elude the interpretations of late modern 
readers. The tropic trajectory of new-to-old, that I proffer below indicates the potential 
inclusiveness of catachresis, an inclusiveness that risks abusing and being abused in order 
to approach inarticulate or as yet untranslatable meaning. Catachresis, according to 
Quintilian, names the creation of terms that stand in linguistic gaps, vehicles that 
originate according not to similarity with the tenors they signify but to proximity or 
orientation to those tenors.25 Its origin untraceable, catachresis generates in the improper 
borrowing of language from elsewhere without gestures of return or repayment. If it 
functions like a transfer, the transfer moves only in one direction.26 In other words, 
catachresis has affinities with translation but it also rejects or deflects it. The movement 
																																																								
24 Similarly, Brinkema claims that “theorizing affective replis [folds, or frames] involves thinking a 
construct that can never be returned to the thinker in its for-me dimension: a repli that does not reply” (36). 
25 See Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria 8.6.34. Catachresis, then, signals a textual move to fill the cuts, gaps, 
and silences before history fills those breaks for certain critics. 
26 Following Quintilian, Lisa Freinkel describes catachresis as a “contradiction in terms—a necessary 
abuse—[… that] destabilizes the notion of propriety itself [and] suggest[s] the ultimate untenability of any 
hard and fast distinction between abuse and translation” (Reading Shakespeare’s Will 161). She suggests, 
then, that all catachreses are translations, all translations abusive, and that differentiating the two terms 
either impossible or unproductive. Elsewhere, she describes catachresis as a kind of figural translation-in-
process: an “improper transfer” that is never properly translated, never settled or at home but always 
wandering, always turning, always troping (“Use of Fetish” 116). Freinkel also describes this endless 
movement of catachresis as a time-stopping perpetual turning in Petrarch, and as the basis underlying the 
logic of Luther’s notion of conversion. 
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of catachresis has no originary source toward which it may translate in reverse.27 It is, 
then, a translation without translation, but to define catachresis as such is to suggest that 
it is not just an improper translation but that it is not a translation at all.28 Instead 
catachresis marks the boundary of what is translatable. Therefore, catachresis also 
identifies the boundary of what is knowable and what is representable in literature. Thus, 
I assert the usefulness of catachresis, distinct from the translative figures, for discussing 
potentially incomprehensible textual elements.  
Rather than dissolve the strangeness of catachresis into the familiarity of 
translation I suggest that catachresis may be more usefully oriented on a spectrum of 
figure that traces a trajectory from new to old, starting with the unexpected or abusive in 
catachresis and moving through the novel turns of language in metaphor and other 
translative tropes before declining into dead metaphor and cliché (see Figure 1.2).29  
 
																																																								
27 As Freinkel says, catachresis, like fetish, is built upon lack (“Use of Fetish” 119).  
28 Also informed by Derrida’s “Des Tours,” my thinking here is logically similar Judith Butler’s explication 
of loss in Freud’s theories of mourning and melancholia in her Psychic Life of Power. She writes,  
In mourning, Freud tells us, there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious. In melancholia, he 
maintains, ‘the object-loss is withdrawn from consciousness’: the object is not only lost, but that 
loss itself is lost, withdrawn and preserved in the suspended time of psychic life. In other words, 
according to the melancholic, ‘I have lost nothing’ (183).  
That is to say, the loss of loss is the loss of nothing; there is no loss. Put another way, the loss of loss is, 
then, loss without loss. Loss without loss cannot be understood as loss because the loss is unrecognizable, 
incomprehensible. Similarly, translation without translation cannot be recognized as translation.  
29 Part of the nature of the abuse that catachresis inflicts is visualized in Figure 1.2. Anderson also 
understands the relationship between tropes as though they were organized on a spectrum, with catachresis 
as a more extreme kind of metaphor. Rhetoricians and theorists of rhetorical style advise a pattern of 
writing that moves along a trajectory that spans from old to new, not new to old. See, for example Joseph 
Williams’s Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace. This old-new principle helps readers follow complex 
arguments by leaving a trail of information that they already know or have just come to understand by 
virtue of reading the argument in question. Catachresis inflicts the abuse of overturning this pattern, 
articulating something new out of something not yet known, thereby leaving the reader floundering to 
understand.  
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    NEW   (Translative)    OLD 
 
 Catachresis  Metaphor        Dead Metaphor 
   Simile          Cliché  
(Unknown) Allegory 
        Analogy 
        
    (Known) 
 
Incomprehensible     Comprehensible         Familiar  
 
 
Figure 2.1: A Spectrum of Tropes.  
 
The uppermost, solid arrow visualizes a tropic trajectory approaching the limits of what 
can be represented, what I call the Unknown/Known Horizon, and extended to the 
familiar. The bottom, dotted arrows indicate the shift from the unknown to the known, 
the unrepresentable to the representable, that happens to the right of this horizon, moving 
from the incomprehensible to the comprehensible and therefore translatable.   
 
 
New readings come into this spectrum from catachrestic figures, and not from the clichéd 
or dead figures.30 When instances of catachresis stagnate in definitive translations, they 
shift into the translative space of the metaphor, just as metaphors shift to cliché when 
they die or become hackneyed.31 Once either of these shifts occurs, though, the new 
cliché cannot return to being a fresh metaphor nor can the metaphor return to the abuse it 
																																																								
30 Of course, these stale figures may be abused anew, thereby emerging as new instances of catachresis. In 
other words, the tropic spectrum I have laid out in a line may also fold back on itself to form a circle, by 
virtue of reorienting the ways one interprets settled, stale, or over done readings of texts.  
31 All metaphor, then, has catachresis and therefore nothing at its origin. This formulation is similar to 
Derrida’s insight on catachresis and metaphor in “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” 
appearing in Margins of Philosophy, an insight which he also implies in “Des Tours.” Following Derrida, 
Freinkel likewise proffers “the ultimate catachrestic structure of all metaphor” (Shakespeare’s Will 161). 
Indeed, as Judith Anderson also notices, both Freinkel and Patricia Parker link the early Greek and Roman 
understandings of catachresis in Ad Herennium, Cicero’s De Oratore, and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria 
to Derrida’s understanding of the trope in “White Mythology.”  
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may have inflicted upon its first strange comparison as catachresis. If clichés are those 
commonplaces that readers may ignore because they have become the common sense 
readings of texts, then clichés constitute a formalization of readerly blindness.32 
Not open to gestures of return as translative tropes are, catachresis instead names 
a new creation, a neologism, a wonder, a miracle, and entails a conversion or a 
transgression of propriety that causes something new to emerge.33 My project does not 
attempt to theorize transgression or representations of transgression. Instead, its 
methodology is itself transgressive, in the way that Ahmed considers her methodology 
queer, because it orients itself differently from, and intentionally does not follow, 
disciplinary paths laid out by others. Ahmed claims that when one follows the paths 
followed by others before, “the repetition of the act of following makes the line disappear 
from view as the point from which ‘we’ emerge” (15). In other words, the path 
disappears from view and is taken for granted as the right or natural way. Ahmed writes, 
under these circumstances, that “a good life” follows the path laid out for it while “a 
queer life might be one that fails to make such gestures of return” (21). When Dollimore 
aims to describe what he calls the necessary containment of transgression, he identifies 
																																																								
32 Stallybrass and White mount a similar project with Mikhail Bakhtin’s work on the carnivalesque in The 
Politics and Poetics of Transgression in which they aim to overcome “Bakhtin’s troublesome folkloric 
approach” insofar as the folkloric may be equated to a kind of common sense that maintains unproductive 
binary categories and equally unproductive critical debates (26).  
33 Transgression is of course a loaded term. I cannot proffer my own transgressive investigation without 
tracing the, often nomadic, genealogy of my own thinking on the subject, which cannot but be informed by 
a trajectory of prior theoretical investigations, leading from Nietzsche and Sade to Bataille and Foucault 
and on to Deleuze and his similarly nomadic and perverse intellectual descendants, Rosi Braidoti and 
Elizabeth Grosz. Likewise, I cannot begin to discuss transgression in early modern literature without 
acknowledging my indebtedness to the work of critics like Jonathan Dollimore, Peter Stallybrass, and 
Allon White. Though my project also has many affinities with these investigations of transgression, my 
project’s transgressive investigation differs from previous studies by focusing specifically on textual 
perspectives and introducing textual affective orientations as an inroad to new understandings of the early 
modern English ideological contexts of politics, religion, and identity.  
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“Renaissance metaphysics” as if it were itself a contained unity that might be described, 
acquiesced to, or undermined, but not easily changed. The kind of containment proffered 
by Dollimore draws the boundaries of his orientation to the subject of transgression, an 
orientation that (like all orientations) is necessarily fraught with blind spots, the likes of 
which my project aims to see. As the introduction makes clear, my project calls on 
critics—including myself— to acknowledge and learn from our own blindnesses. A 
catachrestic reading method is transgressive because it oversteps the horizons of 
perspective, knowledge, and critical paths laid out by others, as well as interpretive 
defenses that the text itself creates.34 Catachrestic textual elements both identify and 
defend these horizons, these limits that potentially evoke a text’s blindnesses and 
unknown unknowns. Many early modern instances of catachresis are deployed by writers 
when language otherwise fails to capture or indicate meanings. Take for example 
Hamlet’s best-known soliloquy, which needs “to take arms against a sea of troubles” in 
order to gesture toward the ambivalence the character struggles to articulate. Thus, I 
contend that understanding the abuses of catachresis as distinct from translative tropes 
keeps open the potential of language to move, the potential for literature to approach the 
limits of what can be said.  
As an instance of abuse, catachresis is also a textual self-defense—rendering itself 
incomprehensible to the reader who would comprehend—and an attack on itself that 
threatens its own, in Stanley Fish’s terms, self-consumption. Catachresis wavers between 
comprehension and incomprehension because it abuses language by strangely, or 
improperly, forcing together signifiers that do not correspond to their signifieds, or tenors 
																																																								
34 The horizon of perspective is visually represented in the Johari window by the lines dividing the hidden 
and blind panes from the unknown pane. 
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that do not correspond to their vehicles, while implying that a correspondence 
nonetheless exists. Thus the logical structure of catachresis helps orient other kinds of 
incomprehensible or ambiguous or ambivalent textual habits insofar as these habits 
constitute ways in which a text may reject and call for interpretation, may deny and 
reconstitute the interpretive biases of the reader, may rebuff and replicate the cultural 
contexts in which it was formed.35 Catachresis, then, helps structure one of a text’s 
possible orientations to the culture that produced it: a double orientation of both rejection 
and desire. This is to say that catachresis names a figure that operates by the same logic 
as the affect called disgust because it flickers between rejection and attraction, toward 
and within, the comparisons it figures.36  
 
WEAK STRENGTH, STRONG WEAKNESS:   READING CATACHRESTICALLY  
The logic of catachresis is especially useful for reading the thematics of Edward 
the Second because the central conflict of the play stems from an abuse of the throne, and 
therefore the nation, that results in the abusive death that Edward faces in consequence. 
Janet Clare has argued that the structural elements of Marlowe’s texts operate as abuse, 
as “an assault on the audience’s sensory perceptions” (87).  The formal elements suggest 
the ways in which Edward itself may be oriented toward its audiences. Furthermore, the 
																																																								
35 I am not suggesting that other instances of ambiguity are necessarily themselves instances of catachresis. 
I am simply suggesting that catachresis offers a useful way to approach their ambiguous elements that does 
not resort to translation into the familiar. This is another way in which what I call a yes, and approach 
advocates for a hospitable relationship between text and reader.    
36 Judith Anderson acknowledges the ambivalence (ambi-valence) of the Greek and Latin terms for 
catachresis. In Greek kata and chresthai and in Latin abusio, the terms at once signify positively and 
negatively. For catachresis, Anderson attributes positively the following defining features of the trope: to 
“use polysemously,” to “apply, extend,” to “transfer,” to “use tropically,” to “use completely or boldly or 
with significant force” (Translating 150). On the negative side of this compound term, she attributes 
“misuse,” to “use excessively (too boldly),” to “use degeneratively,” to “use diachronously or literally,” 
and to “use improperly” (150). She attributes to the Latin abusio the same ambivalence (150).  
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logic of catachresis offers a new perspective on the contradictory parallel structures 
typical of Marlovian style as well as the impossible necessity of interpreting what is not 
articulated in the text, whether in textual gaps, scripted silences, or evocative but unstated 
references to knowledge that arrives in the lack left by these kinds of unarticulated 
meaning. Though they do not proffer a catachrestic reading method, both Charles Forker 
and Stephen Greenblatt see Marlowe deploying and then disrupting translative, 
allegorical methods. In his introduction to the play, Forker writes, “Despite [Marlowe’s] 
use of emblematic figures such as the Mower and Lightborn (whom critics have often 
associated with the medieval Vice), Marlowe generally eschews the semi-allegorical, 
morality-play approach to the dramatization of history with its easily defined exemplars 
of good and evil” (88). Furthermore, Greenblatt, in an early version of “Marlowe and 
Renaissance Self-fashioning,” asserts that Marlowe disrupts allegorical methods “in 
Edward II Marlowe [by using] the emblematic method of admonitory drama… to such 
devastating effect that the audience recoils from it in disgust” (52). By exposing the ways 
in which interpretations of his play are complicit in the orientation of disgust and by 
revealing the vulnerable position of both sovereign and interpretive authority, Marlowe’s 
text reconfigures the ways in which the strengths of authority may be understood as 
weaknesses and suggests a model for reading itself catachrestically, offering the potential 
for new critical perspectives on how this play orients itself to figures of authority in its 
culture of origin. 
The language of Edward the Second brims with opposing forces of symmetry and 
conflict, of being at one and at odds. In their introductory comments on Marlowe’s play, 
Frank Romany and Robert Lindsey identify both symmetry and conflict as key structural 
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features of Edward: these parallels delineate “irreconcilable conflict” and “verbal contest 
is everywhere” (xi-xxix).37 The kinds of conflicts to which Romany and Lindsey refer 
arrange themselves as a series of hierarchical relationships between power and weakness, 
king and subjects, high class and low class. Of course, these relationships also expose the 
conflicts that drive the plot of the play by showing characters with opposing agendas 
butting against each other rhetorically. At the same time, the text of the play creates a 
kind of rhetorical vulnerability that disrupts the authority of sovereignty in particular 
moments of dramatic conflict when lines spoken by opposing factions—Edward and his 
peers—are arranged in pairs that are at once grammatically parallel and incongruous. 
These rhetorical conflicts deploy language in registers that should denote the speakers’ 
strengths but instead exposes the speakers’ vulnerabilities through incompatible links 
between the paired lines. Again, the opening lines suggest one way in which the play 
manages this phenomenon.  
The play’s opening line is paired with a line that it evokes, a line that exists within 
the culture rather than within the narrative time of the play, a line that the play ignores or 
at least defers. By this I mean that no one has voiced the words “The king is dead; long 
live the king,” but the familiar phrase corresponds to the opening line in a way that calls 
attention to the similarities and the differences in this equivalence. The opening line 
suggests the slipping of sovereign power might be represented in language:    
“The king is dead” becomes “‘My father is deceased …””  
“long live the king” becomes “‘…come, Gaveston…’” (1.1.1)  
																																																								
37 See their comments in The Complete Plays by Christopher Marlowe.   
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In both cases, Edward’s father is dead, but in the iteration voiced by the play, Edward 
does not take on the responsibility left to him by the death of his father. Instead, Edward 
will come with his friend to play at being king. The primacy of Edward’s version of 
irresponsible kingship over the familiar gloss of kingly primogeniture is first emphasized 
by this difference. Once the difference is established, the absence of “long live the king” 
becomes palpable. The intensity of its lack is reinforced further by the line’s dual 
voicing: first spoken in the narrative time of the play by Gaveston, but quoted by him 
from a letter presumably first penned by Edward outside of narrative time. Arriving from 
elsewhere, these words exist both inside and outside of the narrative time of the play and 
are already repeated, just like the words of succession that they serve to replace. This pair 
of lines, then, one voiced explicitly and one not, create an ambiguous symmetry that 
shifts the position of strength from the lines that uphold the supremacy of the sovereign 
to privilege lines that undo the sovereign’s responsibility to the state. The priority to 
direct the focus of the play is granted to lines whose content should under usual 
circumstances represent the weaker of the pair: elevating Edward’s desire over continuity 
for the state. Haunted by language that is not voiced but that stands for sovereign 
strength, this play’s inaugural line anticipates nearly all of the play’s rhetorical conflicts 
by establishing the central focus on a king who defies convention, who oversteps his 
bounds, who abuses his sovereign authority as well as duty, who is himself abused. The 
initial focal or orienting perspective of this play, then, is a catachrestic vision of a king.   
Once Edward disjoints the order of succession, he undermines himself as king by 
turning the death of his father into an opportunity to share the kingdom with Gaveston. In 
consequence of divided sovereign authority, the language that executes the directives of 
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that authority begins to lose its force, disrupting the king’s power to use language to 
affect material reality. Insofar as decrees may be made, taxes levied, favors and titles 
granted at his whim, a king’s power largely depends upon his words having the power to 
execute actions and on his subjects obeying his utterances. A king’s power, then, exists 
largely by way of the perlocutionary action of language (to use J.L. Austin’s phrase) in 
which the utterance itself makes something so.38 Because the play seems to occupy the 
time between “the king is dead” and “long live the king,” and because the authority of the 
state, the body politic, has no new body to inhabit, the language of authority loses force 
without a proper king to authorize it.    
Despite evacuating his own authority to speak as king, Edward nonetheless 
expects language to perform his will. Edward’s will directly confronts the will of his 
peers, and their conflict is formalized in juxtaposed pairs of rhetorically symmetrical 
lines. In each instance, the king’s speech should carry the force to enact the will of the 
monarch, but Edward’s peers thwart his rhetorical assertions of material power. For 
example, when Mortimer voices the threat that the nobles will not stand to be ruled by a 
king who is ruled by his minion—“Their downfall is at hand, their forces down; We will 
not thus be faced and overpeered”—Edward calls for his guards to  
Lay hands on that traitor Mortimer!  
in a show of force that names the peers’ response treasonous and targets Mortimer as the 
ringleader of the rebellion (1.4.18-20). Here, Edward, speaking as king, uses the language 
																																																								
38 The force of the words to act depends upon the context and the authority with which they are uttered. For 
instance, a penalty is enacted by a guilty pronouncement in a courtroom by a judge, or, similarly, the 
legality of marriage enacted by both parties saying “I do” and an authorized representative of the state 
pronouncing a couple married. But neither event is actually binding when actors in a film make the same 
pronouncements. See Austin’s How to Do Things with Words.  
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of power and kingly authority to overcome a show of force levied against him. He 
expects his words to materialize as force in the world that leads to the arrest of one who 
defies the authority of the king. But Edward’s show of rhetorical force here does not 
maintain his authority: his words do not lead to the arrest of Mortimer. Edward’s 
command and the lack of ensuing action against Mortimer reveal that the power of the 
king is directly tied to language and that language is failing Edward as a king disjointed 
from both time and power. Without his body politic to back him, which is itself bestowed 
in the language, “long live the king,” Edward’s words are no more authoritative than 
anyone else’s.  
The vulnerability of the position of king is literalized in Edward when his kingly 
language fails him. When Edward’s language has no power, then Edward has no power. 
Edward’s rhetorical cover of kingly authority falls away the moment no one seizes “that 
traitor Mortimer” and Edward’s vulnerability as king is revealed in the consequences of 
the parallel line spoken by Mortimer Senior:   
  Lay hands on that traitor Gaveston! (1.4.21)  
Mortimer Senior’s line matches the structure of Edward’s line but reverses the content: 
the traitor to the nation here is not his nephew Mortimer but Gaveston. Mortimer Senior’s 
language, unlike Edward’s, has consequences: the guards seize Gaveston. In the space of 
one line, the peers’ overthrow of the king is underway. It seems as though the sovereign 
power to command through language has shifted alliances from the king to the peers. 
Edward is vulnerable while the peers are strong. Edward’s power has been thwarted and 
peers’ has been extended.39  This alone is a disruption of sovereign authority, but it 
																																																								
39 This dynamic happens again when Edward says: “Look to your own heads, he [Gaveston] is sure enough; 
and Warwick replies: “Look to your own crown, if you back him thus” (2.2.92-93). 
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amounts to more than power changing hands. This play is not interested in simply the 
overthrow of a weak king by a strong peer. When Mortimer Senior’s parallel response 
does result in real-world consequences, he decimates Edward’s show of rhetorical force, 
but he also shows that the power to command is not God-given, not mystical. A king is 
powerful, then, because a culturally agreed-upon doctrine establishes his right to rule.   
Mortimer Junior delivers a similarly parallel line toward the end of his short rise 
to power, though this time Mortimer’s line matches one spoken by Edward’s son:  
Edward III: My lord, he is my uncle and shall live.  
Mortimer:  My lord, he is your enemy and shall die. ( 5.4.90-1)40  
Structurally parallel, Mortimer’s line reacts with force to the young Edward’s demand 
that his uncle Kent live. The differences between these lines are more striking than their 
similarities, and more striking than the differences in the prior example. Highlighted by 
this difference, the key words in this pair of lines are my uncle, live, your enemy, and die. 
It follows the natural inclination of reason and good sense that one’s uncle should live 
and one’s enemy should die. But that is not what happens here. Mortimer tries to hang the 
charge of treason onto Kent by aligning him with Edward II. However, aligning with 
Edward II cannot be treasonous if Edward III is king by way of the natural line of 
succession. In fact, Mortimer did not stage the coups that would overthrow Edward II, 
renounce Edward III’s right to the throne, and install Mortimer as king. Instead, Edward 
II has given control to his son upon relinquishing the crown prior to his death, saying 
“Commend me to my son, and bid him rule better than I” (5.1.121-2). Thus, Edward III 
rules by virtue of his father preemptively granting him that right. It is illogical to call 
																																																								
40 One may also make the point that Edward III challenges authority and gains power here in a reversal of 
the prior shows of rhetorical force, but that point is not developed in this chapter.   
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treasonous loyalty to Edward II, a loyalty which clearly transfers Edward III. Kent, then, 
cannot be Edward III’s enemy, as Mortimer claims. Mortimer is the enemy and Kent dies 
for it. When Mortimer’s language blurs the line between uncle and enemy in order to 
denounce Kent as treasonous, it also blurs the lines between live and die. Clearly, 
Edward’s uncle cannot both live and die. But kings can. The differences between these 
words must be blurred in order to make the proclamation that governs the beginning of 
this play as well as the ending: The king is dead; long live the king. This proclamation 
that ensures divine right to rule is passed from father to son rests on the idea that the 
king’s body politic cannot die. Mortimer’s machinations to come to power through 
language, then, fall apart in this exchange because the king is living, and the new king is 
living, and now the body politic, which collapses the many of the nation into the one 
body of the king, has multiplied. The force of Mortimer’s language in this exchange may 
enact the death of Kent against the will of either of the two kings Edward, but the 
ambiguity his line creates begins to unravel the language of authority to which Mortimer 
also clings to enact the blunt force of his brief rule.  
The language registering sovereignty has, in the examples so far, occupied the 
second position of the two paired lines because the second line has the last word, so to 
speak, insofar as it has been the second line that effected an act of violence in each 
example. However, in the symmetrical pairs of lines that feature Edward speaking the 
second line, Edward does not use language to make an effective show of force but instead 
to expose his own vulnerability. The structures that have previously marked “verbal 
contest” and rhetorical triumph in this play now structure Edward’s abject weakness. The 
language of emotion marks the final lines in these pairs. However, it is at the same time 
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in these instances that Edward’s language is most forceful because these lines carry more 
power to focalize the textual perspective on his character. Rather than depending on the 
effective, though tyrannical, force of violence and sovereign strength bestowed by the 
mystical transference of sovereign authority, these lines derive force from the vulnerable 
position of fallible human responsibility. For example, when Spenser explains his parting 
with the king by deferring responsibility onto the divine, saying, 
  so will the angry heavens,  
Edward corrects his placement of blame in a matching structure:  
  so will hell and cruel Mortimer. (4.7.73-4)  
Spenser’s lines detach authority from both Edward and Mortimer and instead leave the 
kingdom at the mercy of heaven. Though Edward does not accept personal responsibility 
here, he will not defer to language of sacred judgment as another discourse of power that 
oversees or validates human interactions and protects human agents (in this case 
Mortimer) from taking responsibility for their actions. Edward will not bend to sacred 
authority, but he does place the blame on the man who has ensured his downfall. 
Unwilling to grant Mortimer’s stance the credibility of alignment with God or the good or 
even righteous anger that “the angry heavens” might represent, Edward diminishes 
Mortimer’s judgment by linking it to evil and hell. Moreover, by humanizing Mortimer’s 
will in contrast to the sacred, Edward denies that Mortimer’s right to rule is sanctioned by 
God, therefore calling into question the sacred sanctioning of all kings as well as the 
mystical sanctioning of the body politic.  
When Edward pronounces that heaven is not involved in the judgments that have 
passed over him, he acknowledges the human anxiety that heaven has relinquished 
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control, that hope cannot be assured, that prince and pauper alike will face death and no 
amount of religious or political language, authorized or not, will stop it. What Edward 
does suggest, in this and similar parallel lines, is that acting without clinging to the 
authority of a higher power, be it religious or political, renders one not only responsible 
for oneself but also vulnerable.41 Edward’s lines here show that the position of 
vulnerability allows one to see the structures that one has built up to protect oneself from 
being vulnerable, that these structures undergird both the individual and the hierarchies 
that support the powerful within a culture, and, most importantly, that these structures are 
themselves fragile.  
In the play’s instances of structural parallelism described here, the language of 
authority ceases to function as the play’s audiences would expect. In each instance, 
language that should carry authoritative force becomes impotent. The pairs of 
symmetrical lines work to establish first the ambiguity and weakness of authoritative 
language and, as a result, the tenuousness of kingly authority. Lines that mirror each 
other syntactically but contradict in content create symmetrical boundaries between the 
characters who have organized themselves into opposing loyalties, which in turn parallel 
the potentially opposed values represented by the two bodies of the king. These syntactic 
																																																								
41 Whereas the prior pair of lines, highlight the vulnerable position of sovereign responsibility, two other 
pairs of lines focus on Edward’s vulnerability as an individual. Edward exposes his vulnerability in similar 
structures in at least two other examples of parallel lines. See his exchange with Gurney: 
Gurney: Your passions make your dolours to increase.  
Edward: This usage makes my misery increase. (5.3.15-16) 
See also his exchange with Lightborn:  
Lightborn: What means your highness to mistrust me thus?  
Edward: What means thou to dissemble with me thus? (5.5.79-80). 
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boundaries expose both the weaknesses of the characters and fissures in the system of 
sovereignty that governs the king’s right to rule. Thus, these rhetorical shows of force 
uncover the vulnerabilities that such shows mean to hide, revealing that authority is 
precariously propped up by language. The anxiety this division names and avoids is the 
anxiety that kingly authority, and perhaps all authority, is based on nothing. Marlowe 
obscures this anxiety in the parallel structures of this play by evoking the language of 
authority and rank while seemingly to engage in rhetorical battles with clear winners and 
losers. But, like young Edward’s uncle-enemy, the lines between friends and foes, king 
and subjects, strengths and weaknesses, and between the kings two bodies are not so 
neatly differentiated.  
The play conceives of this kind of ambivalence in a derogatory term that 
Mortimer uses to describe Gaveston: “a night-grown mushroom” (1.4.284). In their 
explanatory note, most editors cite Tilley’s axiomatic explanation for Mortimer’s turn of 
phrase: “Because mushrooms grow overnight, this metaphor was proverbially used to 
describe the unprecedented rise of an upstart.”42 I acknowledge that the proverbial 
implications of an organism sprouting overnight applies to Gaveston as a lower-born man 
whom the nobles perceive as a threat to their authority. The problem with this 
explanation, though, is that Gaveston is not the catachrestic creature that the peers 
envision him to be. As minion, he is not simply an upstart arising as if from nowhere. 43  
Gaveston finds precedence for his command of the king’s favor in the example of the 
																																																								
42 See Romany and Lindsay 652, note 284; and Forker 173 note 284.  
43 Though Marlowe and his contemporaries may not have understood the morphology and reproductive 
practices of mushrooms, they did know that mushrooms were not self-generating but that their reproduction 
had to do with existing mushrooms releasing spores. Later mycologists realized that the surface appearance 
of a mushroom substantiates the existence of a much larger organism underground. See G.C. Ainsworth’s 
Introduction to the History of Mycology.  
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minions of “the mightiest kings” and “the wisest men” (1.4.390, 394). Furthermore, 
Gaveston sets the precedent in this play for the rising of other upstarts, namely Spencer 
and Baldock. Gaveston is likewise reproduced by Spencer and Baldock. The play, I 
suggest, remembers Gaveston in these characters, his association with the natural body 
shifting to inhabit new bodies and thereby persisting according to the same logic as the 
persistence of the body politic. 
Mortimer’s mushroom metaphor for Gaveston intends to categorize him neatly as 
a threat that may be easily contained and squelched, but the play imagines the upstarts 
persisting well past Gaveston’s personal demise. After all, Edward is able to prevail 
against the peers as long as he does because Gaveston’s spawned replacements side with 
the king. The proverbial explanation of mushrooms is overturned by this play in favor of 
the generative connotations of the mushroom. In this image, the play suggests that the 
state persists because of the natural and vulnerable lives of men and women who support 
it, not because a mystical ideal body protects the state from death and decay. 
Furthermore, the memory of Gaveston as threat persists in the peers’ rebellion 
itself. If Gaveston’s rise in fortune were actually the problem, the peers would end their 
rebellion against Edward once they kill Gaveston. The peers’ objections to Gaveston that 
implicate the desires of the king’s natural body is a cover for a more sinister threat that 
arises from the body politic. Mortimer, imagining the minds of the earls and barons as 
collectively singular rather than dispersed, accuses Gaveston of “ambitious pride” and of 
being “the ruin of the realm and us” (1.2.31-2, 29). Mortimer imagines Gaveston as a real 
threat to the state, but by scapegoating him, Mortimer conceals the real threat Mortimer 
himself poses in his own prideful and ambitious rise to power. Gaveston, then, is not the 
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threat, and his death does not reunite the state. The body politic can produce similar kinds 
of upstarts (Mortimer) that are more threatening to the state than the natural desires of 
Edward. Thus the natural body, like the politic body, is both singular and dispersed 
across bodies, suggesting the opposite of the security that the division of the king’s two 
bodies intends to offer for the preservation of the state. The play, then, develops the idea 
that the body politic is no different than the body natural. Both are always already subject 
to demise, their vulnerability increasing as more fallible bodies, more fallible 
perspectives—as all first-person perspectives are—become implicated in the preservation 
of the state. Edward suggests a textual orientation to sovereign power that wavers 
between acknowledging and undoing its force.  
 
 
THE KING’S THREE BODIES: EDWARD’S GUIDE TO CATACHRESTIC INTERPRETATION  
Edward’s ambivalent orientation to sovereign power suggests one way in which 
the play offers its own method for reading that uses a logic of catachresis to help manage 
its many incongruities. The play interrogates three models of reading by strategically 
thematizing three focal interpretive perspectives, which might be understood as the three 
separate and conflicting orientations of the king’s bodies: the body natural thematized by 
Gaveston’s perspective, the body politic thematized by Mortimer’s, and that of Edward’s 
ambiguous and vulnerable body thematized by Edward himself. I suggest that these focal 
perspectives highlight ways in which a logic of ambivalence underpins the possible 
interpretations of textual gaps and significant silences. I argue that the play ultimately 
settles on a model of reading, a textual orientation, that embraces rather than resolves 
silence and ambiguity.  
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Gaveston poses a complex interpretive model simply because Gaveston himself is 
a difficult character to read. Even the peers have trouble penning Gaveston in a consistent 
interpretation. When they refer to him as “minion” they try to contain him in the space of 
subordination, but when they call him an “upstart” they accuse him of rising above his 
station, of being uncontained. The character of Gaveston introduces ambiguity into this 
play that critics are clearly attuned to because they continue to try to resolve it, often in 
less charitable understandings of Gaveston’s position. To take a critical stance that rejects 
Gaveston as a kind of corrupter of the king is to adopt the peers’ reading of Gaveston as 
an upstart. I propose, however, that a more sympathetic reading of Gaveston is not only 
possible but also necessary to this play’s conception of sovereignty.  
Gaveston’s “draw[ing] the pliant king” is most often cited by critics as evidence 
of Gaveston’s ambition and disregard for Edward. Such readings focus on Gaveston’s 
claim that he can control Edward and, in turn, on Edward’s own malleability. I suggest, 
conversely, that a reading of this line need not be focused on the pliancy of the king but 
may also focus on the delight in pleasing Edward because it inaugurates a sustained 
description of seduction focused on pleasurable activities that Gaveston will initiate, as 
he says, to “best please his majesty, My lord” (1.1.70-1). Insofar as the perspective of the 
body natural is tied to desire, and insofar as Gaveston is the focal object of desire for 
Edward, reading Gaveston as invested in pleasing the king makes more sense than 
reading him as ruthlessly ambitious. Furthermore, Gaveston’s personal ambition is not 
expressly represented elsewhere in the play. For example, Gaveston does not ask for, nor 
flaunts, the titles and honors Edward bestows upon him, but he receives them by 
refocusing on his love for Edward, saying,  
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  It shall suffice me to enjoy your love,  
  Which whiles I have, I think myself as great 
  As Caesar riding in the Roman street 
With captive kings at his triumphant car. (1.1.170-3) 
Gaveston makes no mention of the material benefits he receives from Edward. If readings 
take Gaveston at his word, the love of Edward is sufficient. To assert that these lines 
reveal Gaveston still playing upon the heartstrings of his pliant king to his own advantage 
by accepting his advancements so graciously is to read between the lines, to read already 
under the influence of the peers’ perspective of Gaveston, to privilege Gaveston’s ability 
to manipulate “the pliant king” over Gaveston’s love for his friend.  
Similarly, just before Gaveston dies at the hands of the peers, his demands to see 
Edward might be read as demands motivated not by love but by self-preservation. Amid 
the conversation between Arundel and Warwick as they discuss whether or not they will 
“gratify the king” by permitting Edward to see Gaveston before they kill him, Gaveston 
draws attention to his devotion to Edward, yet the peers either dismiss him or do not 
mark him (2.5.42). Responding to Arundel’s reported promise from Edward that “He will 
be mindful of the courtesy” if they allow him to see Gaveston, Warwick asks:  
  How now? (2.5.41)  
But the line is broken by Gaveston’s interjection:  
    Renowned Edward, how thy name  
  Revives poor Gaveston! (2.5.41-2)  
And Warwick continues:  
No, it needeth not, 
Arundel; we will gratify the king  
In other matters;… (2.5.42-3) 
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Though some editors punctuate Warwick’s continued “No, it needeth not” with a period 
as though he were responding to Gaveston, others punctuate it with a comma as though 
Warwick does not hear Gaveston and simply continues speaking to Arundel. In the one 
case, Warwick says, “No, Edward’s name need not revive poor Gaveston.” In the other 
case, Warwick says, “No, we need not gratify the king this way; we will in other ways.” 
Though I recognize that arguments on punctuation are difficult to substantiate in early 
modern literature, none of the early modern printings of Marlowe’s play punctuate these 
lines in a way that indicates definitively that Gaveston’s interjection is either heard or 
responded to by Warwick and Arundel.44 If the peers do not hear Gaveston’s 
exclamation, then Gaveston’s revival by Edward’s name may indicate an honest devotion 
to Edward beyond self-interest. If the peers hear Gaveston and dismiss him, then he need 
not continue a ruse of devotion to Edward in order to preserve his own life because he 
will die either way. Yet he does continue this devotion, focusing on his “Sweet 
sovereign” up to his final line in the play “Shall I not see the king?” (2.5.92; 2.6.15).  
The problem, in these and other examples, is that it is impossible to determine 
how and when Gaveston should be read with sympathy to his perspective. But the 
ambiguity that Gaveston introduces to critical interpretation reflects the problem with 
sovereignty that this play explores. Just as Gaveston unsettles the play, the king’s natural 
body is unsettling for the state. Otherwise it would not have to be managed by the 
idealized body politic. The natural body introduces ambiguity and fallibility into one’s 
ability to govern. The notion of the body politic tries to hide the fact that the king is only 
human. By unsettling the usual hierarchy of the king’s two bodies and offering a 
																																																								
44 My discussion below of Mortimer’s unpointed Latin line suggests that Marlowe was well aware of 
interpretive reliance on and ambiguity of punctuation. 
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sympathetic reading of the king’s personal desires through the ambiguity introduced by 
his natural body, this play turns the analogy meant to perpetuate the power of the king 
over the state into a relationship that puts the king’s body at odds with the good of the 
state. Internally divided and now irredeemable by the analogy of the body politic, Edward 
becomes a figure that attempts at once to uphold and to deny his inherited right to the 
throne, that attempts, in other words, to generate an idea of kingship removed from the 
usual expectations implied by the continuance of the body politic and in effect to create a 
self-generated idea of kingship. The play suggests that the authority of the king to rule 
derives not from divine right but from the state’s capacity to interpret the king as an 
authority. Edward by way of Gaveston’s ambiguity tries to steer his subjects to accept his 
new interpretation, but fails precisely because he reinterprets kingship in a way they 
cannot accept. The crisis of sovereignty in this play, then, is a crisis of interpretation.  
If we read Gaveston sympathetically, taking him at his word, privileging his 
devotion to Edward over his ambition, then we interpret the natural body as trustworthy 
and can interpret favorably the king’s ability to rule, despite his human fallibility. If we 
read Gaveston unsympathetically as the peers do, then we cannot trust any king’s ability 
to rule because every king is subject to this same human fallibility and self-interest that 
are simply hidden in language that divides the king’s natural body from his body politic.   
Mortimer, most clearly aligned with the self-assured confidence of mystically-
backed sovereign power, also most obviously executes the problem of assumption for 
interpretation. He uses ambiguity for interpretation to his advantage, he assumes that 
others will and will not be able to interpret his own ambiguous statements, and he 
proffers interpretations that confirm what he already believes to be true about himself and 
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about others. When the play thematizes Mortimer’s interpretive moves, it suggests the 
same problem I have identified with sovereignty: that despite the language meant to 
uphold and preserve authority, it is vulnerable to self-interested perspective of the one 
who interprets it.45 The play most explicitly represents this vulnerability in Mortimer’s 
letter that will end Edward’s life. In one unpunctuated Latin sentence Mortimer instructs 
his men: 
  Edwardum occidere nolite timere bonum est 
which he translates twice: once as  
Fear not the king, tis good he die  
and again as   
Kill not the king, tis good to fear the worst. (5.4.8,11, 9, 12)  
Significantly, these undecidable translations are both parallel and ambiguous. Mortimer 
draws attention to these features of his language and uses the ambiguity of the lines to his 
own benefit, thereby exonerating himself of Edward’s death. In orchestrating a moment 
of interpretation that is impossible to resolve accurately, Mortimer assumes that others 
both will and will not be able to interpret his meaning. Following the pattern of the other 
parallel lines in this play, Mortimer confirms his will to power in the first translated line 
and refutes it in the second. In addition, he uses ambiguity to protect himself – both his 
desire that the king be killed and his hand in making it so – by willfully not punctuating 
his orders. Thus the structure of this sentence both gives and withholds the command that 
																																																								
45 Similar claims are made by Ben Saunders and Stanley Fish. This conception of critical or interpretive 
desire is fully articulated in Saunders’s  Desiring Donne and in Fish’s understanding of how reader’s react 
to Milton’s Satan in Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost. These ideas about literary 
interpretation assert that the reader makes a set of choices when reading a text that are based on a set of 
prior assumptions made by that particular reader. In interpreting texts, then, a reader reveals something 
about her or himself, sometimes unwittingly.   
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ends Edward’s life. In other words, he enacts the order that will kill the king, acting 
through language as a kingly figure himself who relies upon the perlocutionary force of 
language to dole out death sentences. At the same time, he consciously protects himself 
from taking responsibility for the king’s death. This is the same double-speak upon which 
most subversive political allegory depends: the idea that a writer can always disavow the 
any implication of criticism by clinging to the surface story. Yet placing this tactic in 
Mortimer’s hands, Marlowe’s text highlights the potential corruption at the heart of 
allegory and again accounts for Marlowe’s tendency to avoid this trope.   
The ambiguity that protects Mortimer from responsibility as potential king recalls 
the ambiguity of the opening line that disrupts the way in which language denotes the 
power of a king in this play. In Mortimer’s ambiguous death sentence, the first translation 
is forceful, the second fearful. The first translation begins with fear that is immediately 
jettisoned but ends with death (“tis good he die”). The second translation begins with the 
potential for death but ends on the vulnerability of the speaker (“fear the worst”). This 
single, ambiguous line, for a moment, unifies the two sides of the conflict in this play. On 
the side of the body politic, this line enacts the force that will rid the nation of a foolish 
king. One the side of the body natural, this line protects both Edward and Mortimer as 
individuals. Even as this line reincorporates the two bodies of the king, it tears them apart 
again in its ambiguity that depends not on the force of the author of the line (Mortimer) 
but on the reading of the recipient (Gurney), who “know[s] not how to conster it” 
(5.5.15). In this one line, the language of power, imbued in the king and from which he 
gains authority, is vulnerable to the interpretations of those who receive it. Even in 
Mortimer’s most powerful line, the one that ordains the most severe real-world action, 
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the killing of a king, even this line highlights the vulnerability that underlies its 
strength.46 
 Edward, in contrast, quickly sees through Mortimer’s manufactured ambiguity 
throughout the play, ultimately modeling a method of interpretation that handily reads 
past allegory to read interpret both silence and misdirection. Edward models a keen and 
perceptive interpretation of other characters in the play, especially when faced with 
mortal danger, first for Gaveston and then for himself. Take for example Mortimer and 
Lancaster’s contrived emblems on their tournament shields.47 Upon Gaveston’s repeal 
from banishment, Mortimer and Lancaster describe to Edward these emblems that figure 
their disdain for Gaveston and Edward both. Mortimer’s shield depicts a tall cedar tree 
that houses “kingly eagles” but that has become infected with a canker the “gets into the 
highest bough of all” (2.2.16-9). Lancaster claims that his emblem is harder to read. His 
shield simply depicts a flying fish with an elaborate backstory of being hated and pursued 
by the other fish before it is finally seized by a bird (2.2.22-7). Edward reads the 
supposed obscurity with ease:  
																																																								
46 Mortimer takes great pride in his ability to exercise his strength over others, especially in his ability to 
wield language – “I seal, I cancel, I do what I will” (5.4.49). Yet this speech is often regarded as the tragic 
turn toward Mortimer’s fall from power due to his certainty about his own infallibility and his claim that 
even fortune cannot harm him: “Now is all sure; the queen and Mortimer / Shall rule the realm, the king, 
and none rule us” (5.4.67 and 63-4).  
47 Each emblem, a kind of pictorial allegory, cannot conceal from Edward the treasonous meanings 
intended by his peers and, furthermore, reveals no new or unexpected information about their stance to 
Edward or to the audience.  
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They love me not that hate my Gaveston.  
I am that cedar (shake me not too much!) 
And you the eagles; soar ye ne’er so high,  
I have the jesses that will pull you down,  
And AEque tandem shall that canker cry 
Unto the proudest peer of Britainy.  
Though thou compar’st him to a flying fish,  
And threat’nest death whether he rise or fall,  
‘Tis not the hugest monster of the sea 
Nor the foulest harpy that shall swallow him. (2.2.37-46) 
 
This instance of dramatized interpretation reveals the problem with allegory: it cannot 
conceal what everyone already knows and it cannot reveal what is not already known. 
Edward is keenly aware of the peers’ hatred of Gaveston and of their intentions to get rid 
of him. He reads through their allegory to assert a threat of harm if they do not remain 
loyal to Edward as their king.  
Edward shows that he can read beyond the peers’ attempt at allegory, but he also 
models how to read using a catachrestic logic. That is, he can read new meanings from 
contradictory ones as well as from lack of or gaps in meaning. For instance, Edward can 
interpret what Lightborn is not saying. When Lightborn claims to visit Edward in the 
dungeon “To comfort [him] and bring [him] joyful news,” Edward immediately knows 
Lightborn is lying: “Villian, I know thou com’st to murder me” (5.5.42, 43).  It would 
seem that Edward interprets an inarticulate text: he claims to read his own “tragedy 
written in [Lightborn’s] brows” (5.5.73). Edward is an astute reader of people, not just 
their words. Put differently, Edward can read meaning that seems to arrive from nowhere, 
or at least not from language. If the doctrine of the king’s two bodies does indeed depend 
upon the successful interpretation of a man as a king by his people, then this play 
reimagines in Edward a sovereign who reverses this interpretive move to effectively read 
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others. Edward is not an astute reader of the collective body of the state, but he is attuned 
to the individual, be it Lightborn, Spenser, or Gaveston. 
 
“NONE SHALL HEAR”, “NONE SHALL KNOW”: SIGNIFICANT SILENCES, INTERPRETIVE GAPS  
 Edward’s model for productively reading ambiguous as well as silent meaning 
helps elucidate two scenes that contain significant gaps, which bear on the ways in which 
this play may be interpreted: one at the outset of Mortimer’s rise to power and one at the 
culmination of Edward’s fall. Critics tend either to ignore gaps such as these or else fill 
them with extra-textual details. In his Introduction to Constructing Christopher Marlowe, 
J.T. Parnell points out that critics like Greenblatt, James Shapiro, Thomas Cartellini, and 
Emily Bartels “move, in their zeal to access Renaissance ‘realities,’ further and further 
away from the particularities of Marlowe’s texts” and “tellingly ignore” textual gaps and 
silences (8). However, these silences and gaps are particularly important because one’s 
interpretation of the scenes that contain them identifies in miniature the biases of a 
reader’s interpretive stance on the whole play. Leaving the silences to remain silent and 
the gaps unfilled helps elucidate Edward’s affective orientations to the ideological 
networks of early modern political culture to which this play responds.  
A significant yet unexplained silence remains in the sudden shift in the plot that 
leads to Mortimer’s rise to power. When Queen Isabella approaches Mortimer and the 
other nobles, at Edward’s demand, in order to repeal Gaveston from banishment, she 
appeals specifically to Mortimer for help:  
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Isabella:  Sweet Mortimer, sit down by me a while, and I will tell the 
reasons of such weight as thou wilt soon subscribe to his 
repeal.  
 
Mortimer:  It is impossible; but speak your mind.  
 
Isabella:  Then thus – but none shall hear it but ourselves.      
(1.4.225-229)  
The play never reveals what Isabella says to prevail upon Mortimer to ensure Gaveston’s 
return. After speaking together so “none shall hear,” Mortimer announces to the other 
peers, “of necessity, it must be so” that Gaveston return. Mortimer changes his mind in 
the space of a conversation that happens in full view of the audience but that cannot be 
heard. This silent shift is noteworthy because none of the peers in this scene wants 
Gaveston to return. Lancaster calls his repeal impossible “unless the sea cast up his 
shipwrecked body,” “so sweet a sight” that Warwick affirms “there’s none here but 
would run his horse to death” in order to see it (1.4.205-7). Just before Isabella draws 
Mortimer out of the earshot of the peers and the audience, he echoes the hope that 
Gaveston, “that vile torpedo,” “floats on the Irish seas” (1.4.223-24). Yet pressed by her 
husband to secure his friend’s repeal, Isabella somehow convinces Mortimer that this is 
the best course of action. The peers acknowledge this sudden turn in Mortimer’s 
perspective as a complete change from his desire to banish Gaveston in the first place. 
Lancaster suggests that this change identifies a faulty interpretation: “Such reasons make 
white black and dark night day…In no respect can contraries be true” (1.4.247, 249). Yet 
this catachrestic logic prevails. Mortimer convinces the peers that contraries can be true 
by suggesting that Gaveston is too likeable and too wealthy to live at large where he may 
gain allies (1.4.256-62). The peers must repeal him in order to remove him permanently 
(1.4.264-70). 
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 Mortimer’s speech convinces the peers, but it also hides the gap that the text 
leaves at the outset of their conspiracy against Gaveston. In other words, Mortimer’s 
speech seems sufficient to cover for his and Isabella’s private conversation. However, 
their scripted silence may suggest that their joint conspiracy against Edward begins well 
before critics have otherwise acknowledged. For instance, Forker marks the following 
lines as the play preparing us for Isabella’s adultery:  
Isabel could live with thee [Mortimer] for ever.  
In vain I look for love at Edward’s hand,  
Whose eyes are fixed on none but Gaveston. (2.5.59-60, note 59-60) 
I read these lines differently. Could in the first line may indicate the conditional 
possibility of “Isabel liv[ing] with thee [Mortimer],” of course, but could may also 
indicate that she has the “power, ability, or capacity” to do so.48 In other words, Isabella 
may be saying that she might, one day in an undefined future, possibly live with 
Mortimer, or she may be saying that she already has the power to do so, indeed may 
already be doing so, in the present and extending into the foreseeable future. In the 
second sense, this passage does not not necessarily identify a preparation for adultery but 
an announcement of it. Moreover, depending on what she said to convince Mortimer to 
do Edward’s bidding in order to turn Edward’s desire for Gaveston to Mortimer’s own 
advantage, Isabella could have orchestrated Mortimer’s rise to power while putting on a 
show of faithfulness to Edward. This reading is supported by the fact that Edward and 
Gaveston see through her performance early in the play. Edward accuses her of swaying 
the peers to exile Gaveston, claiming “Thou art too familiar with that Mortimer” after 
Gaveston suggests that she fawns on Mortimer (1.4.154, 146-7).  
																																																								
48 See the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of can, v.1.  
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It follows, then, that this ambiguous could in the lines above offers at least two 
possibilities for reading the silent conversation between Mortimer and Isabella. If we read 
this vital exchange by filling it with Mortimer’s argument to the peers (that Gaveston is a 
bigger threat abroad than at home), we may interpret Mortimer as a calculating and 
duplicitous Machiavel (1.4.256-62). But if we read it in light of Isabella’s betrayal, 
already visible to Edward one hundred lines before but confirmed later in the play by her 
adulterous relationship with Mortimer and her desire to have Edward murdered, then we 
can read her as the orchestrator of Edward’s downfall and Mortimer as a tragic pawn in 
her scheme. This reading echoes Joanna Gibbs’s argument that Isabella is not adrift in the 
emotional turmoil of finding protection from a man—Edward and then Mortimer—as 
other critics have assumed. Instead, Gibbs asserts, Isabella is a strategic and politically 
savvy arbiter of power that sustains her own social and political position. In other words, 
rather than the misogynistic readings of Isabella that see her as a victim in the schemes of 
men, she acts on her own behalf by appropriating the male-oriented political arena in 
ways that use to her own advantage stereotypically feminine spheres of action—including 
emotional ties to her husband and reactions to being banished as well as her private 
conversation with Mortimer. Such a reading places Isabella at the heart of the two 
competing plot lines that Marlowe names in his play’s title: The troublesome raigne and 
lamentable death of Edward the Second, King of England: with the tragicall fall of proud 
Mortimer. Even from the outset of the play, the dual title establishes an interpretive 
scenario in which the reader is asked to take sides, but the play does not offer a clear 
vision for which side is better to take. Leaving this ambiguity open to interpretation 
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further complicates the play’s interrogation of the strength of sovereignty and the power 
of language and perception to determine who rises and who falls.  
Edward’s death scene similarly calls for careful interpretation because it hinges 
on silence. His death is, of course, the culmination of his tragic fall from power and is 
widely discussed by critics who either use it to recuperate sympathy for Edward and 
Gaveston’s relationship or attack it by citing Edward’s demise as the just deserts of a 
foolish king.49 Most critical discussion of Marlowe’s play assumes a sodomitic 
relationship between Edward and Gaveston that culminates, in all modern productions 
and nearly all modern critical treatments, with a murder that mirrors this sodomitical 
relationship: Edward anally penetrated by his murderer Lightborn with the “red hot spit” 
that Lightborn does request.50 Later editors have decided that the play’s silence at the 
moment of Edward’s death requires a gloss that they conveniently find supplied by 
Holinshed. The account is quite gruesome:  
they came suddenlie one night into the chamber where he laie in bed fast 
asleepe, and with heavie featherbeds or a table (as some write) being cast 
upon him, they kept him down and withal put into his fundament an horne, 
and though the same they thrust up into his bodie an hot spit, or (as others 
have) through the pipe of a trumpet a plumbers instrument of iron made 
verie hot, the which passing up into his intrailes, and being rolled to and 
fro, burnt the same. (341, lines 53-62) 
 
In light of Holinshed’s influence on modern critical interpretation, this instance of 
ambiguity in the text exposes the ways in which critics depend too heavily on extra-
																																																								
49 Bruce Smith, Jonathan Goldberg, and Gregory Bredbeck are representative of more sympathetic 
readings. Lukas Erne has identified the tendency toward hostile readings that link the characters in 
Marlowe’s plays with assumptions about his own life experiences. See Erne’s “Biography, Mythography, 
and Criticism: The Life and Works of Christopher Marlowe.”  
50 Orgel is an exception to this critical assumption. Modern editors have inserted more or less graphic stage 
directions, with more or less dependency on Holinshed’s account, to explain Edward’s death in order to 
guide readers through the action of the final act. Lightborn requests the spit at 5.5.30. 
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textual historical context in their interpretations of early modern texts. This dependence 
differs from the way in which the first line of the play opens a gap between the death of 
one king and the succession of the next. The call of the opening line—which in turn 
recalls “the king is dead”—evokes its normal response—“long live the king.” In the case 
of Edward’s murder, nothing at this moment in the text evokes the act of sodomy by hot 
poker. When the text remains utterly silent, neither indicating nor evoking meaning, one 
cannot simply interpret textual silence through analogy to other stories, historical or not. 
These instances require a different kind of interpretative move, one that reads the 
ambivalent orientation the play silently takes on the death of a king.   
Without the historical spackle supplied by Holinshed, Marlowe’s text is silent on 
the particulars of Edward’s murder. At the moment of Edward’s death, the text offers no 
description of the action in the dialogue and leaves the gap in stage direction that editors 
have been eager to fill. From the text, we know only that Edward’s body is pressed 
between the bed on which he lies and a table on which Matrevis and Gurney stamp—
“But not too hard, lest that [they] bruise his body”—and that someone screams loudly—
“this cry will raise the town” (5.6.112, 13). Indeed, no existing early modern copies of the 
play contain other direction at this moment. To interpret the penetration with a spit from 
these lines is to read between them. The text itself is silent on the matter except to suggest 
that it will not reveal the details. In fact, Lightborne clearly states, “none shall know my 
tricks” (5.4.38). The play is not explicit about the particulars of Edward’s murder but it is 
explicit about keeping those particulars silent.  
With no stage direction and no directives worked into the dialogue between 
Lightborn and Matrevis, in marked contrast to the careful discussion of how to employ 
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the table, audiences who were not already expecting a gruesome rape would have no 
purchase on the interpretation that Edward was penetrated by the spit Lightborn requests 
earlier in the scene. Moreover, it is not necessarily safe to assume that Marlowe’s 
audiences would know, by way of Holinshed, the story of Edward’s demise. In an 
argument in defense of the theatre, Thomas Heywood asserts that  
playes haue made the ignorant more apprehensiue, taught the vnlearned 
the knowledge of many famous histories, instructed such as canot reade in 
the discouery of all our English Chronicles.51  
 
The historical account would have to be staged in full view of the audience or else discussed in 
detail to teach this history lesson using theatre. This text, however, leaves the circumstances of 
Edward’s death entirely up to the interpretations of readers or directors. How this gap is filled has 
direct bearing on how one interprets Edward’s reign: Edward solicits a more sympathetic reading 
from those who who witness his demise as a spectacle of violence and cruelty, but less 
sympathetic readings from those who can only imagine Edward’s death offstage as the expedient, 
though illegal, removal of a king who endangers the whole state in order to please himself. On the 
one hand, sympathetic interpretations read the end of the play through an empathetic lens of 
Edward’s pain while, while on the other, retributive readings ignore and effectively silence the 
torture inflicted upon this king. The two extremes of this interpretive spectrum are thematized in 
the implements that Lightborn requests: the fiery hot spit solicits images of screaming pain, no 
matter how he plans to use it, while the table and feather bed signify stifling, suffocating silence. 
The text paradoxically privileges the silence of the table over the pain of the poker by describing 
the one but not the other, thereby staking a willfully ambivalent and inarticulate position on the 
murder of the sovereign.     
																																																								
51 See also Orgel’s point that the inarticulate elements of early modern plays were perhaps not at all 
intended to be understood by the average original audience member (“Incomprehensibility”).  
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THREE “KINGS IN ENGLAND CANNOT REIGHN AT ONCE”  
While Edward suggests in several ways that two kings are always reigning at 
once, the politic king and the natural king, the play ends with the simultaneous reign of 
three kings: Mortimer’s, but also Edward’s as rightful king, and his son Edward’s as 
rightful heir and on whom his father bestows the office. Though the play repeatedly 
evokes the idea that sovereign power is not only vulnerable to the state but vulnerable to 
itself, it thematizes this vulnerability at the end with the clashing reigns of the three 
kings. Yet the play prevents the demise of the state, despite the wavering weakness of the 
body politic, when the threats to the state are dead—Gaveston and Mortimer—and 
Edward III succeeds the throne.   
  It would seem that Edward’s succession restarts the pause begun at the outset of 
the play by taking control of the state and restoring order to the kingdom. However, just 
as the dead Edward I haunts the beginning of the play, Edward II haunts the ending in his 
son’s final words. The brief portion of Edward III’s reign that this play stages suggests 
that he will not return to the political machinations that Mortimer resorts to or that his 
grandfather, upon his deathbed, uses against Edward II by banishing Gaveston. Instead, 
this play marks Edward III with the language of emotion. He speaks of his “loving 
father,” and even though he postures against his mother’s emotional pleadings for pity, 
she does make him cry: “Her words enforce these tears, / And I shall pity her if she speak 
again” (5.6.40, 84-5). Edward III’s words that conclude the play linger on his own 
uncontained emotion:  
 Sweet father, here unto thy murdered ghost, 
 I offer up this wicked traitor’s head,  
 And let these tears, distilling from mine eyes,  
 Be witness of my grief and innocency. (5.6.98-101)  
	 97 
These closing lines of this play leave open the question of whether or not Edward III will 
restore order and power to the sovereign body or will remember the vulnerability of the 
king’s natural body through his act of mourning. He has indeed taken control of the 
political body by killing Mortimer, but the final lines of the play suggest that the natural 
body remains a liability because young Edward’s personal grief for his father is neither 
resolved nor contained. Instead it lingers like a “murdered ghost” and persists like his 
tears that cannot be controlled. The conclusion of the play, then, ambivalently wavers 
between the the sovereign as political and the sovereign as natural, suggesting that the 
king is never free of the vulnerability of his natural body, but he is also never free of the 
vulnerability of the body politic. 
Edward the Second asks readers to pass judgments on sovereignty in their 
interpretations of Edward and Gaveston, just as it requires Edward’s peers to do. But the 
play turns the same judgment onto the body politic, introducing ambiguity, weakness, 
and silence into the language of authority. In its ambivalent waverings and unfillable 
gaps, the play questions the authority of kings as well as the authority of interpreters, and 
reimagines within the text the interpretive moves it solicits. Marlowe’s play disrupts 
received ideologies of power, lingering instead on the potential to witness and embrace 







“I HAVE A SIN OF FEAR”: THE DEVOTIONAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DONNE 
AND THE STRENGTH OF CYCLICAL VULNERABILITY  
 
John Donne has been held hostage by the polarized criticism that marks his 
reception history.1 Scholars such as C.S. Lewis, Stanley Fish, Jonathan Goldberg and 
John Carey characterize Donne—metonymized by his poetic voices—as an unabashed 
egoist, an anxious masculine subject desperately asserting his own identity in poems they 
are inclined to interpret as exercises in compensatory rhetoric. By contrast, William 
Empson and, more recently, Dennis Flynn and Jeanne Shami have more sympathetically 
characterized Donne as invested in mutuality, and morally and intellectually courageous. 
Throughout Donne’s reception history, critics have been similarly split. This critical 
conflict is far from settled.  However, as polarized as it may be, the line that divides 
critics of Donne’s writing often seems drawn on a very simple issue: the question of 
whether critics find Donne’s personality appealing or unappealing.  Somewhat 
scandalously, it seems that disagreements about the interpretation and aesthetic value of 
Donne’s work are over-determined by an essentially moralistic argument about whether 
or not we should regard Donne as a decent person.   
If critics are divided about Donne’s appeal, they are perhaps replicating a more 
fundamental division, detectable in the texts that bear his name. Annabel Patterson 
suggests that Donne used a “strategy of self division” by creating a rhetorical persona, a 
																																																								
1 This chapter refers to Donne by name to indicate the person and writer and Donne’s speaker or similar 
designation to refer to Donne’s narrative voice.  
In “What Was Donne Doing?”, William Kerrigan suggests that literary criticism in general has trended 
toward reductive strategies and that Donne studies have simply mirrored this general movement. See 
especially page 8. 
	 99 
voice that speaks on his behalf (48). Shoshana Felman has usefully explained that when 
critical responses to a text are divided, the division may be traced to divisions in the text 
itself. Following Felman, Ben Saunders has suggested that critics of Donne have been 
thus divided in their readings of Donne’s desire because they mirror Donne’s own 
divided attempt to represent desire in his poetry. Their ambivalent reactions suggest that 
critics may be responding to the ambivalent rhetorical affect evoked by Donne’s texts.    
Before his critics became caught up in the question of whether Donne is to be 
reviled or embraced, the cycle of self-love and self-loathing was operative in Donne’s 
own writings. To offer one of many possible examples: Donne’s speaker simultaneously 
demonstrates what we might call a profound self-attachment, on the one hand, and a 
desire to be rid of himself, on the other, in his account of physical and spiritual sickness, 
the Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions. Consider the following lines from the first 
prayer of this text: 
O eternall, and most gracious God, … enable me by thy grace to looke 
forward to mine end, and looke backward to, to the considerations of thy 
mercies afforded mee from the beginning; … Deliver mee therefore, O my 
God, from these vaine imaginations; that it is an overcurious thing, a 
dangerous thing, to come to that tendernesse, that rawnesse, that 
scrupulousnesse, to fear every concupiscence, every offer of Sin, that this 
suspicious, & jealous diligence will turne to an inordinate dejection of 
spirit, and a diffidence in thy care & providence; but keep me still 
establish’d, both in a constant assurance, that thou wilt speake to me at the 
beginning of every such sicknes, at the approach of every such Sinne; and 
that, if I take knowledg of that voice then, and flye to thee, thou wilt 
preserve mee from falling, or raise me againe, when by natural infirmitie I 
am fallen: doe this, O Lord, for his sake, who knowes our naturall 
infirmities, for he had them; and knowes the weight of our sinns, for he 




2 All emphases in quotations attributed to Donne are original unless otherwise noted.  
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Donne calls upon his “eternall, and most gracious God” to deliver him from bodily and 
spiritual sickness, while also calling for deliverance from his own will, his “vaine 
imaginations” (9, 10). But his pleas for deliverance and declarations of self-surrender hint 
at a deeper ambivalence or even an unwillingness to give his will up or over to God to the 
extent that he speaks to God in imperatives: “enable me,” “deliver mee,” “keep me,” 
“preserve mee,” “raise me,” “doe this” (6, 7). Thus, it seems, Donne would command 
even as he relinquishes willful control.  
Critics have attempted—indeed have seemed obligated—to resolve apparent 
contradictions like this one in order to discuss what Donne is up to.  Some of the most 
vigorous interpretive arguments about Donne’s work involve resolving these 
contradictions to privilege one half or the other of the binary categories– sacred and 
profane, self and other – that are in fact  blurred by his rhetoric.3 Most critics have chosen 
to look only at one side or the other to find the Donne they desire. William Kerrigan 
questions why Donne has not been more central to addressing polarizing debates because 
he seems to incorporate both sides and then some. He writes, “Why haven’t they found 
Donne, who discovers all these themes, and more, in a few dense lines?” (6). There is 
more than a dialectic of division at work in Donne’s texts. While Donne indisputably 
wrestles with these divisions, he also articulates a way through them. As a result, we can 
find in Donne’s writing a way to read it differently.  
Where critics have tended to focus on resolving contradiction, I want to think 
about the ambiguity that Donne creates when he collapses binaries, when the two terms 
of a given binary cease to be discrete. I argue that Donne accommodates more than 
																																																								
3 Interpretive disputes also arise over many other binary divides that Donne articulates, including man and 
woman.  
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polarized reasons by way of ambiguous figures and structures. Donne creates a series of 
paradoxes and incongruities that lead to still more masterful rhetorical maneuvering. 
These tropes and structures suggest ways to encounter Donne’s writing that maintain the 
ambiguity of his work, rather than resolve it toward one fixed interpretation or another. 
Donne models how to embrace ambiguity when he creates contradictions, thereby 
pointing critics toward the possibility of welcoming the strangeness of Donne’s writing, 
toward the possibility of reading Donne otherwise.  
The argument of this chapter responds to the critical habit of taming Donne’s 
paradoxes in allegory and builds an analysis of the thematic and strucural benefits of 
reading paradox differently. First, I propose the logic of parable as an alternative method 
for managing ambiguity that maintains Donne’s contradictory meanings rather than 
trying to subdue them. I explain and deploy the logic of parable in readings of Donne’s 
Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions before considering the liminal figure of the 
Watchman in station sixteen as a parabolic figure for Donne’s counterintuitive texual 
perspectives and orientations. Finally, I explore Donne’s contradictory figure of a circle 
that is also a line as a parabolic organizing principle for each station of the Devotions,  
the text as a whole, and also in miniature in Donne’s short poem “A Hymn to God the 
Father.” Ultimately, I argue that Donne’s parabolic thematic and rhetorical habits reveal 
the ambivalence with which the narrative and poetic speakers orient themselves to the 





ORGANIZING AMBIGUITY, PART TWO: THE FORM AND THE POTENTIAL OF PARABLE 
Many critical readings of Donne’s work suggest that allegory and analogy are his 
master tropes.4 However, reading allegorically or analogically is inherently reductive and 
helps further entrench Donnean criticism into polarized camps. Kate Narveson has 
suggested in her chapter, “The Devotion,” that Donne is up to more than allegory, 
something that not only operates by a logic that exceeds metaphor and tends toward 
riddle but also imitates scripture to offer alternative perspectives. She writes, 
the remoteness of the metaphors and remarkable associative leaps set his 
work apart from other devotional writing. One of the most striking 
features of the Devotions is the way that each thought is subject to further 
angles of vision that cumulatively capture the riddling nature of human 
experience…Ostensibly imitating Scripture’s voyages to fetch remote and 
precious figures, Donne’s restless, associative heaping of figures gives his 
work much of its remarkable energy. (312, 313) 
I press Narveson’s insight to argue that allegory—as extended metaphor, both of which 
operate according to the logic of analogy—offers an inadequate figure to contain the 
contradictions with which Donne wrestles. I propose instead that Donne deploys the logic 
of parable to manage his complex and irresolvable rhetorical maneuvers in his prose. 5  
Though I have already articulated the difference between metaphor and 
catachresis in Chapter II, the difference between allegory and parable may not be readily 
apparent because many critics assume the two terms are synonymous.6 The word parable 
																																																								
4 See, for instance, Dennis Quinn’s “Donne’s Christian Eloquence,” William Muller’s John Donne: 
Preacher, Joan Webber’s Contrary Music: The Prose Style of John Donne, and more recently, Hugh 
Grady’s “Donne's First Anniversary as Baroque Allegory: Fragmentation, Idealization, and the Resistance 
to Unity.” 
5 My argument is indebted to Robert Guffey’s “Parabolic Logic in John Donne’s Sermons,” discussed 
below. My project builds on his to read parabolic logic in Donne’s work beyond his sermons, which are the 
focus of Guffey’s investigation.  
6 This understanding of parable as a species of allegory is indebted to Aristotle, as I discuss below. 
Usefully, twentieth- and twenty-first- century Christian theologians have been able to reorient the ways in 
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and its uses are themselves ambiguous, which likely contributes to critics’ conflation of 
the two tropes. Robert Funk explains that the Greek word for parable, παραβολή, used in 
the Septuagint, held a broad range of meanings, with the primary meaning of simply 
“word saying” (Language 126).7 This usage, Funk continues, passed into modern Greek 
and Latin. Literary Latin, by way of Aristotle’s works on rhetoric and poetics, uses 
parable to signify in only one sense: comparison.8 Aristotle contributes to a 
transcendentalized understanding of parable because he privileges correspondence over 
conflict in comparisons, which leads to a sanitized and simplistic approach to 
interpretation.  In contrast, Funk and other contemporary theorists of religious language 
distinguish parable from tropes like allegory and analogy, and show that contradiction 
and disruption are at the heart of parable.9 They provide insight for reading these 
contradictions insofar as they propose something new, something unexpected, something 
that seems miraculous. Critics who work on parable from a literary or Aristotelian stance 
																																																																																																																																																																					
which their contemporary readers can understand biblical texts, especially parables, without succumbing to 
the comfortable history of allegorical Christian readings that run rampant in the West.  
Similar Helenization impacted the ways in which Hebraic scholars have understood some forms of parable 
in Midrashic texts as allegory depending on the context and intention of the parable’s circumstances and 
use, but Hebraic scholars have also retained the wider definition of parable as word saying and continue to 
acknowledge the strangeness and disruptiveness at the heart of parable. See, for instance, David Stern’s 
historicized explanation of the form in Midrash and Theory. 
7 The Septuagint refers to the ancient translation of Hebrew texts into Koine Greek. 
8 Platonic philosophy, however, comes closer to parabolic logic. Plato acknowledges that he is trying to 
articulate something he cannot articulate because language is merely mimetic and therefore suspect. See his 
Republic book 10 for his concerns with all art as mimetic. Though I am not necessarily interested in 
thinking about parabolic logic in terms of Plato’s allegories of the ideal forms here, in another project I am 
interested in identifying ways in which Plato uses incongruent logic and even catachresis, which have been 
sanitized or smoothed over or ignored by Aristotle or other critics or both. 
9 These characteristics of parable are explained by C.H. Dodd in The Parables of the Kingdom (5-6). 
Though his text is a pioneering work for modern research on parable (especially for Robert Funk, Ian 
Ramsey, Donald Evans, and Paul Ricoeur), Dodd derives his formal explanation of parable from Rudolph 
Bultman’s History of The Synoptic Tradition.  
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will, according to Funk, “have difficulty accommodating [this] diversity of biblical and 
popular usage” (Language 126). 
Typical of this critical oversight, M. H. Abrams’s Glossary of Literary Terms 
offers a limited explanation of parable. Abrams initially defines parable as a species of 
allegory and allegory as “a narrative, whether in prose or verse, in which the agents and 
actions, and sometimes the setting as well, are contrived by the author to make coherent 
sense on the ‘literal,’ or primary, level of signification, and at the same time to signify a 
second, correlated order of signification” (Seventh edition 5).10 Across genres, the 
signature feature of allegory is that it establishes “one coherent set of circumstances 
which signify a second order of correlated meanings” (6). In other words, allegory 
operates like any other translative figure in which one thing stands in for another. In 
Abrams’s estimation, then, allegory must be interpreted (or translated) because the author 
has a particular lesson in mind and relays it in a coded manner.11 In order to solve the 
code, the reader of allegory must accurately interpret the primary and secondary levels of 
																																																								
10 Abrams emphasizes the importance of allegory in Renaissance texts, including the allegorical morality 
play Everyman, Spenser’s allegorical verse romance The Faerie Queene, Milton’s episodic allegory in 
which Satan meets with Sin and Death in Paradise Lost. The wider reaching stakes of my project suggest 
that all of these instances in which allegory is specifically intended by the author or read as such by the 
critic may be fruitfully reread as parable.  
See examples of the renewed interest in early modern allegory among early modern critics in Judith 
Anderson’s Reading the Allegorical Intertext: Chaucer, Spencer, Shakespeare, Milton and Brenda 
Machosky’s edited collection Thinking Allegory Otherwise.  
11 Both Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe understand allegory as a less 
sophisticated trope because it is translative. In The Statesman’s Manual, Coleridge derides allegory as 
nothing “but a translation of abstract notions into picture-language, which is itself nothing but an 
abstraction from objects of the senses,” nothing but “empty echoes which the fancy arbitrarily associates 
with apparitions of matter” (438, Abrams 313). In other words, for Coleridge, allegory provides no new 
content but instead forces the information it intends to convey into an arbitrary relationship with 
representations of the known world. Similarly, Goethe in Maxims and Reflections understands allegory as a 
kind of translation of a “phenomenon into a concept, the concept into an image,” that forecloses the 
possibility of new meaning because “the concept always remains bounded in the image, and is entirely to 
be kept and held in it, and to be expressed by it” (No. 1112, Abrams 313). In both assessments, allegory 
serves little more than a didactic purpose. Abrams calls attention to both of these negative assessments. 
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meaning. This method implies that the reader uses what she already knows in order to 
understand something she does not yet know. However, in practice, both the primary and 
secondary orders (both the tenor and the vehicle) of allegory must be known in advance 
in order to be translated.12  
The collapse of parable into allegory will not always be tenable even if it is 
convenient. If allegory must be based on public and shared knowledge, then so-called 
allegories that do something other than translate one familiar story by way of another 
disrupt allegorical conventions and must be approached differently. Even Abrams 
acknowledges that some figures are not conventional like allegory but must be decoded 
by way of inference.13 These figures, Abrams attests, generate “a more difficult problem 
in interpretation,” a problem which attempts to read the unknown unknowns toward 
which a text may gesture (311). Parable is more closely aligned with Abrahms’s 
understanding of the private symbol than it is with allegory, and the disruption at the 
heart of parable offers a different, more nuanced perspective.  
The basic characteristics of parable, according to Dodd, are familiar to most 
readers. First, parables may take a variety of forms, but most commonly understood, 
parables are extended narratives like Jesus’s story of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32). 
Parables may also be single vignettes or aphorisms – such as “the watched pot never 
boils,” shorter narratives, or more detailed and action-packed vignettes that communicate 
a complex idea – such as Jesus’s claim that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye 
																																																								
12 To recognize the second order Christ in the first order Chanticleer, for example, one must already know 
the story of Christ. 
13 Abrams’s solution to the interpretive problem for what he calls private symbol resembles my agenda for 
interpreting ambiguous elements. Abrams explains that private symbols “suggest a direction or a broad area 
of significance rather than, like an emblem in an allegorical narrative, a relatively determinate reference,” 
and asserts that this attribute makes the private symbol an “irreplaceable literary device” (312). 
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of a needle than for a rich person to enter the Kingdom of Heaven (Luke 15:11-32, 
Matthew 19: 24, Mark 10:25, and Luke 18:25). Each of these familiar forms nonetheless 
take on catachrestic characteristics of contradiction, strangeness, and incongruity in one 
way or another. Secondly, and significantly less disruptively, the images and narratives 
deployed by parable must not only be common to everyday experience. They must also 
behave or unfold in ways that the audience can predict. In other words, parables appeal to 
the audiences’ expectations for what should logically happen in everyday situations. For 
instance, a farmer in a parable should sow seeds and reap crops, while shepherds should 
tend to flocks, and not vice versa. This characteristic of parable makes the form seem 
similar to allegory, but the similarities end with the disruption that parables provoke. 
Parable inevitably turns away from the familiar, rendering it strange and providing 
perspectives on every-day issues that the audience cannot predict. While parable involves 
knowns, the form also involves unknowns and potentially unknown unknowns.  
Though parable begins with the familiar and predictable, parable necessarily 
contradicts or violates the audience’s expectations. Thus, like catachresis, parable entails 
a transgression that creates confusion and renders the familiar unfamiliar.14 Dodd 
explains that parable “arrest[s] the hearer by its vividness or strangeness, and leav[es] the 
mind in sufficient doubt about its precise application” (5). Paul Ricoeur similarly 
describes the logic of parable—in catachrestic terms—as a “process of ‘transgression’ 
that ruptur[es]…ordinary speech” and thereby “open[s] up our very experience” to the 
metaphysical (Figuring the Sacred 58-61). Ricoeur and Funk both show how this 
transgression is made possible in New Testament parables through excessive actions, 
																																																								
14 Whereas allegory is primarily didactic, parable cannot be simply so because the form both elucidates and 
confuses in order to leave open the interpretive potential of its contents.  
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breaks in judgment, foolishness, and especially hyperbole (Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred 
60 and Funk Language, Hermeneutic 160-62).15 Thus parable does not attempt to indicate 
something metaphysical, as allegory or analogy might. Instead, parable disrupts the 
ordinary logic of these other tropes to evoke something that ordinary language cannot 
capture, something that transgresses ordinary experience.  
This disruptive, transgressive quality of parable asks readers change their 
orientations, to see the familiar differently, and as Dodd suggests, parable pushes readers 
to glimpse beyond the limits of the known world (159). Yet these glimpses remain wide 
open to individual interpretations because parables are less indicative than they are 
evocative.16 In other words, because parable gestures toward but does not concretely 
indicate, parable must be interpreted and reinterpreted, never settled on a single 
interpretation.17 Another defining feature of parable, then, is that its methodology results 
in alternative or counterintuitive perspectives for the reader, perspectives that approach 
the blind and the unknown categories of perception. Similarly, Robert Guffey 
differentiates parable from analogy through this kind of change in perspective, suggesting 
that the logic of analogy is limited to what one already knows rather than what one may 
be taught by encountering a text (117). Reading with the logic of parable, Guffey 
																																																								
15 Hyperbole, as a misuse of language in overstatement, has associations with catachresis that are resonant, 
for instance, in Postcolonial Theory but also in early modern rhetorical understandings of both terms. 
16 In “Parabolic Logic in Donne’s Sermons,” Guffey explains that “parabolic logic is part of a persuasive 
strategy that is aimed not only at rational argumentation and illustration, but at active transformation of the 
audience’s consciousness” (109).  
17 Their understandings of parable, then, are exactly like Abrams, Colleridge, and Goethe’s understanding 
of private symbol, which, in turn, is like Lisa Freinkel’s suggestion, in Reading Shakespeare’s Will and 
“The Use of Fetish,” that catachresis is the trope that never stops turning. Parable, then, cannot be 
understood by way of translation into allegory, at least not concretely.   
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suggests, “dislodge[s] the auditor from this [analogical] way of thinking and…open[s] the 
conscience to a radically different standard of judgment” (117).  
Parable, then, functions as a kind of puzzle that has no clear, or at least no single, 
solution, operating like vehicular images and stories without established, culturally 
shared tenors. The point of a parabolic story is not necessarily to confound but to 
acknowledge that readers will not understand if they do not try to see differently, and to 
encourage readers to stop reading complacently. To read a parable parabolically, then, is 
to read it against the grain—especially, for Western readers, against the grain of Christian 
allegory—and to look for the blind spots in the familiarity of the story, to read 
otherwise.18  That is to say, parabolic readings reorient the reader to take another path 
through the text than is customary or expected or accepted as the way. The parables of 
Jesus, in contrast to their allegorical interpretations, disrupt the audience’s expectations 
for whom in the story to model and ask those who can hear and see to hear and see for 
themselves rather than assume that they already know the conventional moral of the 
story.19 Western Christians have done New Testament parables a disservice—akin to the 
one Stephen Orgel exposes in early modern studies bent on resolving ambiguity—when 
they tamed parables into established and controlled allegorical interpretations. The way 
of reading parabolically for which I advocate takes a vulnerable position by implicating 
																																																								
18 New Testament parables have similarities and differences with other Hebraic parables. While both are 
didactic, New testament parables are future oriented rather than aimed at textual exegesis as in the rabbinic 
tradition and therefore avoid teleological assumptions, making them more disruptive and abusive rather 
than simply didactic.  
19 This idea is repeated in the familiar parabolic refrain characteristic of New Testament parable, “he who 
has ears, let him hear,” as translated in the King James, Revised Standard, and other versions (Matthew 
13:9, and elsewhere).   
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the reader in working out an answer, and implicates the text itself in an ambivalent stance 
of passive resistance.20  
Just as most scholars of language and literature understand the narrative extension 
of metaphor to be allegory, I suggest that catachresis extends into narrative as parable 
because, like catachresis, parable participates in an ambivalent structure that has affinity 
with the translative tropes but is primarily identified by its tendency toward disruption. 21  
Like catachresis, parable cultivates ambiguity, but it is also useful for organizing it. 
Parable formalizes an extended logic for approaching ambiguity, for gesturing toward the 
ways in which texts navigate content that is difficult or even impossible to say, for 
approaching how a text may teach readers something they cannot anticipate.22 
Articulating the characteristics of parable as an extension of catachresis further develops 
the logic through which this project orients itself toward ambiguity.  
																																																								
20 I explain the concept of passive resistance in Chapter IV. 
21 To my knowledge, no one has considered the potentials for thinking about catachresis as an extended into 
narrative form in the way I propose. David Stern comes close when he articulates the different ways of 
understanding mashal (parable) in midrashic texts. In Midrash and Theory: Ancient Jewish Exegesis and 
Contemporary Literary Studies, Stern argues that midrashic forms, especially mashal, offer “an alternative 
to the various ‘logocentric’ hermeneutical traditions, like that of allegoresis, that have dominated Western 
literary cultures since antiquity” that also mediates between the Israelite and the Hellenized traditions in 
which this literary form finds its origin and to which it is “simultaneously receptive and resistant” (15-16). 
Though he opposes the kind of immanent readings I advocate, favoring instead an even more theoretically 
inflected, and specifically poststructuralist, methodology than I advance here, Stern argues that most 
rabbinic meshalim offer “neither a secret tale with a hidden meaning nor a transparent story with a clear-cut 
moral,” that they contain “an allusive narrative told for an ulterior purpose” drawing  “a series of parallels” 
between the story and a real-world situation that they do not make explicit but leave “to [their] audience to 
figure out” and are, indeed, often not just contradictory but ambivalently so (44, 47). Similarly, Donald 
Evans, without directly saying so, understands parable as comparable to catachresis, as a means by which 
one may read one thing through the context of another, even though the two things may be in no way 
related (131-32). Thus, it is not appropriate to equate parable with allegory.  
22 Abrams turns to the language of parable when he evokes Mark Turner’s suggestion in The Literary Mind 
that parable is more than a trope or teaching tactic, but “a basic cognitive principle” relevant to every 
instance of interpretation. It is telling, I think, that Abrams avoids discussing catachresis in his Glossary, 
deploying a discussion of symbol that fills the catachrestic gap in his text.  
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In sum, a parabolic reading takes the familiar and predictable, uses it to evoke 
something that cannot be anticipated in advance of each reader’s reading, and, in the 
process, emphasizes the strangeness of the familiar, thereby reorienting readers to new 
perspectives both on what readers think they already know as well as on what they do not 
know. Reading parabolically extends the transgressive logic of catachresis into larger—
structural and substantive—patterns of textual affect and offers critics a route to 
reorientation that navigates ambiguity differently while privileging the perspectives of the 
text. It is with the full ambiguity afforded to parable that I differentiate it from allegory 
and define the potential of parable as a trope.   
 
EARLY MODERN PARABLE: DONNEAN ERUPTIONS AND DISRUPTIONS 
Critics already recognize the importance of parable to the structures of early 
modern literature insofar as parabolic plots are borrowed and amended from New 
Testament stories and from the mediating influence of English morality plays. Whereas 
the morality play tradition picks up on the didactic quality of parable, it also subdues the 
strangeness of parable by forcing it into allegory. Later sixteenth- and seventeenth- 
century appropriations of parabolic structures do something different. As Janet Clare has 
asserted, early modern texts do not ask audiences to “passively assimilate received 
biblical or moral truths;” instead, texts deploy disruptions in “dangerous effects and 
emotions” (80).  Early modern inclusion of parabolic structures and narratives, replicated 
and revised with a difference, picks up on the uneasiness that the New Testament 
parables evoke. In this dissertation, I show that Marlowe and Shakespeare deploy 
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catachrestic forms and re-readings of parables in discrete instances and vignettes. 23 So 
does Donne, but he also uses this logic on a macro-level as a structuring or organizing 
principle. Parable, then, offers a way of understanding the uneasiness, both thematic and 
structural, inherent in Donne’s work and in critical responses to it.  
Critics have identified the productive significance of contradiction in Donne’s 
writing. Though they do not consider the logic of parable as a means for organizing these 
contradictions, they come quite close to describing Donne’s writing in parabolic terms, 
especially in regard to the inherent disruption at the heart of parable. For example, in 
“The Exegesis of Experience,” Janel Mueller  notes that the merging of various and often 
contradictory practices is characteristic of Anglican theology and has been so since the 
beginning of English theology and ritual, especially in devotional texts. She cites Helen 
White’s influence on the idea that “English devotional writing exhibits the hardiness and 
vitality frequent in mixed strains” led to a focus on “the eclectic spirit of Donne as at 
once both dominat and representative of its expression” (Mueller 1). Mueller does not see 
Donne’s use of scripture as a means to lend himself authority as other Protestant 
devotional texts do (3).  Instead, as Mueller and Kate Narverson both observe, Donne 
uses scripture to stand for a counterperspective to his own (Mueller 3, Narverson 313). 
Narverson attributes “Donne’s remarkable style…in part to his departures from 
convention in the way he used Scripture,” as well as to his departures in form that 
distinguish Donne’s Devotions from the devotional texts of Augustine, Ignatius of 
																																																								
23 Much of the appropriation of these plots in Shakespeare and Middleton for instance shows that the stories 
themselves are internally strange. Although he does not necessarily acknowledge parable as itself strange, 
in Thomas Middleton and the New Comedy Tradition, George Rowe highlights the ambiguity that 
Middleton creates when he introduces the structures of the Prodigal Son parable into his comedies and, “by 
juxtaposing two contradictory structures [creates] a play which is deliberately unsettling, a play which 
insistently pulls its audiences sympathies in two opposite directions” (56). 
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Loyola, Thomas Rogers, John Hayward, and other medieval and early modern religious 
writers (313). She claims that “Donne’s innovations in the devotional genre [should] be 
seen as the product of a hermeneutic far more sophisticated than is usual in devotional 
works” (315). I suggest that this hermeneutic extends the earlier, first-century uses of 
parable.    
Though critics have not identified Donne’s counterintuitive use of parable in the 
Devotions, in “Parabolic Logic in Donne’s Sermons,” Robert Guffey argues that Donne’s 
sermons deploy a parabolic logic because they use “the same figurative technique and 
persuasive strategy” as the New Testament Parables of Jesus (104). Furthermore, Guffey 
argues that critics have mistaken these parabolic rhetorical moves for analogy in Donne’s 
sermons, probably because Donne “sets up the expectation of an analogical similarity” 
(105). For example, Guffey explains the analogy in the central image of Donne’s sermon 
on Psalm 38. Donne writes, “For thine arrows stick fast in me, and thy hand presseth me 
sore,” in order to compare arrows to temptations. However, Donne does not let these 
similarities stand. Instead, he “contradict[s] expectations by shifting the proportional 
scale in which the analogy is based or by representing the image in a radically 
incongruous way” (Guffey 105). Donne goes on to articulate the ways in which arrows 
are not at all like temptations because “a man cannot shoot an arrow at himself, but we 
can direct tentations upon our selves” (2:57). Thus he retracts the initial analogy, which 
would only work as such if the vehicle and tenor behave counterintuitively, differently 
that one might expect. Guffey proposes that the initial image of the arrow implies 
temptation striking from outside and a passively victimized position for those who are 
tempted (110). When Donne changes the image to a self-shot arrow, he disrupts the 
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familiar understanding of how arrows operate in the world and shifts the text’s 
orientation “from one of passivity and the implicit denial of responsibility for his 
condition to one of active responsibility for sin and suffering” (Guffey 110-11). In other 
words, Donne attempts to teach his original audiences a different way of approaching sin, 
one that at once embraces self-responsibility and and unexpected vulnerability to oneself. 
When late modern readers grasp this counterintuitive lesson, we glimpse the way in 
which the text orients itself to unspoken attitudes, assumptions, and orientations of early 
modern audiences. I argue that Donne deploys similar contradictory strategies of parable 
throughout his poetry and prose writings, that the logic of parable not only pervades 
Donne’s corpus but is also central to reading the ambiguous figures and forms that open 
Donne studies into new directions.24  
The Devotions creates ambivalence when it wavers but ultimately refuses to chose 
between willful assertion and surrender—one version of the moralized binary structure 
that I have suggested divides critical discourse on Donne into two polarized camps.25 
Donne’s tendency toward this blurring is apparent in in treatment of the binary to which 
his speaker seems most vulnerable: life and death. Both merging and vacillating between 
these two opposites, Donne’s text demonstrates how to negotiate ambivalent rhetorical 
structures and paradoxical language in order to articulate a first-person perspective on 
																																																								
24 William Kerrigan does not discuss “what Donne was doing” in terms of parabolic logic, but his strategy 
for unpacking Donne’s rhetorical maneuvering around the topic of love closely resembles the parabolic 
logic I am deploying here. Kerrigan shows how Donne takes common or traditional (especially Petrarchan) 
tropes and narratives and turns them to say something altogether different about the nature of love. 
Kerrigan says that “Donne idealizes mutual love, and he will not…abandon his partner. Whereas the eyes 
of the conventional lady scorch or chill, Donne makes a world of reciprocal gazes, transforming St. Paul’s 
symbol of heavenly perfection – knowing even as we are known, knowing then – into an emblem for 
returned love here and now” (12).  
25 The blurring of willful assertion and surrender that I pursue here is only one of the many ways in which 
the Devotions create ambivalence.  
	 114 
something which such a perspective can not articulate: a first-person report of one’s own 
state in death.  
In the Devotions, reading illness as analogous to sin and death does not account 
for death as the ambivalent concept that it seems to be for Donne, something he both 
desires and detests. Ramie Targoff, for one, catalogs the contradictory positions that 
Donne takes when considering death: “an urge to battle death directly; a desire to take 
death into one’s own hands; a loathing of the separation of body and soul; an 
overwhelming concern for the material decay of the corpse; an anxiety about the mixing 
of remains in the grave; a longing above all for resurrection” (Targoff, “Facing Death,” 
217). This indecisive orientation toward death pervades the Devotions. Take for example 
a contradictory image of dying in the final station: the self-executed executioner.   
wee are not onely executed, (that implies gultinesse) but executioners, 
(that implies dishonor;) and executioners of ourselves, (and that implies 
impietie). (124) 
The seeming analogy dependent upon the image of execution breaks down because the 
players—the executioner and the executed—are not operating in an ordinary or 
recognizable way. The image instead invokes the logic of contradiction.  
The guilty, dishonorable, and impious self-executing executioner entails a 
paradoxical, circular, and twice doubled perspective on impending death, a perspective 
that is irresolvable. The obvious doubled perspective, of course, is the speaker’s 
simultaneous occupation of the usually separate perspectives of the executioner and the 
executed. This doubling of first-person perspective is incongruous and virtually 
impossible. But to suggest that the executioner is executing himself recombines the two 
perspectives, suggesting that the first image is not incongruous at all. In effect, the 
perspective of the speaker is singular, double, and both singular and double at once when 
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he suggests he executes himself. The final image of the self-executing executioner turns 
again toward the opening image of the collective experience of “we” “ourselves” being 
executed, resulting in an infinite cycle of being executed, that is, of dying. The cyclical 
image suggests that one never stops being executed, and never stops executing oneself, 
never stops dying.  
The endless cycle of dying is complicated by the parenthetical implications of 
each perspective. The implication that executed person is guilty in turn implies that the 
execution is deserved. The implication that the executioner is dishonorable implies that 
whoever is responsible for the death also loses, particularly within a community within 
which honor is gained and sustained by reputation. The proposition that the self-executed 
executioner is impious identifies such a death as a kind of suicide. The perspectives of the 
three parties begin with guilt and end with guilt because taking one’s own life was 
considered sinful, but also suggests that in self-executing one takes responsibility for 
one’s sins. Taking responsibility for one’s sins paves the way to the possibility of 
forgiveness. If this were not true for Donne and his first readers, then his speaker would 
not worry as he does about the possibility of not being forgiven if one relapses but does 
not afterward repent. This self-canceling, indeed suicidal, image provides another 
incongruity in dying: a pious impiety. That is, the piety implicated in taking 
responsibility for ones sins and seeking forgiveness is accomplished by the impious act of 
suicide, a paradox that is circular and therefore undecidable.26 The convoluted first-
person perspective on dying and the ensuing images and implications identify the 
																																																								
26 This recalls the much debated, incongrous aphorism, “living is Christ and dying is gain” (Philipians 
1:21). 
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impossibility of articulating a first-person perspective of the the actual state of death that 
Donne nonetheless attempts to articulate using a logic of  productive incongruity.  
Similarly, Targoff argues that Donne’s differing views of death must be 
considered together to make sense of the most counterintuitive element of his speaker’s 
apparent fear of death: that he is not actually attached to his mortal life (Targoff 217).27 
What Donne’s speaker does seem to be attached to, however, is his body and thus his 
identity. Indeed, four of the six fears that Targoff lists indicate a concern for the body 
itself: the frightening desire to kill one’s own body, the soul leaving the body, the 
decaying of the body, the body mixing with the remains of other bodies (217). Donne’s 
homelitic speaker even considers resurrection to be a reunion of the soul with a perfected 
material body. In a sermon, he identifies the new life, the perfected body, that is no 
longer subject to death but is nonetheless born out of death when he says,  
unto God the Lord belongs the issues of death, and by recompacting this 
dust into the same body, and reanimating the same body with the same 
soule, hee shall in a blessed and glorious ressurrectin give mee such an 
issue from this death, as shal never passess into any other death, but 
establish me into a life that shall last as long as the Lord of life himself. 
(Sermons 10. 239-40)  
This wish to overcome death in death attempts to cover the terror of death with eternal 
life, but succeeds in merging the two concepts in an irresolvable tension. The passage 
opens with a birth (“the issues”) that immediately contradicts itself because it is a birth 
resulting from death itself. Wavering again toward life—and the same life, “the same 
body” and “the same soul”—preserves the speaker from death because no part of the 
former body or soul has been lost, in effect suggesting that no death occurred. The 
																																																								
27 Targoff refers to Donne’s homiletic speaker as if he represents Donne himself. Because she analyses 
sermons to come to her conclusions, I refer to the perspectives in question as those of Donne’s homiletic 
speaker instead.  
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sameness of the identifing features advances a stronger attachment to the mortal life than 
Targoff posits.  
Targoff argues, following John Carey, that Donne’s homelitic speaker at once 
favors sameness of his own identity while attempting to avoid a collective sameness, 
identifying what the speaker most fears as “the collapse of distinctions between persons, 
the complete erasure of individuality” (Targoff 228). Donne’s speaker, Targoff continues, 
cannot tolerate considering “the horror of losing himself within the collective mass of the 
dead” (Targoff 228). Gary Kuchar sheds light on this overwhelming fear when he 
explains that Donne cannot conceive of himself “as an image of God” without his own 
“ideally unified body,” and, further, that Donne registers separation from God “in terms 
of a dismembered and disorderly body” (157).28 In other words, Donne needs his body in 
order to feel close to God, and when his body fails him, he feels he fails God. These 
readings of Donne’s sermons depend on an analogous relationship between the disorderly 
body and sinfulness. In contrast, I argue that it is precisely at the moment when Donne's 
devotional speaker identifies his own heart as “dismembered and disorderly” that he most 
clearly surrenders his will to God’s will and therefore moves spiritually closer to God and 
physically closer to death. Thus, when he is most vulnerable, he can be closest to God, 
but he clearly fears the vulnerability entailed in the loss of control that he also most 
strongly desires. When Donne’s devotional speaker loses control over his certainty about 
his spiritual relationship with God, the text ceases to function anaogically, introducing 
																																																								
28 Kuchar evokes Daniel Featley’s term “autologie” to describe Donne’s task in the Devotions. A kind of 
theology, “autologie” indicates that the way to God is through the self, and Kuchar says that Donne “does 
more than merely enact a devotional quest toward God via the self; [he] diagnoses how changes in concepts 
of the body impact and threaten the preconditions of ‘autologie’ as a means of coming to know God by 
coming to know the self as an embodied being” (Kuchar 154). 
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paradox and disrupting readerly expectations. For example, the speaker’s heart, in station 
11 and discussed in detail below, is not perfect enough to be given in submission to God, 
but giving makes it perfect. The speaker says his is not like other hearts that are either 
faint or joyful, thereby rejecting the analoguous association invoked by simile. The 
speaker’s heart is instead a middle heart, “not so perfit, as to bee given, but that the very 
giving, mends them” (59). The initial paradox is apparent: the heart cannot and must be 
given. The disruption of expectation requires more clarification. The middle state of the 
speaker’s heart would likely startle his protestant audience who recall the description of 
God who detests and rejects middle hearts, those that are lukewarm rather than either hot 
or cold.29 Furthermore, rather than calling on God and relying on grace to perfect his 
heart and make it joyful as the prostestant audience might expect, the speaker suggests 
that he himself has control over his heart’s mending.30 In other words, the speaker mends 
his heart through his own act of giving it. He thereby takes responsibilty for his own heart 
and remains uncertain about God’s grace. The speaker’s does not fit into any of the 
analogies evoked by the hearts his is not like nor those anticipated by his audience. 
Therefore, rather than understanding Donne’s account of illness in the Devotions as a 
degenertion of body that is analogous to the degeneration of the soul, I suggest that the 
degeneration happens on the level of ambivalent and incongrous turns of phrase and that 
																																																								
29 See Revelation 3: 15-17: “I know your works; you are neither cold nor hot. I wish that you were either 
cold or hot. So, because you are lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I am about to spit you out of my 
mouth. For you say, ‘I am rich, I have prospered, and I need nothing.’ You do not realize that you are 
wretched, pitiable, poor, blind, and naked.” 
30 See God as the agent of heart-mending in Psalms: “The Lord is near to the brokenhearted, and saves the 
crushed in spirit” and “He heals the brokenhearted, and binds up their wounds” (34: 18, 147: 3). See God’s 
grace rather than one’s own active faith as the salvific agent in Paul’s letter to the Ephesians: “For by grace 
you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God— not the result of 
works, so that no one may boast” (2: 8-9). 
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this ambivalence registers a kind of textual disgust toward both life and death. This 
disgust that makes it posible for Donne to teach personal responsibility for one’s life so 
as to mediate, first, the repulsion to life in favor of ending it in death and, second, the the 
attraction to life in asserting one’s own will and identity and to preservin these features of 
living in death. In effect, the wavering between the two, suggests a textual disgust that 
mediates the speaker’s attempt to destroy and preserve life in death. 
Even though critics have seized upon Donne’s stance on death in Devotions and 
elsewhere, none of the current scholarly work has considered Station 15 “I sleepe not day 
nor night” despite this station’s sustained focus on the body’s need for sleep and the clear 
connection that Donne lays out between sleep and the initial state of death that he most 
fears: when consciousness is dissociated from the body. When Donne’s speaker collapses 
the binary of life and death through the concept of sleep and the liminal figure of the 
Watchman, he deploys a parabolic logic that reveals a personal or individual vulnerable 
state: loss of control, loss of perspective, and ultimately loss of identity, all of which 
forgo the possibility of forgiveness and the preservation of a liminal perspective that 
superscedes that of the individual.  
Donne’s project here becomes suspect when he attempts to explain why sleep is 
the model for death that allows humankind to greet death as the familiar restorative 
comfort that sleep provides to the body. At first glance, the speaker appears to set up a 
commonplace analogy to resolve fear of the unknown in death. In this anological reading, 
sleep as a metaphor allows Donne’s speaker to subsume his fear of death by making 
death familiar and restorative in sleep and thereby equating death with life and other 
processes that sustain and enrich life. In doing so, the speaker does not actually face his 
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fear; he tries to hide it, to disempower it, to tame it in the familiar, a tactic that informs in 
analogical readings of Donne’s final sermon as well as in some of his lyrics, like “Death 
be not proud.” But such readings likewise avoid the ways in which Donne’s devotional 
speaker makes the comparison of sleep and death strange. Though he equates death with 
the comfort of sleeping, he cannot sleep. Indeed, his sleeplessness propels the  station on 
sleep. Thus sleep does not work as an analogy because it does not use sleep’s presence 
but its lack to confront death, and the would-be sleeper does not acting according to what 
audiences expect sleepers to do. In other words, if Donne’s speaker can find comfort in 
death through sleep but cannot sleep, then this analogy breaks down, the speaker cannot 
find comfort in death, and his fear persists. But by the end of this station, Donne’s 
speaker is neither comforted nor submissive but still self-interested and demanding that 
God “consider [him] in that condition” he was in when “thou wast pleased with [him]” 
(81). Equating death with sleep attempts to disarm one kind of vulnerable state with 
another, but the analogy fails to find comfort and understanding in sleep’s familiarity.   
However, sleep proves to be worth considering as a parabolic image because, in 
addition to the would-be sleeper thwarting expectations, sleep is a troubling and 
incongruent figure for death. At the outset of this station Donne’s speaker links life and 
death in the act of sleeping by both asserting and distancing himself from this analogy.  
Naturall men have conceived a twofold use of sleep; that it is a refreshing 
of the body in this life; that it is a preparing of the soul for the next; that it 
is a feast, and it is the grace at that feast; that it is our recreation and cheers 
us, and it is our catechism and instructs us; we lie down in a hope that we 
shall rise the stronger, and we lie down in a knowledge that we may rise 
no more. (Devotions 77) 
The first words inagurate his distancing before the analogy is even posed. In attributing 
the “twofold use of sleepe” to “Natural Men,” Donne’s speaker suggests that their double 
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usage does not follow. As Guffey points out, Donne understands natural reason to be 
stunted, fallen, chaotic (124).31 Thus, the reasoning of natural men is immediately marked 
by a lack of reason. The disruption of this analogy bears out through the entire station as 
the comparison becomes more and more convoluted. Donne’s speaker explicitly refutes 
the usefulness of analogy when he says,  
though naturall men, who have induced secondary and figurative 
considerations, have found out this second, this emblematicall use of 
sleepe, that it should be representative of death…God, I say, intended 
sleepe onely for the refreshing of man by bodily rest, and not for a figure 
of death, for he intened not death it selfe. (77-78)    
The speaker directly repudiates what natural men think of sleep as a figure for death, a 
figure that strains under the forced induction, the unnatural birth, of their “secondary and 
figurative considerations.” In what follows, the issuing equation of sleep and death 
becomes strangely entangled and divided. After proving false the analogy of sleep to 
death based on what the speaker takes to be the original intention of God, he asserts that 
God did in fact appropriates this analogy to comfort men:  
God hath taken Mans Creature, death, into his hand, and mended 
it…[and] presents it to him, in a familiar, in an assiduous, in an agreeable, 
and acceptable forme, in sleepe (78)  
Thus the speaker’s refutation of natural men’s analogy wavers because God has 
apparently taken this logic, already identified as faulty, and used it for human benefit, 
thereby validating the fallen logic upon which this analogy depends. Donne’s speaker 
attempts to untangle this tenuous analogy throughout the station but never fully settles on 
a confident assertion that the analogy works.     
																																																								
31 Donne replicates this point in several sermons. See, for example, sermons three, four, and five.  
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For example, from the outset of the prayer, the text divides the singular act of 
sleeping into its two separate uses for life and death. It multiplies and condenses the 
“twofold use of sleepe” both thematically and structurally in the abrupt opening sentence. 
Donne complicates the the analogous relationship between sleep and death with the main 
verb in the opening clause. Donne’s “Naturall Men” do what at once can and cannot be 
done: they “have conceived,” thought of and given birth to their analogy that links sleep 
to death. It seems sleep as death has a double conception: concieved and induced by 
natural men and then created by God despite his not intending to equate the two. Both 
God and natural men become surrogate mothers of death through their ideas. Elsewhere 
in the Devotions, Donne deploys a similarly problematic image of surrogacy and birthing. 
In the first station, the known unknown (the certainty of death) is already prefigured in 
the familiar signs of illness: “our dissolution is conceived in these first changes, quickned 
in the sicknes it selfe, and borne in death, which beares date from these first changes” (7). 
Interestingly, this passage suggests another incongruous concept: the life cycle of death. It 
figures illness itself as a third mother of death in which the conception and the 
quickening—the coming to life and its perception—of death occur. Death figures as the 
offspring of illness, born at the moment one dies. Donne deploys an extended, 
paradoxical image of generation, development, and birth to describe the fact of mortality. 
The incongruity of the figures—God, natural men, and illness as mothers of death—
suggests that the logic of parable is at work in Donne’s attempt to understand death 
because the key terms of the three analogical mothers are not behaving as would 
normally be expected.32 Rather than using the familiarity of illness or sleep to explain the 
																																																								
32 Readers may object that this idea is characteristic of Platonic and therefore Neo-Platonic understandings 
of men giving birth to ideas as a higher or more important form of birthing than literal childbearing. 
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signs of death, Donne suggests that death is always already a part of and comes to life in 
both.  
Ramie Targoff similarly understands Donne’s writing to insist “that what we 
regard as life is indistinguishable from death” and that life itself is “a continuous act of 
dying, beginning with conception” (226). Targoff asserts that the final sermon, Death’s 
Duel, shows a “marked departure” from Donne’s other dealings with death which she 
reads as “normally regard[ing] death as a highly marked transition between one world 
and the next” (226). Targoff notes that Death’s Duel reduces the “bustle and activity of 
life” to the “rattling of bones underground” and thereby emptying “all meaning from 
human vitality and achievement” (226). Further, she understands Donne’s move to 
conflate life and death as “a negation of the joy of birth” and a “perverse strategy for 
conquering the terrors of death” (226). Building on Targoff’s arguments concerning 
Death’s Duel, I have shown that this collapse happens earlier in his career in the 
Devotions. Furthermore, I argue that Donne’s thematic and structural conflation of life 
and death is birthed from a perverse lack of reason that fails to familiarize death through 
sleep and instead defamiliarizes life.  
The structure of the station’s first sentence, taken as a whole, reveals the 
multiplicity of uncertain and contradictory meanings that Donne will apply to death and  
sleep. Like the thematic content, the structure first suggests analogy before rendering it 
strange. The main clause (“Naturall Men have conceived a twofold use of sleepe;”) 
announces the primary claim of this sentence and reveals the first doubling in its content 
																																																																																																																																																																					
However, I suggest that Plato too is deploying more parabolic logic than analogical logic because he 
repeatedly suggests in the Republic that he is not able to articulate what he is trying to say, that he is 
grasping at what cannot be grasped. Though I have no interest in idealizing my argument here, I do posit 
that Plato’s texts are similarly up to something more than simple analogy or allegory.  
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(“a twofold use”) while remaining singular in its form (emphasis original). It is formally 
a single simple sentence, but its grammatical singularity immediately splits after the first 
semicolon. The second phrase, in content, announces the first division of the “twofold use 
of sleepe” the “refreshing of the body.” This split is not singular: it still depends upon the 
initial independent clause and it anticipates its partner in the “twofold” split, which 
appears after the second semicolon. Further, it precisely parallels its dependent partner  
That it is a refreshing of the body in this life;  
That it is a preparing of the soule for the next;  
This parallel structure implies not only that these two parts of the use of sleep are equally 
important, but also that the terms of these parts are somehow equivalent. In other words, 
the syntax implies that a refreshing is a kind of preparing. This refreshing preparation of 
sleep enables the body to live well in this life and also prepare itself spiritually for death. 
In this parallel structure, Donne collapses the body and the soul, life and death, into the 
act of sleeping. He hides death in the image of sleep and equates death to life in the same 
collapse. Thus, he turns his fear of the sleep of death into a restorative feature of life and 
not only renders death familiar, but also reintroduces into the sleeping stage of death the 
life he hopes to regain in the resurrection of his body. 
The next pair of phrases structurally confirms and denies this analogical reading. 
While these dependent phrases are also almost parallel to each other and to their internal 
phrases, they also contain internal parallel pairs. In the first internal pair,  
That it is a feast,  
and it is the Grace at that feast;  
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Donne renders sleep strange by calling it the feast itself and also the grace, a part of that 
feast. He turns a metaphor of sleep as a feast into a synecdoche of sleep as grace. Thus, 
sleep is both the whole analogy (the feast) and also part of the whole analogy (the grace). 
Thematically, the comparison does not hold either because grace cannot be a feast. 
Grace, that is the words designating blessings or virtues, can itself be neither food nor 
festival. Grace constitutes meaning twice here and that meaning devolves: first, as the 
literal grace as the part of a literal feast and then as the term grace as a part of the whole 
of the feast, which stands for sleep. The seeming parallel, feast and grace, also divides 
the concept of sleep into two coordinated clauses, recombines them as part and whole in a 
twofold process of sleep, and dissolves them as it deteriorates into a cover for the fear of 
death it means to dissolve.  
Similarly, the text parallels division and recombination in the next phrase pair,  
That it is our recreation, and cheeres us,  
and it is our Catechisme, and instructs us; 
He first divides the recreation—in the already double sense of amusing activity and the 
act of creating anew—and cheer of the body from the catechism and instruction of the 
soul, yet this division leans on a recombination because each part still describes sleep. He 
introduces the ambiguity of the stance he takes on sleep itself, identifying the positive 
aspects of sleep as “recreation” and “cheere” and then turning to the less enjoyable but 
important aspects of sleep as “Catechisme” and “instruction”. Oddly, he pairs the 
emotion cheere with instruction, conflating the unreliable perceptions associated with 
emotion and the generally reasonable logic underlying instruction. This pair, then, 
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suggests that emotion may be a worthwhile route to instruction and that instruction may 
be hampered by emotion.  
Turning to the parallel structure of the larger phrases,  
That it is a feast, and it is the Grace at that feast;  
That it is our recreation, and cheeres us, and it is our Catechisme, and 
instructs us; 
 feast becomes a recreation that cheers us while grace, now neither a blessing nor a gift 
bestowed by God, becomes a catechisme that instructs, suggesting that the gift of grace is 
not free, that one must first learn one’s lesson. Because feast has already been conflated 
with grace, these matches can also be reversed when this pair of larger phrases divides 
into a parallel trio.   
That it is a feast, and it is the Grace at that feast;  
That it is our recreation, and cheeres us,  
and it is our Catechisme, and instructs us; 
Though this configuration does not change the parallel structures for grace (it is still 
cheer and instruction), feast takes on the the additional parallel with catechism, which 
intertwines feasting and delight in this life with fear of judgment in the next.  
Thus, the entangled illogical pairs require body and soul, life and death, to be both 
separate and intertwined, sleep to be both death and feasting as well as enjoyment, 
rebirth, and  interrogation.  
 The final pair of phrases in this opening sentence repeats the the dissolution of 
parallel structures. Here a troubling parallelism both aligns and contrasts the terms of this 
final pair of phrases. This ambiguity reveals the tenuous position of how natural men 
irrationally rationalize their fear of death. Again, one could naturally read this pair to 
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show that Donne uses grammatical parallelism to align terms such that they imply a 
similarity between otherwise dissimilar terms. 
wee lie downe in a hope, that wee shall rise the stronger; and  
we lie downe in a knowledge, that wee may rise no more. 
This double pairing is strange for a couple of reasons. First, hope aligns with knowledge 
Of course, a person on his deathbed may hope to awake from sleep, but a faithful person 
can only hope to arise from death in salvation. A person knows that soon he will one day 
not awake from sleep. But this knowledge of rising no more also offers a hint of doubt in 
salvation after death. The uncertainty of salvation that pervades this text implies the 
uncertainty of hope and not the certainty of knowledge. Furthermore, “ris[ing] the 
stronger” aligns with “ris[ing] no more,” effectively wavering between virile living and 
feeble dying.33 Thus, the grammatical structure of the sentence suggests that life and 
death are the same — a hopeful implication that is clearly designed to diminish the 
fearfulness of death. But the structure also suggests that life and death are not the same, 
so the hopefulness of the analogy breaks down in its knowledge of a fearful state for 
Donne’s speaker. Thus, this parallel structure does not, by the end, compare terms but 
instead contrasts them and reinstates the terror of death. The final pair of phrases in this 
sentence reinforce the uncertainty and fear that Donne’s speaker faces when he 
contemplates death by exposing the ambiguity and irrationality of the natural argument 
for coping with this fear. The image of sleep intended to provide comfort in the face of 
death dissolves into doubt.  
																																																								
33 I discuss Donne’s habit of punning on “more” in detail below.  
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None of these structural incongruities lend themselves to a simple analogical 
understanding of this opening sentence upon which the entire fifteenth station is built. 
Rather than confirming a tidy equation, Donne’s speaker wavers on the border between 
life and death. Without the familiarity of sleep, he can only face the unknown in death. 
He says that this “is the misery of [his] sicknesse, that death…is now before [his] Eies” 
and he can no longer see death through “that forme [sleep], in which God hath mollified 
it to us, and made it acceptable” (78). If he cannot face death through the familiar lens of 
sleep, then all that is left for him is to face death itself, thereby also rendering sleep 
unfamiliar.  
Positioned on the outskirts of human activity, isolated by virtue of his illness, so 
far removed from the joy and wonder of birth, Donne’s speaker confronts the unknown. 
From this perspective, he watches for the certain uncertainty of death. The fifteenth 
expostulation introduces the Watchman, a liminal figure that confirms and denies 
vulnerability Donne’s speaker faces in his tenuous position between life and death (80). 
The speaker names himself and presumably his priestly peers, if not all of humankind, 
watchmen, identifying them all with an unsleeping perspective oriented to the possibility 
of seeing both sides of a binary at once. He says, “The name of Watchmen belongs to our 
profession; Thy Prophets are not only seers indued with a power of seeing, able to see, 
but Watchmen evermore in the Act of seeing” (80). The term watchman carried a number 
of meanings that were available in the early seventeenth century.  Generally, the term 
takes on the meaning of one who watches, a sentinel, a lookout “posted to give warning 
at the approach of danger,” one who keeps vigil and all of these especially imply that the 
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one who is watching watches at night while others sleep.34 The watchman, importantly, 
does not sleep; his duty is to remain awake to see approaching danger. This liminal 
figure, tasked with the responsibility to see, stands on the border between the inside and 
the outside of a city, for instance, watching the outside in order to protect the inside. 
Because a watchman is both and neither inside and outside, he stands where oppositions 
cease to function. Announcing both ambiguity and vulnerability, the watchman as figure 
may be understood as a turn of language that stands for the function of undecidability.35 
Identifying with the watchman, Donne’s speaker thematizes his perspective as well as the 
ambiguity of his position on sleep and, therefore, on life and death. With the perspective 
of a watchman, he can maintain his tangled and uncertain binary between life and death.  
 
DONNE THE WRITER, DONNE THE WATCHMAN 
 For Donne’s devotional speaker, the watchman thematizes his vulnerable 
embodied state. As Targoff has asserted, Donne as writer “positioned himself again and 
again on the threshold between this world and the next,” and as Kuchar affirms, “neither 
alive nor dead, neither animate nor inanimate, Donne lingers in a liminal state between 
life and death, a purgatorial state where one is radically dislocated from the power of 
one’s will” (Targoff 217 and Kuchar 166). Donne’s speaker occupies the liminal space of 
the watchman, neither inside nor outside, neither alive nor dead. Though he watches the 
																																																								
34 See the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of watchman.  
35 The watchman may analogically replace sleep to evoke more certain comfort because the watchman can 
actively defend against death. However, the watchman contains within itself the logic of parable as a figure 
for undecidability, ambivalence, ambiguity. The watchman is a parabolic figure that behaves according to 
the logical expectations for his profession, yet these expectations are themselves ambivalent, wavering 
literally between defending the city and permitting it to be permeated through in-trafficking of resources 
and out-trafficking wastes.  
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signs of his illness for his impending death, he does not watch his own life, nor his 
unreadable body; he has negated the joy of life by claiming conception as a kind of death. 
Thus, Donne’s speaker, as a watchman himself who has seen death coming since birth, is 
an outcast of sorts. Existing on the border, he is not part of the daily life of like other 
people are, and he watches for death to approach. In this liminality, Donne’s speaker 
juxtaposes death and life, altering perspectives on both. On the one hand, he protects the 
boundary between life and death, and this is vital for Donne the writer. Without this 
boundary, he loses the bodily boundary that identifies him as John Donne. On the other 
hand, the watchman dissolves this boundary, creating exactly the indistinction that 
Donne, across his writing, seems to fear.  
The watchman, as a means to think differently about the text’s orientation to 
death, illuminates Targoff’s insight that Donne the writer most fears decomposition and 
that Donne removes from life the vitality of living by conflating life with death. He will 
apparently fight death to ensure that he will not be taken asleep, by which he seems to 
mean that he will not face decomposition before the resurrection of his body. Donne will 
not be content to find his soul with God; he must retain the identity that his body affords 
him. He recognizes his physical life as imperfect: he is tenuously positioned in society as 
a former Catholic in a Protestant England, he made a poor match in marriage, and he did 
not prosper financially. If he did not lead the life he expected to lead, he can hope for a 
perfected life in the resurrection. What he fears, then, is not the dying: rather, he seems to 
look forward to it. What he fears is losing his body and the losing the promise of a 
fulfilled life that resembles the life he perhaps wanted to have in his body. He fears his 
own impotence and vulnerability in this life and in death before the resurrection. This 
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fear makes sense in light of one of his letters. He reveals his fear of that part of death 
before the resurrection that he equates with sleep in Station 15. He says, “I would not that 
death should take me asleep” (Letters 50). While the lines that follow go on to explain 
how he wants to actively engage death and be overcome by it in vigorous battle, this line 
hints that Donne already finds sleep problematic in regard to death. He does not fear 
death taking him forcefully; he fears death taking him asleep. If he is afraid of sleeping 
with the threat of death looming, then he cannot be using sleep as a simple analogy to 
disarm the unknown in death. More interestingly however, he hints at what he may be 
doing by turning this analogy on its head. He suggests that if death took him forcefully, 
his own vulnerability would be excused, but if death took him gently as he slept, he 
would have no excuse for his impotence (Letters 50). If he dies awake, then, he would 
not be guilty of weakness, but if he dies sleep, the weakness of his imperfect body would 
be exposed for all to see.36 Wakefulness, and not sleep, then is the better comparison for 
death despite the pervasive, familiar, and comforting analogy that suggests the opposite.  
Thus, Donne’s devotional speaker does not find comfort in sleep but watches so 
that death does not catch him unaware, so that he can retain control over himself, so that 
he can preserve his body from decomposition, so that he will not appear weak but will 
instead appear perfect, as well as willful, in body and in soul. By emphasizing this strong 
yet  fragile covering of vulnerability, Donne’s texts solicit readings that manage 
ambiguity as undecidable.  
The readings that conclude this chapter will trace the ways in which Donne’s 
Devotions structures and thematizes a paradox of willful vulnerability that suggest the 
																																																								
36 Donne expresses this same attitude toward his experience in his poem “Batter my heart, three-personed 
God” when he calls for God to violently overthrow of the speaker’s own will.  
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text’s devotional model may be disruptively oriented toward the expectations of Donne’s 
first readers. As Guffey also explains, parabolic logic necessarily but, unlike analogical 
tropes, only “initially represents the world as the audience members know it,” its goal 
being to “effect a transformation of the auditor’s way of being in the world” (121). In 
Donald Evans’s words, “to accept a parable is to adopt and attitude” which alters one’s 
natural perceptions of the world. Thus, parabolic logic, more than the logic of any other 
figure, identifies the ways in which a text attempts to alter perception and therefore 
evokes auditors’ natural perceptions as well as a text’s affective orientation to the 
networks of perception in which the text originated.   
 
LINEAR CIRCLES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATION 
Soliciting the expected only to render it utterly strange, the Devotions offers not 
only an affirmation of parabolic readings but also a textual pattern of organization that 
operates according to the same logic of contradiction. Donne stretches the ambiguous 
logic as a means to organize the Devotions through a structure that collapses two of the 
images Donne deploys to describe God, the circle and the line. He writes,   
O eternal, and most gracious God, who considered in thy selfe, art a 
Circle, first and last, and altogether; but considered in thy working upon 
us, art a direct line, and leadest us from our beginning, through all our 
waye, to our end (6).  
Donne takes a traditional metaphor for God—the circle—and marries it to something 
unexpected, something a circle cannot be—a direct line.37 Not conforming to simply a 
																																																								
37 For more on God as a circle and the use of circles in Donne and elsewhere, see Jay Dean Divine’s 
“Compass and Circle in Donne’s ‘A Valediction Forbidding Mourning,’” Frank Livingstone Huntley’s “Sir 
Thomas Browne and the Metaphor of the Circle,” Marvin Morillo’s “Donne’s Compasses: Circles and 
Right Lines,” Isabel Rivers’s Classical and Christian Ideas in English Renaissance Poetry, James L. 
Spenko’s “Circular Form in Two Donne Lyrics,” and more recently Barbara Correll’s “Symbolic 
Economies and Zero-Sum Erotics: Donne's ‘Sapho to Philaenis,’” Verena O. Lobsien’s “Squaring the 
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linear, Augustinian path “from confusion and error to spiritual understanding,” Donne 
instead “structures his work around the always necessary, recurrent exercise of 
transcending the perspective of natural man” (Narverson 314). In other words, Donne 
imposes a structure of cyclical progression. Donne’s impossible linear circle is the basis 
for a counterintuitive organizing principle that spans each station of the devotion and 
sustains itself across the whole document.38 Because this self-cancelling structure of 
cyclical progress allows Donne’s speaker continually to submit and reinstate his will, it 
also provides an organizational pattern for the other contradictions that he faces in his 
assertive submission to his God. Key among them are, first, the complex need both to live 
and to find salvation in death discussed above and, second, the equally complex need to 
submit and to reinstate his own will. The ambiguity of both needs is organized by textual 
disgust as the Devotions waver between attraction to and repulsion from both death and 
submission, both life and willful resistance. Through thematic and structural 
contradictions that indicate and then disrupt the ordinary expectations his audience likely 
has for devotional literature, Donne’s speaker evokes that which is difficult to know or to 
understand as well as that which is difficult to articulate—about affect, the sacred—while 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Circle: Neoplatonic Versions of the Self in Early Modern Poetry,” and Brian Rotman’s Signifying Nothing: 
The Semiotics of Zero, Helen Wilcox’s “Squaring the Circle: Metaphors of the Divine in the Work of 
Donne and His Contemporaries.”  
38 Other critics have identified a circular and other patterns structuring Donne’s Devotions, but no one to 
my knowledge has linked this pattern to either the image of the linear circle or to its parabolic logic. See N. 
J. C. Anderson’s “Donne’s Devotions and the Psychology of Assent” understands a linear structure extant 
on both the micro and macro scale of the text, apparent in each station and across the entire text; Kate 
Gartner Frost’s Holy Delight, which considers several different patterns; Clara Lander’s “A Dangerous 
Sickness which turned to Spotted Fever,” which understands the Devotions within the progression of 
typhus; Janel Mueller’s “The Exegesis of Experience;” and Sister Elizabeth Savage’s reading of the 
Devotions as structured like the cyclical Ignatian meditation. Jonathan Goldberg, in “Not unto Death,” sees 
the Devotions as non-sequential. 
	 134 
suggesting a method for late modern readers to negotiate the silences and gaps that may 
inhibit readings of early modern cultural perspectives.  
Donne’s text harnesses parable’s logic in the content and the structure of the 
linear circle in each station of his Devotions, engaging his ambivalent desire to submit to 
his God while retaining his own will. Station one, “The first alternation, the first 
grudging, of the sicknesse,” offers a clear example of Donne’s localized use of parabolic 
logic and the structure of cyclical progress. The first meditation’s abrupt opening, a 
signature Donnean move across his writing, invites the reading of parabolic logic in his 
texts because parable necessarily startles one out of one’s ordinary perception. In this 
case, Donne’s speaker is both startled and unable to articulate the cause: “This minute, I 
was well, and am ill, this minute. I am surpriz’d with a sodaine change, & alteration to 
worse, and can impute it to no cause, nor call it by any name” (7). The opening 
meditation explores the abrupt imposition of illness on the body and suggests from the 
outset that the text will proceed by disrupting the familiar with the unknown and by 
attempting to articulate that which cannot be named.   
This meditation establishes the familiar facticity of the human condition (bodies 
sicken and die) but then disrupts how one may perceive this outcome. One cannot change 
the fact of death but one can read its signs, its “jelousies and suspitions and 
apprehensions of Sicknes, before we can cal it a sicknes; we are not sure we are ill; one 
hand asks the other by the pulse, and our eye askes our own urine, how we do” (7). Yet 
this method is unreliable. It emerges from three emotional states: 1) jealousy, or 
vehemence of emotion on the one hand, devotion on the other; 2) suspicion, or the feeling 
or intuition of evil; and 3) apprehension, or “The action of ‘feeling’ anything [or,...] 
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sympathetic perception” (OED). Emotion, as I have already discussed, is subject to 
interpretation and misinterpretation, but the words Donne chooses here suggest a 
particular kind of affective ambivalence, wavering between wrath and devotion, between 
imaginative, sympathetic perception and certainty, an ambivalence that suggests a general 
orientation of disgust. He further thematizes this ambivalence when he writes that we call 
it sickness when we can not be certain we are ill. Indeed, the diagnosis of illness relies 
entirely on perception and interpretation, which, like emotions, are unreliable and subject 
to all of the problems of first-person perspective. The speaker’s explanation amplifies the 
problem because the person who may be ill reads the symptoms of his illness privately, 
internally, without alternative perspectives: “one hand asks the other” and one’s “eye 
asks [one’s] own urine.” One may read one’s body but one may not be assured of 
correctly interpreting. One is, in other words, vulnerable to one’s own fallible 
perspective. From the outset, Donne gestures toward the strangeness of not being able to 
correctly interpret the most familiar thing of all: one’s own body.  
The meditation first describes illness as external assault, “a Cannon batters all, 
overthowes all, demolishes all; a Sicknes...summons us, seizes us, possesses us, destroyes 
us in an instant,” when the audience, both early and late modern, understand illness as 
internal to the body (7). The images of assault begin externally with cannons, summons, 
and sieges on the physical space of the body metaphorized as a building. But the 
externality of these descriptions of illness shift toward ambivalence between internal and 
external effects: one may be overthrown, demolished, possessed, and destroyed from 
either the outside or the inside, and these words do not specify the orientation. Donne’s 
speaker concretizes the internalization of illness when he equates humans to “little 
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world[s…with] earthquakes in him selfe, sodaine shakings; these lightnings, sodaine 
flashes; these thunders, sodaine noises” but then externalizes one’s ability to make sense 
of the little world’s sudden, often loud, and frightening signs when he switches to signs 
typically associated with interpretation, “these Eclypses, sodaine offuscations, & 
darkening of [the] senses; these blazing stars; sodaine firey exhalations; these rivers of 
blood, sodaine red waters” (8). By invoking untranslatable—or often mistakenly 
translated—portents alongside obfuscated senses and perceptions while explaining the 
human condition, Donne’s speaker posits the problem one’s first-person perspective to 
disrupt the idea that one can understand one’s own illness and anticipates his parabolic 
turn to shift the perspectives of his audience. The ambivalence of inside and outside 
terms and the strangeness of not being able to read one’s own body bears on the way in 
which the Devotions connects illness with sin. 
The first expostulation continues the external pattern in respect to sin. “I run, I flie 
into the wayes of tentation, which I might shun; nay, I breake into houses, wher the 
plague is,” suggests that one seeks out sin, moves toward it, must break and enter into sin 
in order to be affected by it (8-9). He even suggests that he is deploying an analogy 
between illness and sin. He writes, “why is not my soule, as sensible as my body? Why 
hath not my soule these apprehensions, these presages, these changes, those antidates, 
those jealousies, those suspitions of a sinne, as well as my body of a sickness?” (8).  
However, he has already disrupted the first term of the analogy (illness), suggesting that 
the body is not at all sensible. The signs of the body are, first, external and ambivalently 
internal to the body, and, second, not able to be read or, if they are, the readings are 
problematic in the same way as readings of other prophecies. He suggests the same thing 
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in this supposed analogy (that equates body with soul) when he refers to the signs of sin 
as apprehensions, presages, and suspicions, none of which are dependably legible. At the 
heart of the common reading of illness as analogy for sin is disruption and incongruity. 
Considering this and heeding the interpretive warnings Donne has already announced, it 
makes little sense to read the Devotions only with attention to analogy.     
In the first expostulation, Donne extends the seemingly analogical move of 
translating his body into his soul when he writes, “I am more than dust & ashes; I am my 
best part, I am my soule” (8). With this move, the speaker can escape his miserable, 
embodied human condition of sickness and death, and focus instead upon preserving his 
immortal self, his soul. He makes this move to preserve himself in the face of bodily 
decay and to establish his own authority to negotiate with God. He says that his soul, his 
true self, is the “breathe of God” and, as such, “[he] may breathe back these pious 
expostulations to [his] God” (5). Then he launches into a complaint that continues to blur 
the line between the concrete body and the insubstantial soul, blurring the terms of his 
analogy. The speaker complains that “[his] soul [is not] as sensible as [his] body” (5). He 
wants a soul that that he can read – a soul that emits signs of spiritual illness, just as his 
body emits signs of physical illness – so that he may seek remedy in order to preserve his 
“best part” for eternal life. But Donne has already established that reading the body does 
not necessarily produce reliable interpretations. A soul is in fact just as sensible as a 
body; or rather neither one is particularly sensible. Donne has turned back on itself the 
analogy of understanding the soul as we understand the body. After spending much of 
this station requesting legible bodily and spiritual signs, Donne turns midway to explain 
that he does have these signs but he does not heed them and, in fact, avoids them:  
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Thou hast imprinted a pulse in our Soule, but we do not examine it; a 
voice in our conscience, but wee do not hearken unto it. We talk it out, we 
jest it out, we drinke it out, we sleepe it out; and when wee wake, we doe 
not say with Jacob, Surely the Lord is in this place, and I knew it not: but 
though we might know it, we do not, will wil not. (9)  
Here Donne’s speaker accuses the audience of ignoring their personal responsibilty for 
sin. He also notes their inability to change their perspectives alone, to recognize that 
something strange is happening (the Lord being in this place) and they did not know, but 
even though they may recognize the bodily or spiritual signs, they also do not and will 
not acknowlege the strangness. Those who are ill no less than those who are sinful can 
not will themselves to be physically or spiritually well.   
This is a turning point in the larger parabolic structure of the first station, the point 
at which Donne both disrupts the analogical logic of the body/soul equation and suggests 
that the only means of recovering is to give up one’s first-person efforts to do so.  In 
other words, this turn moves the speaker from an incongruent position of both self-
reliance and lack of personal responsibility (because illness comes from outside of 
oneself), on the one hand, to taking responsibilty for himself while also submitting to rely 
on God for mending or redemption, on the other. The repetition of these paradoxical 
positions of a kind of willful submission perpetuates the cycle of the individual station as 
well as the progressive repetition of  the same cycle across all twenty-three stations.  
Opening abruptly on inexplicable illness and the original state of man before 
turning in the middle of the station to address the impossible contradictions at the heart of 
its content, the first station ends with the willful misery with which it began. But first, the 
closing of the station suggests a tentative surrender. Unable to recover body or soul on his 
own, Donne’s speaker can only surrender to God in the prayer, and he names God here as 
the circle that is also a line:  
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O eternal, and most gracious God, who considered in thy selfe, art a 
Circle, first and last, and altogether; but considered in thy working upon 
us, art  a direct line, and leadest us from our beginning, through all our 
waye, to our end (6).  
Donne’s God is both inside time (“first and last”) and outside of time (“altogether”). 
Donne’s God is, in Paul Tillich’s words, “the ground of being,” the answer to the crisis of 
the human condition (64). It is here that the speaker calls upon his God for spiritual and 
physical healing as well as for relief from his own will (10). But it is also here that the 
speaker makes demands even as he surrenders (“enable me,” “deliver mee,” “keep me,” 
“preserve mee,” “raise me,” “doe this”) perhaps in suspicion that God will forget him or 
not keep his promises to him (10). In either case, his is a willful surrender, a paradoxical 
surrender that signals the ambiguity of the speaker’s own vulnerability to the unknowable 
will of God, a vulnerability that exceeds his embodied vulnerability to the sickness at 
hand.  
This station opens with the vulnerable and “miserable condition of man” and 
concludes with a hint at the exact same condition, “our naturall infirmities” for which 
Christ “paid a deare price” (3-7). The circular structure of this station is complete, but it 
also offers a vector out into the next cycle with the suggestion that Donne’s speaker 
remains vulnerable, and that he both can and cannot surrender to God’s will. Thus, this 
first station creates thematic and structural ambiguity that does not permit critics to 
expose Donne as only an egoist or exactly submissive. Instead, it offers a new perspective 
on the Devotions that wavers between the two opposed perspectives to suggest an 




CONCENTRIC EXTENSION: THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEVOTIONS 
Donne’s parabolic logic transgresses the bounds of a single station. The structure 
of the entire Devotions takes this cyclical turn as it progresses. Just as each station divides 
this progression into three parts, dividing the whole text similarly into three parts to focus 
on the the first station, the central station (Station 11), and the final station (Station 23) 
will show the cyclical form of the collective Devotions. Station one, we have seen, lays 
out the strangeness and the vulnerability of the human condition, body and soul. It 
presents in miniature the same cyclical form of opening abruptly, laying out the facts of 
the speaker’s illness, negotiating an argument to overcome these conditions, proposing a 
surrender of will, then reinstating it, that is amplified in the larger trajectory of the text. 
As the opening of this larger cycle, station one lays out the initial facts of the “miserable 
condition of Man,” and reinforces that this station as a whole is about beginnings. By 
repeating the misery of man’s condition (three times in this first station) the station 
lingers, indeed pauses to wallow, in humankind’s distress. In effect, it stops time at the 
beginning, marking this station as the beginning thematically in addition to structurally 
by virtue of being the first. Stressing the pause, the repetition of man’s condition suggests 
that it is insurmountable because the phrase is paired with other desperate proclamations 
of the speaker’s state:  
 unprevented for all our diligence,  
unsuspected for all our curiositie; nay  
undeserved, if we consider only disorder (7). 
The parallel structure of these phrases not only emphasizes the miserable condition but 
also externalizes it. It is foisted upon man from outside, susceptible to no preemptive 
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defense, not even anticipated as a possibility, and unwarranted, but unwarranted only 
when one sees the disorder of sickness as an external force. Though the condition of man 
is contextual, the speaker seems to suggest even here that his audience is wrongly (or 
only) considering it from outside and therefore not taking responsibility for their 
conditions as individuals, and also that this lack of personal responsibility contributes to 
their misery. Even as the cycle of this station turns, it delays movement away from this 
beginning. The station emphasizes the lack of movement by continually evoking 
beginnings and suddenness (these words are each repeated seven times), suggesting that 
station one turns internally in its own circle with unresolved lines connecting it to the 
next station. In its attention to sudden beginnings this station also inaugurates the larger 
circle of the Devotions as a whole.   
At the heart of the Devotions, Station 11, “They use Cordials, to keep the venim 
and Malignitie of the disease from the Heart,” turns, like the first expostulation, to the 
heart of the human experience, the “best part”, the soul.39 At the heart of this station 
Donne’s speaker posits a heart that is vulnerable: imperfect and decomposing.  It is a 
heart that is weak and unreliable, yet upon which the entirety of one’s perceptions 
depends. Donne writes,  
 Whence can wee take a better argument, a clearer demonstration, that all 
the Greatnes of the world, is built upon opinion of others, and hath in it 
self no reall being, nor power of subsistence, then from the heart of man? 
It is alwayes in Action, and motion, still busie, still pretending to do all, to 
furnish all the powers, and faculties with all that they have; But if an 
enemy dare rise up against it, it is the soonest endangered, the soonest 
defeated of any part. (56) 
																																																								
39 The word heart appears 79 times, significantly more often than any other word in the station. 
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Donne’s speaker claims that the heart of man argues for and demonstrates that the 
greatness of the world has no real being and no power to survive without the perceptions 
or opinions of others, which he locates in the hearts of men. Yet as a means of organizing 
and perpetuating the world, the heart busily pretends to be the origin and sustenance of all 
worldly powers and all senses or talents. The speaker suggests that the heart is 
responsible for perceiving all of the greatness of the world as nothing and asserts that the 
heart is only pretending to to supply the greatest things the world has to offer with all 
they have to make them great. If they are not actually great, have no real being nor 
power, and the heart merely pretends to give them all they have, then the heart pretends 
to give worldly greatness nothing while exposing that worldly greatness is nothing. The 
nothingness of worldly greatness redoubles as the responsible, if pretending, heart turns 
tail in response to external assault. The perceptions of the heart, then, are fraught with 
pretense that cannot be maintained and perception constitutes nothing. If everything 
worldly is created by this weak heart, and it is the best of parts, Donne’s speaker asserts 
his intensely vulnerable position as nothing.    
After explaining the nothingness of the heart, Donne’s speaker divides hearts 
again into two kinds: joyful and faint. Claiming to have neither “joyfulness of heart” nor 
“faintness of heart,” Donne’s speaker disrupts the binary that identifies hearts in order to 
place his own heart flickering in between the two:  
There is then a middle kinde of Hearts, not so perfit, as to bee given, but 
that the very giving, mends them: Not so desperate, as not to bee accepted, 
but that the very accepting dignifies them. This is a melting heart, and a 
troubled heart; and a wounded heart, and a broken heart, and a contrite 
heart… such a Heart I have. (59) 
Here, the speaker identifies his vulnerability to the will of God. If his heart is imperfect, 
“melting”, “troubled”, “wounded”, “broken”, and “contrite”, then he has given over his 
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heart, and therefore his will, to God at last. Yet this giving over happens almost exactly in 
the middle of his Devotions, indeed buried here in the middle of his central expostulation, 
out of place in the section in which he typically negotiates his arguments against the 
conditions laid out in the prior mediation. The middleness of the heart emphasizes the 
middleness of this station. The word middle is only used in the explanation of a middle 
kind of heart, and roughly in the middle of the station. This is the turning point of the 
parabolic movement of the the larger structure of the Devotions because this vulnerable 
display is not the speaker’s final or definitive action even in this station. Though the 
speaker maintains the semblance of surrender to the will of God to the end, leaning 
toward submission “in thy kingdome” in the final lines of the eleventh prayer, he remains 
ambiguously assertive, continuing to make willful demands (“Preserve that to mee”) and 
to elevate himself (“I may take a greater degree, and serve thee in a higher place”) (61). 
Donne’s speaker exposes and hides his most vulnerable moment of surrender at the heart 
of the Devotions cycle.  
The Devotions does not end on surrender, but anticipates a return to the fearful 
state of sudden sickness considered at the outset. The final station, entitled “They warne 
mee of the fearefull danger of relapsing,” does not evoke a final submission but 
culminates in a plea for protection from a fear of relapse. The word relapse itself suggests 
a circular movement at the end of an illness that turns toward the beginning of a sickness, 
as in taking a turn for the worse, a turning that also suggests figurative turns of language 
that quickly devolve into incongruity.  
This station opens with the refutation of one of Donne’s common analogies. The 
comparison of the large to the small. In the opening lines, Donne writes,  
	 144 
It is not in mans body, as it is in the Citie, that when the Bell hath rung, to 
cover your fire, and rake up the embers, you may lie downe, and sleepe 
without fear. Though you have by physicke and diet, raked up the embers 
of your disease, stil there is a feare of a relapse; and the greater danger is 
in that. (121)  
The city is not like a man’s body. In the city, one can extinguish one’s fire and sleep 
without fear of burning, but people facing the fear of illness leading to death cannot be so 
certain of their fates after death, either salvation or damnation. In other words, in 
sickness, one can never find contentment in sleep, nor can one find contentment in death. 
Though in the city neighbors depend upon each other to put out their own fires, thereby 
preserving the city, the individual’s body has no externally shared responsibility for self-
preservation—neither medicine nor diet. Each person faces death alone. This is a source 
of the fear because one must take personal responsibility in the face of an uncertain future 
in death.  
Though the word city is not explicitly used as a figure earlier in the Devotions, the 
comparison between city and body evokes the idea that man is a little world from the first 
and fourth stations. City similarly suggests, on a smaller scale, the expansion of one man 
to many. Yet this passage refutes the analogy. That the text explicitly says that analogy 
does not work—“It is not in mans body, as it is in the Citie”—suggests that prior 
instances of this kind of micro-macro analogy also break down. The expansion of the one 
man to the whole world already becomes uncertain and therefore ambivalent when it 
retracts again in the image of the little world.40 The return to and revision of prior images 
																																																								
40 The opening lines of this station also evoke images from other earlier stations, too many to fully treat in 
the scope of this chapter, suggesting that they may similarly break down.Though the references for all of 
these images are likewise too many to list here, death, fire, man’s body, sleep, fear, and disease, appear as 
comparative images throughout the Devotions. The Bell, for one, stands out in its repettions because this 
image is so often referenced in the line, “Any Mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in 
Mankinde; And therefore never send to know for whom the bells tolls; It tolls for thee” (87).  
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reinforces the degeneration of the ending—of one’s illness, of one’s text, of one’s life. 
But it also emphasizes the turning of the cyclical structure of Donne’s Devotions through 
the backward-looking, formal and thematic characteristics of the final station.      
 The incongruent but simultaneous combination of degeneration and return 
amplify the ambivalence of the final station, which overflows with references to and 
invocations of both fear and ambiguity. For example,  
wee must watch through all those long nights, and mourne through all 
those long daies, (daies and nights, so long that Nature her selfe shall 
seeme to be perverted, and to have put the longest day, and the longest 
night, which should bee six moneths asunder, into one naturall, unnaturall 
day)…(121) 
In the “natural, unnatural” pairing of the longest night with the longest day, nature herself 
seems perverted. The speaker’s fear is so ambiguous that he “can scarce fix a feare, 
because wee know not what to feare” and so he affixes fear to relapse “the nearest object, 
the most immediate exercise of that affection of feare” (122). Sharon Seelig does not see 
this relapse as a fearful return to illness but as a paradoxical hopefulness in anticipation 
of death. In her words, “a return to health…is in theological terms a postponement of the 
goal, and that fear of relapsing, contrary to our first impression of the matter, may be 
taken as a sign of hope” (112). A return to health is itself the cause of anxiety, but a 
relapse quickens death. This strange hopelfulness, a kind of rebirth of death in relapse, 
recalls the opening station’s concern with the life cycle of death. Similarly, in the word 
relapse Donne stages a return to the beginning of the Devotions. This return occurs in the 
formal and thematic revisions described above, but it becomes explicit in the repetition of 




  Variable, and therefore miserable condition of Man (Station 1, 7) 
wee fall from that comfort which wee might have in our first sicknesse, 
from that meditation, Alas, how generally miserable is Man.” (Station 23, 
122)41 
The latter line claims to be different from the former. It not only misremembers and 
therefore revises the fear of that first station—that the first sickness was not then 
comfortable. It also refutes this difference when it invokes the miserableness of man.  
At the end of his final station, Donne’s speaker again claims surrender to God to 
avoid relapse but does so with imperatives directed at God (“preserve me,” “Say to my 
Soule,” “let mee”), ultimately reasserting his own will rather than giving it over to God 
(126,127). The final station formalizes the certain uncertainty—“where is my 
assurance”— in incongruously paired analogies and recollections of the first station, 
suggesting that this final station is formally relapsing to the sudden fear of sickness, 
completing the linear yet cyclical structure of the Devotions as a whole (123).  
 
ONE MORE LINEAR CIRCLE 
In a short poem composed around the same time as his Devotions, Donne’s poetic 
speaker confirms a reading, not of rampant egoism, nor of congenial wit, but one of 
radical fear and vulnerability before his most important critic – his God. This poem, “A 
Hymn to God the Father,” deploys in miniature the same cyclical structure of the 
Devotions, the effect of which is the text’s ambivalent orientation to faith evoked by the 
iterative cycle of submission in confession and willful, fearful doubt. The poem is short 
enough to reproduce in its entirety:  
																																																								
41 The Devotions is preoccupied with man’s miserable condition throughout.  
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I. 
Wilt thou forgive that sinne where I begun,  
 Which was my sin, though it were done before? 
Wilt thou forgive that sin, through which I runne,  
 And doe runne still: though still I doe deplore?  
  When thou hast done, thou has not done,  
   For, I have more.  
II. 
Wilt though forgive that sinne which I have wonne 
 Others to sin? and, made my sinnes their doore?  
Wilt thou forgive that sinne which I did shun 
 A yeare, or two: but wallowed in, a score?  
  When thou hast done, thou hast not done,  
   For I have more.  
III. 
I have a sinne of fear, that when I have spunne  
 My last thred, I shall perish on the shore;  
But sweare by thy self, that at my death thy sonne  
 Shall shine as he shines now, and heretofore;  
  And, having done that, thou hast done,  
   I feare no more.  
 
At a distance, the poem takes the same three-stage arrangement that Donne’s 
speaker lays out in the Devotions. The poem opens with reference to the familiar: the 
past, the “miserable condition of man,” original sin, “that sin where I begun” and the 
propensity for humanity to continue to sin even as they regret it. The second section 
extends the present or perpetual heart of sin, the willfulness of both urging “others to sin” 
and wallowing in one’s own sins despite knowing better. The final section names the 
speaker’s sin as a fear of eternal death and, like the prayers of his Devotions, calls 
imperatively upon God to preserve him in the future.  
These thematic concerns are replicated by the poetic forms, including rhyme 
scheme and register. The repetition of rhyming trios through all three stages emphasizes 
not only the same three-part structure of the Devotions but also the simultaneous circling 
back and progressing forward of the linear circle. As each stanza proceeds, flickering 
	 148 
between rhymes in a two-part rhyme scheme, it also recalls the rhymes of both the prior 
and the forthcoming stanzas. For example, “begun” at the end of the opening line 
anticipates all of the other words which which it rhymes—“runne,” “wonne,” “shun,” 
“spunne,” “sonne,” and “done”—while all of these words recall “begun” as well as each 
other. Furthermore, the repetiton of the word “done” at the conclusion of each stanza 
creates the effect of finality that is not at last final, repeating twice more and recalling all 
of the prior and forthcoming end lines and therefore suggesting that none of the 
seemingly definitive ends can be understood as final with any certainty. This repetition 
orients the poem toward an end that can always circle back to the beginning. 
The cyclical progression repeats when the rhyming words organize into a pattern 
of first lines, third lines, and fifth lines of each stanza, offering the same three-part cycle 
in terms of their registers, which respectively evoke beginnings, middles, and ends. The 
first lines of each staza end with words that evoke beginnings. Obviously, “begun” and 
“done” suggest beginnings and ends. The the other rhyming words at the openings of the 
second two stanzas also suggest newness and creation. The word “wonne” of the second 
stanza suggests a new accomplishment, a new acquisition, and the procession of the life 
of a project. The word “spunne” of the third stanza evokes both creation of something 
new, as in the act of spinning thread, and a perpetual circling, as in the movement of 
spinning or turning. Advancing and stalling this progressive turning, the middle registers 
of the end-words of each stanza’s third line falter with the progressive movement of 
turning toward in “runne,” to the regressive movment of turning away in “shun,” 
followed by the turn to redemption evoked by the “sonne.” Similarly cyclical registers 
organize the rhyming words of the second and sixth lines of each stanza. The liminality 
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of beginnings emerges in “before,” “doore,” and “shore,” while the twice repeated 
“more” concludes every stanza by evoking the potential for another progressive 
reproduction. The spiraling yet wavering momentum of repetitions in the three-part 
structure combined with the fact that them poem proceeds with only a two-part rhyme 
scheme—ABABAB—recalls the ambivalent thematic concerns that pervade Donne’s 
writing.   
Unlike, the Devotions, this poem seems to stress thematically a final surrender in 
its closing line. Whether we read it as most modern editions, “I fear no more,” or in some 
manuscripts, “I have no more,” the effect here is of ultimate dissolution of the self rather 
than a reconstituting of the will. This poetic “I” appears at last empty, empty of fear and 
possessing nothing, thus belying critics’ polarizing synecdocal readings of Donne’s ego. 
Instead, Donne’s poetic speaker has translated his identity into a lack of identity, a 
nothingness, akin to the identity of lack in catachresis. He has, in other words, turned his 
linear self (represented by the literally linear form of “I”) into a circle, the signifier that 
represents nothingness (zero).42 However, Donne’s speaker does not say that he no longer 
fears. He says something slightly different: “I fear no more.” Because this poem 
repeatedly evokes one of Donne’s oft repeated puns on his own name, it stands to reason 
that this final “more” is another of his naming puns based on his wife Anne’s maiden 
name.43 The “more,” then, deserves a second glance as a “more” that is more than more, 
as a “more” that is inconclusive because it invites the possibility of progression into the 
future. The emphasis on more as the concluding word of the line and of the poem 
																																																								
42 For a more on zeroes and nothingness, see Brian Rotman’s Signifying Nothing: The Semiotics of Zero.  
43 Because puns are grammatically incongruent, their rampant use by Donne throughout his corpus offers 
further support for the method of understanding his work though an incongruent rather than analogical lens.  
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suggests that the speaker clings to fear, that despite the “no” there is always “more” at the 
end. In the poem’s concluding phrase, the poetic speaker’s fear may be simultaneously 
released and retained. The speaker either submits and therefore evacuates himself of 
identity or else stubbornly asserts the extension—the more—of his willful control. Either 
way, speaker remains vulnerable to retribution and loss.  
*** 
Both thematically and formally, Donne’s texts negotiate what it means to be 
radically vulnerable, which they revealed in their complete incompleteness, in their 
transgressions and disruptions. Donne the writer knew something about fear and 
vulnerability. He was vulnerable to the networks of power that structure his world (the 
State, the Church, the interpretations of his first audiences, language itself). Donne turned 
this fear and his experience of vulnerability to the systems of his day into rhetorical 
resources that reveal how his texts are oriented within these cultural networks.44 Donne’s 
texts manage a fear, which is, on the one hand physical—a fear of the dissolution and 
disappearance of his body—and on the other hand metaphysical—a fear of being 
misinterpreted, misunderstood, unforgiven.  
In the final wavering embrace of vulnerability in both “A Hymn to God the 
Father” and the Devotions, Donne’s speakers offer a reading strategy that reveals the 
productive ambiguity of willful lack, of evacuated identity. By evacuating identity, 
Donne’s texts revoke the distinctions that identify things by what they are not and thereby 
call for readings that are hospitable to the possibility of new paths to understanding things 
heretofore unknown. It is rhetorical willfulness that enables lack to generate something 
																																																								
44 This also constitutes a rhetorical practice of passive resistance.  
	 151 
new in catachrestic figures. Reading the polarizing effects inherent in Donne’s writing as 
undecidable through the catachrestic logic of parable turns ambivalence from an 







“IS NOT THE TRUTH THE TRUTH?”: STRANGER TRUTHS AND LIES 
IN SHAKESPEARE’S HENRY IV, PART I  
 
What if Falstaff tells the truth? More precisely, what if Falstaff says something true when 
he lies? This question drives my analysis of Shakespeare’s second Henriad. Herbert Weil 
works from the same proposition in a brief article, “Montaigne and Falstaff,” in which he 
reads the old knight along with Montaigne’s ideas about truth in “How We Cry and 
Laugh for the Same Thing.” Weil asserts that though he is  
More renowned for his outrageous lies, Falstaff, I think, comes much 
closer than any other character in his plays (and perhaps in any play in 
early modern literature) to telling certain sorts of truth. It seems far-
fetched to argue any direct influence by Montaigne on the creation of 
Falstaff. But I think that the fictional character shares with his predecessor 
an exceptional ability to tell truths that others deny—or ignore—or fail 
even to notice. (49) 
Similarly, I am interested in disrupting the critical tendency to trust Hal and suspect 
Falstaff, specifically in Henry IV, Part I. I intend to show that Falstaff offers a reliable 
focal perspective when he transgresses the boundaries between truth and lie, presence and 
absence, bravery and cowardice in ways that suggest a different tactic to interpret the 
play’s pervasive discourse of honor, one that finds strength in weakness.1  I argue, in 
																																																								
1 Though I sympathize with A.C. Bradley’s generous reading of Falstaff, I am not suggesting that he lies 
out of jest or “on purpose to get himself a difficulty” or that he does not expect others to believe him 
(Bradley 264). I will argue in this chapter that his lies are intentional, motivated, and revelatory of truths 
that others do not want to face. I am suggesting that Falstaff (or disorder generally) is less contained than 
Stephen Greenblatt admits when he suggests that Henry IV, Part I does allow for subversive voices that 
may be “powerfully registered” but “do not undermine that order” that permits them and contains them (in 
“Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and its Subversion, Henry IV and Henry V.” Political 
Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism. Eds. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield. Ithaca: 
Cornell U P, 1985. 18-47. Print. 38). In Shakespeare’s History Plays: Rethinking Historicism, Neema 
Parvini also counters Greenblatt to argue that he “overestimates the level of Henry [IV]’s ideological 
control over the state” and that just because the play invites readers “to understand the costs of power, [but] 
it does not follow therefore that we are invited to accept that power” (206). Equating Greenblatt’s point to a 
kind of ideological victim blaming, Parvini analogizes Greenblatt’s suggestion: “to say that Henry IV’s 
state ‘produces’ its own subversive elements is akin to saying that a bank that has failed to secure its vaults 
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other words, that Falstaff’s function in relation to Hal’s suggests alternative ways of 
reading that endorse embracing one’s own vulnerability in order to stake a rejection of 
the systemic and ideological abuses perpetrated and sustained by one’s culture. 
Falstaff exaggerates to exceed the bounds of truth, but the textual and critical 
attempts to contain him in his lies suggest that these same lies must be contained because 
they are actually threatening. If Falstaff were not powerful, then he would not need to be 
stopped, he need not be confronted for lying, he need not ultimately be rejected. In 
Neema Parvini’s words, King Henry V’s rejection of his friend is less a rejection and 
more “a tacit acknowledgment of the fact that Falstaff is too wily a character to have at 
close quarters” (Shakespeare’s History Plays 207). Harry Berger suggests that Falstaff is 
complicit in Hal’s final rejection of him, that he knowingly misleads the Prince, and that 
he knows that his friend must ultimately discard him.2 Berger sees Falstaff as a sinner in 
search of punishment for his sins, which is a far more charitable reading of the character 
than the role of self-interested Vice in which many other critics cast him.3 Despite his 
																																																																																																																																																																					
‘produces’ its own robberies” (206). In contrast to the argument I develop in this chapter, however, Parvini 
ultimately agrees with Greenblatt that Falstaff is finally contained “but only to the extent that he was 
‘contained’ by the terms of his own self-interest at the start of 1 Henry IV” (Shakespeare’s History Plays 
207).   
2 See his reading of Hal’s rejection of Falstaff in “The Prince’s Dog.”   
3 As the critical history surrounding this character suggests, critics tend to divide themselves into two 
camps: pro-Hal (and therefore anti-Falstaff) and pro-Falstaff (though not necessarily anti-Hal). As is clear 
from the outset of this chapter, my position is sympathetic toward Falstaff and may at times appear to be  
especially critical of Hal. However, participating in this critical impasse to proffer yet another apology for 
Falstaff is not the purpose of my argument.  
Falstaff launched critical debate long before William Empson suggested that he “started the whole 
snowball of modern Shakespearean criticism” (“Falstaff” 38). Strong reactions to Falstaff’s character, both 
positive and negative, have been a part of the critical reception of this play from its inception. Much 
Falstaffian criticism is marked by critical ambivalence that vacillates between the two responses: critics 
who oppose what they read as Falstaff’s moral depravity also tend to forgive him because he is not only 
funny but witty while critics charmed by Falstaff struggle to accommodate his less savory 
characterizations. Shakespeare’s second tetrology, and especially the characters of Hal and Falstaff, have 
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remained so critically popular that the body of work addressing this particular critical division is massive. 
What follows is merely a sketch of a much larger whole.  
Though much morally focused Falstaffian criticism, especially in the eighteenth century, attended to 
Falstaff as though he were a real person, one early defense of Falstaff anticipates the project I undertake 
here, considering not only his character as textual form but also commenting on the acts of analysis and 
interpretation of this play. Reacting to critics like Samuel Johnson, who read Falstaff negatively, Maurice 
Morgann specifically counters charges of the knight’s assumed cowardice by rereading the scenes like 
Gad’s Hill that are used to level those same charges (“An Essay on the Dramatic Character of Sir John 
Falstaff,” 1777). Christy Desmet identifies the usefulness of taking seriously Morgann’s attention to 
interpretation, and my project’s focus on critical perceptions and blindnesses benefits from these earlier 
considerations (Reading Shakespeare’s Characters: Rhetorics, Ethics, and Identity).  
Reacting to pro-Falstaff critics like A.C. Bradley, cited above, and reinvigorating the anti-Falstaff camp for 
the twenieth century, Dover Wilson reads Falstaff through his allegorical connections to the Vice figure of 
morality plays and the miles gloriosus in order to highlight Hal as the play’s intended focus (The Fortunes 
of Falstaff). W.H. Auden in “The Prince’s Dog” and C.L. Barber in Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy, among 
others, follow suit to allegorize Falstaff as a Lord of Misrule and position Hal and the obvious focal 
perspective thematized by the play. 
Some later twentieth-century readings of the play refocused on positive readings of Falstaff. Valerie Traub, 
for instance, understands Falstaff as a kind of mother figure for Hal in “Prince Hal’s Falstaff: Positioning 
Psychoanalysis and the Female Reproductive Body.” Others read Falstaff as once again central to 
understanding the play, as a carnavalesque inversion of moral values (in Robert Hunter’s “Shakespeare, 
Pattern of Excelling Nature,” and Graham Holderness’ Shakespeare Recycled), as an extra-texual 
perspective that transcends both the political and comic plots of the play in order to comment on both (in 
Derek Traversi’s Shakepeare: From Richard II to Henry V), and as a metaphorical embodiement of these 
two textual and ideological spaces (in Francois Laroque’s “Shakespeare’s Battle of Carnival and Lent”). 
More recent criticism of Falstaff highlights the continued critical ambivalence associated with the old 
knight’s reception. Alan Stewart, for example, sees both Hal and Falstaff as representatives of corruption in 
the Gad’s Hill episode (Shakespeare’s Letters). Michael Davies, who is also concerned with the dangers of 
ignoring Falstaff’s longstanding appeal, reads Hal’s rejection of Falstaff as justified insofar as it stages a 
kind of protestant conversion for Hal that would have resonated with the play’s original audiences 
(“Falstaff’s Lateness: Calvinism and The Protestant Hero in Henry IV”). Charles Forker considers the 
relationship between Falstaff and Hal insofar as it figures early modern political maneuvering and religious 
reconciliation in “ The State of the Soul and the Soul of the State: Reconciliation in the Two Parts of 
Shakespeare’s Henry IV.” The persistance of linking Falstaff to subversions, both productive and 
destructive, may be seen in studies like Phebe Jensen’s Religion and Revelry in Shakespeare’s Festive 
World, Robert Bell’s “The Anatomy of Folly in Shakespeare’s Henriad,” Douglas Hayes’ Rhetorical 
Subversion in Early English Drama, and Neema Parvini’s Shakespeare’s History Plays. And advocates of 
the anti-Falstaffian camp remain: see, example, Christopher McDonough’s brief comparision of Falstaff to 
classical cowards in “ ‘A mere scutcheon’: Falstaff as Rhipsaspis” and Karen Marsalek’s “Marvels and 
Counterfeits: False Resurrection in the Chester Antichrist and 1 Henry IV” in which she refers to Falstaff as 
Shakespeare’s abusive “Antichrist figure.”   
My project stands in clear opposition to the less charitable readings of Falstaff, but it also attempts to 
expose the tendency of critics to privalege their sympathy with Hal’s perspective even when, perhaps 
especially when, also sympathizing with Falstaff’s. For instance, in Shakespeare’s History Plays, Parvini 
reads Falstaff not so much vicious as simply self-interested, and he reads Hal exactly the same way. 
Acknowledging the imposibility of understanding the play wihtout considering “where the play ultimately 
intends the audience’s sympathies to lie,” Parvini nonetheless seems to sympathize with Hal’s project to 
establish his own ideological order as king (206).  
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charity toward Falstaff, whom he casts as a repentant “old white-bearded Satan,” no one 
would accuse Berger of being of this devil’s party (2.4.446). Berger still favors Hal, Hal’s 
perspective, Hal’s need to reject his misbegotten youth once he becomes King Henry V.4 
Yet Berger suggests that Hal’s rejection of Falstaff in Part II is also a rejection of his 
former self, the youthful and perhaps indiscreet Hal (Berger, “The Prince’s Dog,” 41). 
Berger concludes that in rejecting Hal, Henry V avoids “an unknown or half-known fear 
of himself,” disposes of his corruptible self, and publically solidifies his conversion from 
prodigal.5 In other words, when the new King casts out his former friend, he engages in 
willful self-blindness, a refusal to acknowledge parts of himself that Henry would rather 
ignore, parts that make him feel shame, and therefore parts that make him vulnerable.  
Following, though amending, Berger, I suggest that Falstaff is not simply 
complicit in Henry’s rejection of him in Part II. I argue instead that Falstaff pressures Hal 
to acknowledge and learn from his own vulnerable positions starting in Part I. Rather 
than reading Falstaff’s shenanigans as vicious or self-interested, I read them as didactic 
and radically self-deprecating. Furthermore, I read both Henry’s rejection of Falstaff and 
his clemency toward his former friend as Falstaff’s failure to make Hal see the potential 
of his own strength through the lens of his own vulnerability.6 I argue that Falstaff urges 
																																																								
4 Berger falls prey to identifying with Hal, as many other critics do. Greenblatt argues that spectators are 
“dazzled by their own imaginary identification with the conqueror” and Jonathan Goldberg suggests critics 
identify with Hal as mirror of Christian kings and “an ego ideal” (Greenblatt, 63; Goldberg, 152). 
5 As I discuss below, Hal establishes an elaborate deception that involves him appearing to squander his 
resources and reputation only to reemerge as heir-apparent, more respectable for having overcome this 
contrived low point. Rejecting Falstaff, I am suggesting here, is another of Hal’s exercises in lying.   
6 I build here on Berger who builds on William Empson who, oddly enough, agrees with Dover Wilson, to 
acknowledge the pity King Henry takes on his former friend (William Empson, Essays on Shakespeare, 
68). But Berger suggests that King Henry, in this same move, both forgives and forgets his former self 
(Hal) as a form of “moral self-protection” (Berger, “The Prince’s Dog,” 42).    
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Hal to see his personal faults, to acknowledge the vulnerability and shame they cause 
him, and to change them from deficits to assets that will enable him to rule England 
responsibly and honorably without deferring to the empty discourse of honor that drives 
his father, Henry IV, and his political rivals in this play. At the same time, I contend that 
Falstaff acknowledges for the audience the vulnerabilities imposed upon the population 
by Henry IV and other monarchs, including Shakespeare’s, Queen Elizabeth. By 
illuminating the shadows that inform how Hal navigates spaces of tavern, court, and 
battlefield, Falstaff’s function in this play ultimately suggests that Hal’s interpretations 
protect him from acknowledging his own vulnerabilites.7   
 
THE STRANGEST FELLOW AND RESISTANT READING 
How one reads Falstaff, and how one reads Falstaff reading, both bear on the 
kinds of interpretations one may make of this play. Reading along with Falstaff offers an 
interpretive perspective that refocuses the ways in which this play—and the rest of the 
Henriad—understands the concepts of sovereignty, autonomy, and honor. 8 As my 
discussions of the Gad’s Hill and the play’s extempore episodes will show, I argue that 
Falstaff offers a textual perspective on which to focus interpretation of this play that is at 
least as worthwhile as Hal’s. While I do suggest that Falstaff is a better reader than Hal, I 
also argue that Falstaff tries to show Hal how to be a better reader of himself. To this end, 
I suggest that Falstaff models how to be a better reader of himself insofar as he relies 
																																																								
7 This interpretation comes close to Berger’s point that Hal rejects Falstaff out of self-preservation that 
distances and defends him from his own former life of vice, a point also echoed by Neema Parvini. At the 
same time, I suggest that Falstaff acknowledges for the audience the vulnerabilities imposed upon the 
population by Henry IV and other monarchs.  
8 Insofar as Falstaff embodies this method in the play, I will continue to attribute this method of 
interpretation to his character as a function of the text.  
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upon knowledge of not only his own faults but also on knowledge of how other people 
interpret him.9 Furthermore, I suggest that Falstaff’s perspective is counterintuitive 
because he turns his own weaknesses into sites of strength when he uses them to reveal 
fissures in the play’s dominant discourses, especially as they are thematized by Hal. In 
effect, Falstaff deploys a reading method that resembles a passive resistance to Hal’s 
monopoly on prescribing and authorizing intra-textual interpretation in this play.    
Before proceeding to my argument, I will briefly explain what I mean by an 
interpretation that is passively resistant. A passively resistant reading model neither 
ignores nor assents to a dominant discourse; it resists by exposing the tenuous 
presumptions that underpin that dominant discourse. This method is not the way of 
cowards conceding to their own complicity within networks of power. Such a method 
would be simply passive. Instead, I suggest that Falstaff’s interpretive method resists the 
dominant discourses in ways that seem at first to be passive but that nonetheless prove to 
be subversive and confrontational.  Though it reflects back to Hal the problems 
embedded within his ideas about himself, about honor, about sovereignty, Falstaff’s 
method does not use Hal’s discourses against him. Instead, Falstaff deprecates himself by 
modeling an exaggeration of those problems, often putting himself further into harm’s 
way.10  
																																																								
9 Here Falstaff has the self-knowledge demonstrated in Twelfth Night by Feste who profits from his 
enemies who tell him plainly that he is an ass (5.1.15-20). See the discussion of Feste’s exemplary reading 
skills in Chapter I. Phebe Jensen explicitly links Falstaff to Feste in “Falstaff in Illyria: The Second Henriad 
and Twelfth Night,” reading a trajectory of festival that spans the histories to this mid-career comedy.   
10 For example, Falstaff deploys this method when he takes on and extends his role as butt of Hal and 
Poins’s joke by lying extravagantly to call out not only a problem with the prince—he is sneakily 
dishonest—but the systemic problem that a figure of authority abuse can deceive and abuse others for fun. I 
discuss the aftermath of the Gad’s Hill robbery in detail below.  
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The model I have in mind for this kind of interpretive resistance comes from a 
problematic moment in the New Testament Sermon on the Mount.11 The call to “turn the 
other cheek” in this sermon attributed to Jesus has long been decried as advocating 
complacency in the face of oppression or sidestepped when violent acts are perpetrated in 
defense of another person or simply ignored in favor of violent resistance.12 These 
																																																								
11 My project reads Henry IV in light of an earlier New Testament model because the terms of the Sermon 
on the Mount and the parable of the Prodigal Son, which I discuss below, are also terms evoked or 
indicated by Shakespeare’s text. Illuminating one on its own terms can illuminate the other. 
The portion I am interested in here concerns the statement on retaliation: “You have heard that it was said, 
‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes 
you on the right cheek, turn the other also; and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your 
cloak as well; and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile” (Matthew 5:38-41). All 
biblical citations in this chapter, unless otherwise noted, come from The Oxford Annotated Bible: New 
Revised Standard Version with the Apocrypha (3rd ed. Ed. Michael D. Coogan. Oxford, Oxford U P, 2001. 
Print).  
12 I acknowledge and am indeed indebted to the readings of this passage that do not assume that it 
advocates complacency, including mainline theological understandings as well as secular uses of this idea 
to further the social justice agendas of both Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. I cite my 
indebtedness as appropriate in this chapter. Nonetheless, the dismissal of this passage insofar as it is 
understood to be a passive acceptance of oppression is long-standing, despite its incongruity with the words 
and actions attributed to Jesus.  
Even Augustine, who recognizes that the New Testament teaches nonviolence in regard to self-defense, 
does not advocate nonviolence when one’s neighbor is threatened and therefore opens the door for just-war 
theory to eventually justify violence against any threat whatsoever. In his words, “War is justified only by 
the injustice of an aggressor; and that injustice ought to be a source of grief to any good man, because it is 
human injustice” (The City of God 447). His understanding persists in contemporary theories of justified 
violence. 
Walter Wink explains the persistent misreading that leads to rejecting this passage and why it should be 
reread otherwise:  
Many otherwise devout Christians simply dismiss Jesus’ teachings about nonviolence out 
of hand as impractical idealism. And with good reason. “Turn the other cheek” has come 
to imply a passive, doormat-like quality that has made the Christian way seem cowardly 
and complicit in the face of injustice. “Resist not evil” seems to break the back of all 
opposition to evil and to counsel submission. “Going the second mile” has become a 
platitude meaning nothing more than “extend yourself” and appears to encourage 
collaboration with the oppressor. Jesus’ teaching, viewed this way, is impractical, 
masochistic, and even suicidal—an invitation to bullies and spouse-batterers to wipe up 
the floor with their supine Christian victims.  
Jesus never displayed that kind of passivity. Whatever the source of the 
misunderstanding, such distortions are clearly neither in Jesus nor his teaching, which, in 
context, is one of the most revolutionary political statements ever uttered…The 
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readings of the passage tend to turn it into an allegory on how to be submissive to 
authority or else find a loophole in the new commandment to “not resist an evildoer” by 
resisting on behalf of another person rather than oneself. 13 Both of these interpretations 
miss the counterintuitive point of the advice. In a passage that specifically addresses 
retribution—”You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a 
tooth’”— the text signals a counter-logic with the contrasting language, “But I say to 
you.” The conclusion of this counter-point is strange: “do not resist an evil doer.” In this 
scenario, an evil has been committed, an eye or a tooth taken, and the audience has heard 
that they can get even with those who hurt them, but Jesus wants them to do something 
else instead. If Jesus were making a statement about passive acceptance of oppression, he 
would have said something like “Do nothing” or “Accept what is done to you.” What 
Jesus suggests instead is a series of positive actions one should take: turn the cheek, give 
the cloak, go the extra mile. These actions seem incongruous with the command to “not 
resist an evil doer.”  The problem is one of translation. The Greek word translated as 
																																																																																																																																																																					
traditional interpretation of “do not resist an evildoer” has been nonresistance to evil—an 
odd conclusion, given the fact that on every occasion Jesus himself resisted evil with 
every fiber of his being. (The Powers that Be: Theology for a New Millennium 98-99) 
13 There is a political reason for the persistence of these kinds of readings among the early modern English. 
King James I was concerned about the marginal notes included in the Geneva bible that permitted 
opposition to the king’s authority. In his words, 
No marginal notes should be added [to the new translation that will become the King 
James Version], having found in them which are annexed to the Geneva 
translation…some notes very partial, untrue, seditious and savouring too much of 
dangerous and traitorous conceits: as, for example, Exod. 1:19, where the marginal note 
alloweth disobedience to Kings. (Historical Account of Several English translations of 
the Bible 47, qtd. in David Norton 84)  
Though James is not here specifically concerned with the Sermon on the Mount, Wink suggests that his 
resistance to Geneva marginalia resonates in his commissioned translation of this passage. In other words, 
the value of passivity is crystalized by the translators of the King James Version to encourage submission 
to the monarch, for fear that passages like this one would be an endorsement of rebellion.  
See also my discussion on the problems of allegorical readings in Chapter 2.  
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“resist” is antistenai, which literally means to stand against but is most often used 
figuratively to refer to warfare, to confront a potential equal as on a battlefield. The point, 
then, is not “do not take a stand” but “do not respond violently in kind.” Instead of 
retribution, Jesus recommends three unexpected and utterly strange counter-actions, all of 
which work in essentially the same way to force the abuser to acknowledge the humanity 
of the abused and stop abusing. Each example shows the abused person acting out of and 
exaggerating vulnerability to wield this force against the abuser. 14 For example, the 
turning of the cheek suggests that the cheek-slapper has intended the slap as an insult and 
therefore backhands the victim’s right cheek.15 The slapper would have struck the other 
man with his right hand: left hands were restricted to “unclean” tasks. The only way to 
strike another person on the right cheek with the right hand is to backhand him or her. 
Furthermore, to strike the victim on the left cheek with an open palm or with a punch 
would have signaled to Jesus’s first-century audience a relationship of social equality 
between the slapper and the slapped.16 Therefore, when the victim turns to suggest the 
slapper strike again, either the abuser has to hit such that he acknowledges his victim as 
his social equal or else stop slapping. The victim, then, has effectively stopped the abuse 
against him or her without actually fighting back. The message is that one can take a 
																																																								
14 While the slapping addresses resistance to violence, the cloak scenario involves economic oppression and 
compels the abuser to publicly shame himself, and the extra mile scenario involves oppression perpetrated 
by the military arm of the government and forces the abuser to break the law and therefore fear for his own 
wellbeing. My reading of this portion of the Sermon on the Mount is indebted to Walter Wink’s The 
Powers that Be: Theology for a New Millennium (especially 98-111). Though I offer an overview of the 
slapping example here, see Wink for full elucidation of the strangeness of all three of these scenarios.  
15 For ease of explanation, I imagine that both the slapper and the slapped are men. 
16 Wink elucidates this cultural difference associated with the connotations of slapping other people: 
Masters backhanded slaves; husbands, wives; parents, children; Romans, Jews. The 
whole point of the blow was to force someone who was out of line back into place… but 
only equals fought with fists. (101-2).  
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stand against abusive authority without engaging in the same wrong acts against which 
that stand is taken. Jesus is saying, in other words, “Do not wage war against an 
oppressor” or “Do not dish back what has been served to you.” Do something strange 
instead.  
The strangeness that this sermon calls for is self-deprecation as a form of 
nonviolent retaliation. I suggest that Falstaff deploys a similar strangeness when he 
models moments of interpretation that rely on own faults. I turn now to the Gad’s Hill 
and play extempore episodes in Henry IV, Part I to elucidate this point.   
When Poins explains to Prince Henry the purpose of the jest they will perpetrate 
against Falstaff at Gad’s Hill, he identifies two of Falstaff’s signature faults: cowardice 
and dishonesty. Indeed, Poins avers that Falstaff will “fight [no] longer than he sees 
reason” and will tell “incomprehensible lies” (1.2.172-3, 174). Falstaff may be the lying 
rogue that Poins claims he is or he may be something else altogether: “the strangest 
fellow” for whom Hal will vouch when he covers another of Falstaff’s lies, offering to 
“gild it with the happiest terms I have” (5.5.150, 153). This strangeness in Falstaff that 
the Prince acknowledges in their final scene of this play draws me to question the 
expectation that Falstaff’s lies are only ever lies. Perhaps something stranger than mere 
lying is afoot.17  
Poins frames Hal’s interpretation of Falstaff: as a liar. At Gad’s Hill, Falstaff, Hal, 
Poins, and their companions stage a highway robbery after which Hal and Poins stage a 
counter-robbery of Falstaff and the others in order to enjoy the aftermath which will no 
																																																								
17 Falstaff ruminates on many things, but not on his lying. Yet critics read his lying as if he were Autolycus 
in The Winter’s Tale, who more clearly resembles a caricature of the morality play’s allegorical Vice and 
who monologues about the villainy he will undertake and profit from as a result of his lying. See The 
Winter’s Tale, Act 4. 
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doubt entail the crucial and hilarious telling of “incomprehensible lies.” In this phrase, 
Poins announces his expectation that Falstaff will lie, but also that the lies will be 
incomprehensible, that is, that they cannot be contained and that they cannot be 
understood. Thus, even as Poins functions to control interpretation of Falstaff in this 
scene, he acknowledges that he cannot interpret, or even understand, Falstaff.18 Poins’s 
assessment here shapes late modern critical readings, drawing the boundaries for how Hal 
and critics alike will interpret Falstaff. Despite the weakness of those boundaries, freeing 
Falstaff from the constraints that contain him in labels like “that reverend Vice,” “that 
villainous abominable misleader of youth,” “that old white-bearded Satan,” is far from 
easy (2.4.437, 445-46).19 However, Poins’s influential pronouncement on Falstaff’s 
honesty rests on a faulty assumption: that incomprehensible statements are necessarily 
lies. In effect, Poins asserts that because he is incapable of understanding Falstaff, the old 
knight must be lying.20  
Falstaff undeniably lies about the circumstances of the Gad’s Hill robbery. Hal, 
Poins, their companions, and the audience know that Falstaff did not fight “a hundred 
upon poor four of us” nor “a dozen of them two hours together”; he was not set upon by 
“sixteen at least” (2.4.155-6, 159, 168). Falstaff is overstepping the bounds of truth in 
																																																								
18 Though the Oxford English Dictionary cites this passage as an example for incomprehensible to mean 
uncontainable, boundless, or immense, the second sense of the word—a lack of understanding—was 
available and in usage in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries. Granted, Poins may also be making the 
point that he can’t understand how Falstaff would expect anyone to believe his lies rather than the point 
that he cannot understand the lies themselves.   
19 In Shakespeare’s Practical Jokes, David Ellis acknowledges that Poins’s “promise of ‘incomprehensible 
lies’ creates audience expectation for Falstaff’s next appearance following the robbery” (92). A.C. 
Bradley’s earlier argument ties sympathetic readings of Falstaff to how readers feel about his humor in 
relation to his rejection (Oxford Lectures on Poetry 252). As is also evident in the broader scope of this 
project, I am less interested in Falstaff makes readers feel and more interested in why he speaks and acts so 
outrageously.   
20 Falstaff himself offers an alternative, which I will discuss below. 
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wild and obvious hyperbole.21 His response to the counter-theft is clearly deliberate 
because he goes to great lengths to procure props and stage effects that signify a fight: a 
hacked sword and artificially bloody noses. The question, then, is Why does Falstaff lie 
when a gang of five eye-witnesses may call his bluff at any moment?  
I propose that Falstaff lies so obviously and so extravagantly about the Gad’s Hill 
incident in order to catch the Prince off guard. Jonathan Goldberg suggests something 
similar when he says that, in this scene, “Falstaff catches Hal out—his truth that he 
robbed Falstaff makes the difference between lying and truth-telling moot” (173). I agree 
with Goldberg, and would extend his point to suggest that in this catching out that 
collapses the difference between truth and lie, Falstaff models another of Hal’s 
limitations: his tendency to ignore or project his own faults, and to become entrenched in 
his own first-person perspective. The problem with first-person perspectives is that they 
are not, of course, omniscient; but Hal behaves as if his is (and too many critics of the 
play choose to believe him). However Hal, like all of us, is most at risk of being dead 
																																																								
21 Gadshill, compatriot and organizer of the initial robbery, participates in Falstaff’s exaggeration, and the 
audience knows his description is also false: “We set upon some dozen—” (2.4.167). Yet another thief, 
Peto, joins in the contradiction in a way that almost confirms to the audience the ability of both Falstaff and 
Gadshill to recollect:  
Peto:  No, no they were not bound.  
Falstaff:  You rogue, they were bound, every man of them.  
Granted, the bound men Falstaff and Gadshill recall here may be the imaginary dozen or sixteen, but Peto 
does not deny the numbers just the fact that they were bound, and someone was indeed bound: one may 
know this from stage direction, though stage direction may itself be unreliable. After the travelers are 
waylaid on the highway, the stage direction tells us “here they rob them and bind them” just before the 
original band of robbers leave the stage and the direction for “the Prince and Poins [to enter] in buckram” 
(2.2.86). Hal, however, ignores these details, and even goes on to believe Peto’s reporting of how Falstaff’s 
sword came to be hacked and the party came to be bloody. Hal, then, selectively believes reports of others, 
even when they have been shown to lie.   
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wrong at the very moment he is most secure in his beliefs.22 Falstaff belabors his own 
lying to draw attention to Hal’s predicament here.  With his defenses down because he 
believes himself to have the upper hand, Hal is set up to experience feeling most secure, 
most superior, when indeed he is vulnerable—in this case to criticism for his own 
complicity in the Gad’s Hill episode. In other words, Falstaff lies in order to catch Hal 
lying at just the moment when Hal expects to mock and embarrass the old knight. 
Furthermore, insofar as Falstaff’s counter-jest understands the problem of first-person 
perspective through the act of seeing, Falstaff calls into question Hal’s abilities to 
perceive and to interpret the events at Gad’s Hill.23 At issue, first, is Hal’s ability literally 
to see, and Falstaff makes plain that Hal’s seeing is faulty precisely in the way he goes 
about modeling faulty seeing: by sneaking truth into his lies.  
 After an extended description of numerous and vague foes encountered and 
subdued in the course of the robbery, Falstaff settles the focus of his lies precisely on the 
truth: the “two lads in buckram suits” that we, and Hal, recognize as the Prince and Poins 
(2.4.185-86). We might expect a glimmer of a realization from Hal that Falstaff has 
identified him, but Hal is, I suggest, still too securely enveloped in the humor of his own 
																																																								
22 See Chapter I for an extended discussion of the problems of first-person perspective and how formalizing 
the ways in which perspective may be described helps illuminate how textual perspectives like Hal’s 
operate within their own texts and in relation to their own cultures.  
23 Neema Parvini similarly argues that “the depth of Falstaff’s understanding goes much further than the 
nature of value [of an object understood to be valuable because others think it is]; he realizes that the law, 
the aristocracy, the crown, the nation and any other such ideological constructs are fundamentally 
imaginary—they exist inside people’s minds,” and “this is perhaps why he routinely transgresses the law 
and also why he tells so many lies: perception is all that truly matters” (Shakespeare’s History Plays 205, 
emphasis original). Parvini orients himself more cynically to Falstaff than I do when he attributes to the old 
knight the “insight that perception of [Hal’s] subjects is all that truly matters,” insinuating that Falstaff is at 
fault for teaching Hal to lie (Shakespeare’s History Plays, first emphasis original, second emphasis mine). 
My project also differs from Parvini’s insofar as he understands Falstaff to pass “his subtle understanding 
of ideology on to Hal…through osmosis rather than direct teaching” while I assert that Falstaff deploys a 
strange, self-deprecating mode of teaching that has not been recognized as such (Parvini 205).  
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jest that he does not see that he has been identified so precisely. With Hal still tucked 
away in his security that his jest will humiliate the old knight, Falstaff keeps the true 
account moving in the same direction as his prior lies, spinning a story that multiplies 
marauders from two in buckram to eleven. Just as the buckram lads seem to be spinning 
out of control, Falstaff abruptly turns again to precision: it was “three misbegotten knaves 
in Kendal green” who were solely able, in Falstaff’s account, to subdue him. They “came 
at [his] back, and let drive at him, for it was so dark, Hal, that thou couldst not see thy 
hand” (2.4.214-16). The real buckram boys Falstaff claims to have “peppered” and 
“paid”; the fictitious Kendal knaves he credits with victory (2.4.184). The exaggerated 
numbers cease to matter to Hal, who has been amusedly tracking Falstaff’s 
multiplications all along, marking the final transformation of himself and Poins into the 
“monstrous…eleven buckram men grown out of two!” (2.4.212). Once Falstaff’s 
description of the Kendal color is so particular, the blinding darkness so tangible, and, 
most importantly, the honor of subduing him attributed so erroneously, Hal can no longer 
brook Falstaff’s exaggerations. The rage with which the Prince lets loose a tirade of lewd 
insults—combined with Falstaff’s clear but subtle insinuation that Hal was present and 
could not see his own hand—suggests Hal knows he’s been caught, that he’s been led 
along by the lies and cries of “a plague of all cowards,” that he is indeed one coward to 
whom Falstaff directs this curse (2.4.216, 18-21, 110).24 Falstaff’s reply only serves to 
amplify the Prince’s rage at being called out on his jest before he can enjoy it: “What, art 
thou mad? Art thou mad? Is not the truth the truth?” (2.4.222-23). In effect, he asks the 
																																																								
24 Once Hal’s anger takes over, he lashes out: “These lies are like their father that begets them, gross as a 
mountain, open, palpable. Why, thou clay-brained guts, though knotty-pated fool, thou whore-son, obscene, 
greasy tallow-keech—” (2.4.218-21). 
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Prince, “Are you so foolish that you cannot see that I saw you?”—rudely prompting Hal 
to acknowledge his own faulty seeing. But Hal cannot yet see that he cannot see. Hal has 
forgotten that Falstaff has already explained that he not only saw but also “peppered” and 
“paid, two rogues in buckram suits” (2.4.184). Falstaff has shown his lie to be true: 
before our eyes Falstaff has “peppered” the rogues with an onslaught of lies and “paid” 
them for their jest by exposing it. If Falstaff could see buckram, he certainly could see 
Kendal green. His ability to see is not at issue; Hal’s is.25   
Hal does not notice Falstaff’s initially precise buckram reference because he 
expected it.26 Hal knew that there were two buckram-clad rogues: himself and Poins. 
Perhaps Falstaff tries to call out Hal’s trickery as early as his first mention of buckram, 
but Hal cannot yet see that the jig is up. It is not until Falstaff specifies and credits rogues 
that Hal could not see (because, of course, they were not present), not until Falstaff 
proposes an unambiguous lie that Hal cannot anticipate, that Hal objects. Yet Hal 
interrupts to question not his own ability to see but Falstaff’s:  
Prince Henry: Why, how couldst thou know these men in Kendal green, 
when it was so dark thou couldst not see thy hand?  
 
Hal’s protest against the Kendal green knaves shows the complexity of his own inability 
to see: his seeing is unreliable and he cannot see that it is. Hal slyly misquotes the knight 
to avoid acknowledging that he cannot see. Falstaff has not, in fact, said that he couldn’t 
																																																								
25 Hal cannot see his own hand before his face, yet Falstaff, in contrast can make out precise shades of 
green in the dark. We might dismiss this as just another of Falstaff’s humorous lies, but Hal’s response is 
visceral and emotional. Falstaff has clearly touched a nerve in the Prince at this moment.  
26 In Chapter I, I discuss the inherent problems of commonplace readings that rely on what a reader already 
assumes or expects. 
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see. He specifically said that Hal could not see: “…it was so dark, Hal, that thou couldst 
not see thy hand” (2.4.214-16, emphasis mine).27 
Hal turns Falstaff’s description of the darkness to his own purposes that aim at 
self-preservation. Furthermore, Hal cannot see the two in buckram when Falstaff first 
mentions them because one of them is Hal himself. Falstaff shows, then, that when Hal’s 
self-interest is concerned, Hal is blind. Falstaff attempts to accomplish this lesson through 
a model that depends upon making himself vulnerable: by turning the critical attention on 
himself, by blatantly lying, and by showing himself to be vulnerable before he turns the 
attention to Hal. Falstaff thus kindly, though raucously, sets Hal up to acknowledge the 
ways in which he hides from his own faults; but Hal defends himself by turning the 
attention back to Falstaff and his lying. Hal, in other words, will not learn the lesson. 
Nonetheless, Falstaff collapses one kind of truth and lie to reveal another truth: that Hal is 
also lying by perpetrating an extended and deceptive jest against his friends and then 
concealing his involvement in order to laugh at their expense. Hal’s is a lie of omission.  
It is the question of whether or not Falstaff sees the Kendal knaves that causes 
Hal to respond sharply again, resulting in the slinging of more insults between the two 
until Hal pulls rank in order to take control of the emotional exchange that he initiated. 
“Breathe awhile,” he says to Falstaff who may be literally out of breath from exchanging 
insults with the prince.28 “Breathe awhile, and then to it again, and when thou hast tired 
																																																								
27 Hal and Falstaff often refer to each other familiarly, as thou. But in this moment, perhaps Falstaff is also 
gesturing toward “thou” as an address not of intimacy by condescension that suggests, again, that Hal is 
lying. Falstaff may be “giving Hal the lie”—calling him a liar and therefore challenging him to a duel—just 
as Sir Toby eggs on Sir Andrew to “give the lie” to Cesario by encouraging him to speak condescendingly 
to Cesario: “If thou ‘thou’st’ him some thrice, it shall not be amiss” (Twelfth Night. Eds. Roger Warren and 
Stanley Wells. 3.2.41-42, notes 42 and 43.).    
28 Of course, Falstaff could be figuratively in need of breath here, but that the fat old knight may be literally 
out of breath remains a valid possibility after this exchange.  
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thyself in base comparisons, hear me speak but this” (2.4.240-43).29 The “this” Hal 
speaks is the truth, as best as he can tell, of what happened at Gad’s Hill. He directly 
contradicts Falstaff and reports the double-crossing caper as he sees it. Despite Falstaff’s 
repeated clues that Hal has been caught in a lie, Hal’s method to resolve the interpretation 
of the episode is to make his first-person perspective the only valid telling of the story.  
The scene is often, if not always, understood from a perspective that mimics 
Poins’s assumption that Falstaff will run away and lie about it. The audience confirms 
Poins’s expectations when it “knows” Falstaff is lying because the audience witnessed 
the incident unfold differently on stage. The audience, like Poins, “knows” the truth: that 
Hal and Poins do not participate in the initial theft in which Falstaff and the others 
succeed, that Hal and Poins attack this band of robbers and steal their booty. We know 
that Falstaff and the others run away, and Poins emphasizes “the fat rogue [Falstaff] 
roared!” (2.2.105).  
We learn later, after the scene in which Falstaff lies about the robbery, that Hal’s 
interpretation here is suspect. The others had to have met up prior to rejoining Hal and 
Poins at the tavern because the party of fleeing thieves were together to witness Falstaff 
“hack [his sword] with his dagger” and to “tickle [their own] noses with spear-grass to 
make them bleed and then to beslubber [their] garments with [the blood]” (2.4.96, 299-
301). If, as they’ve told us, the party of thieves did in fact “meet each other,” then it is 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Prince Henry:  I’ll be no longer guilty of this sin. This sanguine coward, this bed-presser, this 
horse-backbreaker, this huge hill of flesh— 
Falstaff:  ’Sblood, you starveling, you eel-skin, you dried neat’s tongue, you bull’s pizzle, 
you stockfish! O for breath to utter what is like to thee, you tailor’s yard, you 
sheath, you bow-case, you vile standing tuck— (2.4.234-40) 
29 Hal accuses Falstaff here of “base comparisons” when he is not only guilty of making the same, but 
guilty because he started it.  
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also possible that they were not “possessed with fear,” as Hal seems to assume or even to 
hope. Hal would have to interpret their feelings of fear on their behalf, in the dark, and at 
a distance as they ran away. Hal’s prediction of fear so intense that they will “each take 
his fellow for an officer” is, in retrospect, mistaken (2.2.101). Because the account of 
Gad’s Hill is mediated in the text by commentary from Poins and Hal and sparse stage 
direction, we are asked by the text to see the jest only through the eyes of these two, self-
interested perpetrators. The text sets us up to trust their descriptions, some of which are 
not plainly observable. For instance, we may rely on the report (from both Hal and the 
stage direction) that “the [first] thieves are all scattered” but Hal must interpret that they 
are “possessed with fear so strongly that they dare not meet each other” (2.2.99-100). Hal 
has rendered his own telling immediately dubious because of the very evidence he has 
already deployed to accuse Falstaff of not seeing. If Hal can suspect Falstaff’s seeing 
because it is so dark, then Hal’s ability to see and report events is likewise suspect.30 Hal 
cannot have it both ways: either it was light enough to see and to report the incident, or it 
was not.  
Hal refuses to see his own complicity in this situation that has, in effect, triple-
crossed him: “What trick, what device, what starting-hole canst thou now find out to hide 
thee from this open and apparent shame?” he asks of Falstaff, but might as easily ask of 
himself (2.4.254-56). The trick is that neither Hal nor critics will see his own “open and 
																																																								
30 See Hal’s explanation of the counter-robbery beginning at line 245.  
Prince Henry:  We two saw you four set on four and bound them, and were masters of their 
wealth. Mark now how a plain tale shall put you down. Then did we two set on 
you four, and, with a word, outfaced you from your prize, and have it, yea, and 
can show it you here in the house. And, Falstaff, you carried your guts away as 
nimbly, with as quick dexterity, and roared for mercy, and still run and roared, 
as ever I heard bull-calf. (2.4.245-52) 
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apparent shame” and Falstaff digs it in again, in case anyone missed his point the first 
two times: “I knew ye as well as he that made ye” (2.4.268). In other words, I saw you, 
Hal, and you know it. 
 
TRUTHFUL LIES: FALSTAFF’S AMBIVALENT PERSPECTIVE 
In the Gad’s Hill aftermath, Falstaff establishes his function in the play as a model 
of intra-textual interpretation: he literally can see what others like Hal cannot. Parvini 
also notices that Falstaff “seems to see through all ideological illusions,” that he “seems 
to occupy a place outside of ideology; as he says himself, ‘I live out of all order, out of all 
compass’” (3.3.16-17 and Shakespeare’s History Plays 203). Moreover, Falstaff shows 
that all perspectives—including his own—are limited. In another episode in the same 
scene, Falstaff’s extends his function from localized seer/interpreter to a pervasive 
interpretive force in this play. Here I follow Joan Linton’s observation that Falstaff 
haunts the final play of the Henriad even though his character never appears on stage in 
Henry V.31 He is, for Linton, a kind of absent presence in that play. I suggest that Falstaff 
functions as an absent presence as early as Henry IV, Part I in moments when his intra-
textual interpretive moves recall, rely on, or suggest knowledge of textual information 
that he should not be able to know.   
In the already meta-textual episode of the play extempore, Falstaff again calls 
attention to the act of interpretation by staging himself interpreting King Henry IV’s 
interpretation of Hal. At the same time, Falstaff reveals his own interpretive chops as an 
																																																								
31 In Ken Jackson and Arthur Marotti’s edited volume Shakespeare and Religion: Early Modern and 
Postmodern Perspectives, see Linton’s contribution to entitled “The Passing of Falstaff: Rethinking 
History, Refiguring the Sacred.”  
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analytical function of the text. He “reads” Hal again in this scene as if he has been 
reading (or watching) along with the audience of the play. Falstaff seems to know things 
about the text that his character simply should not know because they happen under cover 
of darkness or disguise or while Falstaff absent from the stage. The Gad’s Hill counter-
plot is one instance.32 His reading of Hal in the play extempore is another. 
Significantly, the play extempore episode arrives in the wake of Falstaff’s open 
chiding of Hal and Hal’s inability to be chidden. Nonetheless, even as he exposes the 
prince, Falstaff helps Hal save face in front of the others at the tavern by once again 
turning their attention to himself and his own “instinct” to avoid “turn[ing] upon the true 
prince” by suggesting a change in subject: “What, shall we be merry? Shall we have a 
play extempore?” (2.4.260-270). When the subject quickly shifts again to the news that 
Hal has been summoned before his father, Falstaff turns the play’s purpose from 
distraction to exam preparation.33 Falstaff worries that Hal “wilt be horribly chid 
tomorrow when [he] comes to [his] father,” and the knight once again appeals to his 
friend’s love: “If thou love me, practise an answer” (2.4.360-62).34 Falstaff not only tries 
																																																								
32 The accounting for Falstaff’s knowledge of the counter-theft is easily explained in the physical act of 
actually seeing the buckram rogues. He need not be privy to Hal and Poins’s covert planning of the jest in 
order to see what they are up to. The play extempore offers a more complicated example of Falstaff’s 
potential textual knowledge.  
33 Hal, again, is not quick on the uptake and continues insulting Falstaff until Mistress Quickly interrupts 
the party, announcing news from King Henry IV. Falstaff, however, has the last word before the scene 
shifts from the Gad’s Hill aftermath to the news from the king. In response to Hal’s final dig despite his 
agreement to have a play—”Content; and the argument shall be thy running away”—Falstaff hushes his 
young friend: “Ah, no more of that, Hal, an thou lovest me!” (2.4.271-73.)  
The news from Hal’s father prompts Falstaff to remember his idea for a play extempore, but he has altered 
its purpose: from making merry fellowship with the “Gallants, lads, boys, hearts of gold” to once again 
helping Hal (2.4.67-68). 
34 This line stands chiasmatically related to Falstaff’s prior phrasing that hushes Hal after the Gad’s Hill 
aftermath: “Ah, no more of that, Hal, an thou lovest me!” (2.4.272-73.)  
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to help Hal prepare for his father’s examination, but he also helps Hal save face again by 
suggesting that the practice is for Falstaff’s own peace of mind rather than to supply 
Hal’s lack of preparation. Falstaff’s doubled concern for Hal, punctuated by the doubling 
of the phrase “if thou love me,” establishes the old knight as a concerned mentor rather 
than a vicious misleader of youth.   
Falstaff begins the mock examination innocuously enough. Anyone might expect 
the king to be critical of his son and “not only marvel where [Hal] spendest [his] time, but 
also how [he is] accompanied” (2.4.385-86). Falstaff specifies the point of criticism that 
Hal expects from his father:  
If then thou be son to me, here lies the point: why, being son to me, art 
thou so pointed at? Shall the blessed sun of heaven prove a micher and eat 
blackberries? A question not to be asked. Shall the son of England prove a 
thief and take purses? A question to be asked. (2.4.392-96)  
   
Hal is openly reckless, and Falstaff evokes the Gad’s Hill robbery, the taking of purses, 
as proof of Hal’s recklessness. He emphasizes this example rhetorically by punctuating it 
with “A question to be asked.” In other words, the most important—and most obvious—
point Falstaff seems to make here is that the son of the King should not go about thieving.  
More interestingly, though, Falstaff suggests a point that Hal does not expect. 
Falstaff elides his initial proof for why Hal is “pointed at” when he skips past it with “A 
question not to be asked” (2.4.394-95, emphasis mine). This point—that Hal is a 
“micher” and an eater of blackberries—is also overlooked by editors. Editors of the 
Norton, the Oxford, and the Arden editions gloss “micher” as “truant,” an interpretive 
move that emphasizes the fact that Hal is absent from the responsibilities of court so long 
as he remains in Eastcheap and also helps solidify charges that his absenteeism marks Hal 
as a kind of Prodigal Son. Yet the word “micher” also renames Hal as a “petty thief” and 
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“a person who skulks or sneaks about with dishonest intent.”35 In effect, then, this point 
of evidence doubles the Gad’s Hill example. However, it also adds nuance to the charge 
of “thief,” suggesting that Hal is not only sneaky but also untrustworthy. If Falstaff 
insinuates in the Gad’s Hill aftermath that Hal is dishonest by calling him out on a cruel 
trick and a lie of omission, here, Falstaff calls Hal a sneaky and inattentive liar.  
Why is this the question “not to be asked,” and why have editors and critics not 
asked it? One answer reinforces Falstaff’s role as Vice or “misleader of youth” because 
the thieving and eating he evokes to accuse Hal are both activities that he participates in 
with the Prince.36 I suggest an alternative answer: Falstaff’s mention of “michers” and 
blackberries hints at his own meta-textual perspective. In this evidence against Hal that 
he hedges with the assertion that he should not ask or even mention it, Falstaff echoes the 
language of Hal’s soliloquy in Act 1, suggesting that he has, for want of a better word, 
“overheard” it. I do not mean by this that Falstaff qua character is himself skulking about, 
eavesdropping on the prince. I propose that Falstaff’s function as the alternative 
interpretive model in this play for which I advocate is strengthened in moments like this 
one and Gad’s Hill where he subtly suggests that he knows more about the play than one 
expects.37 Furthermore, Falstaff’s perspective usurps Hal’s when he suggests that he is 
																																																								
35 See the Oxford English Dictionary entry 2. a.  
36 This is, of course, reflective of the dominant critical perspective on Falstaff, both those that read Falstaff 
negatively and those that read him positively. It is nonetheless a perspective that is based on the interpretive 
cues provided by Poins and Hal himself. Both of these characters are not only complicit in the vices they 
accuse Falstaff of perpetrating, they are also themselves untrustworthy.  
37 Even though I suggest that Falstaff haunts the Henriad as a kind of super-reader, I am not suggesting that 
one must have transcendental insight in order to be a careful reader of a text. I am suggesting quite the 
opposite: that those who claim to have the upper hand often do not, as Hal and Poins expect to have in the 
aftermath of Gad’s Hill and like Hall in his opening soliloquy. Furthermore, I am deploying a strategy 
similar to Berger’s in “The Prince’s Dog: Falstaff and the Perils of Speech-Prefixity.” Here, Berger 
suggests that “When a speaker echoes the words and sentiments uttered in an episode from which he was 
absent…it usually means that he is inscribed in the same discourse” (44). Contra Berger, I am suggesting 
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aware of textual elements that occur when his character is absent from the text. Falstaff, 
then, functions counter to Hal: he is present, not truant, and he is a careful reader.38 But if 
Falstaff’s point about “michers” and blackberries reinforces a perspective that trumps 
Hal’s apparent reign over a dominant strain of critical interpretations of this play, it is a 
card that Falstaff must play carefully because it risks treason and leaves him vulnerable to 
retribution, which Hal is all too ready to supply.39 Even critics who are charmed by or 
sympathetic to Falstaff retain the interpretive position on the play that Hal’s character 
occupies. Indeed, Hal will win the game in the end, ascend to the throne, make the rules, 
authorize the history.40 Many audience members would align their perspectives with the 
figure of power. Yet this persistent privileging of Hal’s perspective proves questionable 
at best when the text repeatedly reveals that Hal is unreliable.41     
																																																																																																																																																																					
that Falstaff is not necessarily complicit in but critical of that discourse. Berger does acknowledge, as I also 
do, that Falstaff “parades himself as an example of what he mocks” (44). 
38 Falstaff is certainly a more careful reader than Hal, who, as we haves seen, misquotes Falstaff to suit his 
own purposes. Berger also notes how well read Falstaff seems to be in his chapter on Henry IV, Part II in 
Making Trifles of Terrors. 
39 Hal’s final retribution is of course the public rejection of his friend after his coronation in Henry IV, Part 
II.  
40 Here, I echo Bradley’s point that Hal is not only dishonest but also succeeds in his dishonesty (Bradley 
253). My point in disagreement with Bradley Hal is not “on the whole, a fine and very attractive character” 
and, furthermore, that Shakespeare does prepare readers for Hal’s perhaps catastrophic rejection of Falstaff 
throughout Parts I and II, but that this preparations are largely ignored (Bradley 254-55). Bradley 
acknowledges that in other instances, critics notice inconsistencies, particularly in delineating good and evil 
characters, but that it is oddly hard to read evil in Hal (256-59). Bradley solves this problem by focusing on 
Falstaff as the supreme genius of Shakespeare’s work in this play who overshadows even the king and will 
not be dethroned (Bradley 259). I suggest in this chapter that the problem may be addressed by rereading 
Falstaff and Hal through Falstaff’s perspective rather than deferring to the perspective of the king.   
41 In addition to the examples Hal’s dishonesty investigated here, Hal orchestrates the picking of Falstaff’s 
pocket, pockets Falstaff’s papers to peruse later at his leisure, and intentionally confounds Francis the 
drawer in Part I, and impersonates a tavern worker to tease Falstaff again in Part II (Part I, 2.4.510-530  
and 2.4.1-81; Part II, 2.4.254-60).  
Hal also uses this mock trial before his father as yet another opportunity to criticize Falstaff and solidify 
critical audience support for himself. And he reveals his own hand by refusing to play the game or the role 
of the initial play. He turns it to criticize Falstaff explicitly. This turn is akin to his emotional outbursts in 
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In the instance of the play extempore, Falstaff evokes Hal’s private speech—in 
which the prince insinuates a confession that he is indeed untrustworthy—when Falstaff 
plainly equates the son of England to the “sun of Heaven.”42 No doubt, the common 
equation of a king to the sun and the common quibble on sun and son make an easy 
explanation for Falstaff’s language here, and Falstaff also may be telling us that we 
should not ask the question raised by his first point because it is so common, as common 
as blackberries. This simple explanation is perfectly reasonable. Nonetheless, his 
reference to the sun also calls to mind Hal’s earlier speech in a way that implies Falstaff’s 
character can function as an interpreter within its own play. My assertion that Falstaff is 
aware of Hal’s speech is strengthened when Falstaff ties it directly to Gad’s Hill, another 
instance in which he has proven to know more than Hal anticipated. Falstaff links the two 
points not only by their proximity in his speech, but by this overlooked word, “micher.” 
At once referencing truancy, secrecy, and thievery, this word evokes absence and 
presence, knowledge of hidden information, and, in the Gad’s Hill instance, theft and 
covertly plotted counter-theft. Nonetheless, as most editors confirm, “micher” also 
references the prodigality that Hal confesses to trying on awhile in his soliloquy. By tying 
all of these references together in a point that quibbles on the prodigality and dishonesty 
of the son/sun in exactly the same way Hal does, by evoking the immediately prior 
episode in which Falstaff’s perspective, his ability to see, proves more reliable than Hal’s, 
and by doing all of this in an instance that is already a meta-textual moment of intra-
																																																																																																																																																																					
the Gad’s Hill aftermath episode and is tied to these by the similar strings of insults he lobs at the knight 
when he refuses to face his vulnerable position under Falstaff’s scrutiny.  
42 In his soliloquy, Hal reveals his plan to “imitate the sun” (1.2.185). 
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textual interpretation, Falstaff hints at an awareness and a criticism of Hal’s plan to play 
the prodigal.   
 
THE PROBLEM OF HAL’S PRODIGALITY 
Hal’s plan is simple. He will model his own life trajectory on the parable of the 
prodigal son.43 He will squander his resources and reputation, conveying the impression 
of a ne’er-do-well and wastrel, before unexpectedly reconciling with his father and taking 
on his role as heir apparent. Hal’s plan is also dishonest. He is not simply wasteful and 
negligent like the son in the parable. He intentionally takes up loose living in order to 
make his return and ascent to the throne that much more spectacular. In effect, Hal’s plan 
is to enhance the appearance of honor by at first being purposefully dishonorable. 
																																																								
43 In the New Testament text, the Book of Luke frames this story as a lesson for the Pharisees and scribes 
who were irritated that tax collectors and sinners were coming to listen to Jesus speak. The prodigal story is 
one of seven examples that make up this lesson. The other examples in this sequence are 1) the story of the 
shepherd who seeks and finds one lost sheep when it strays from the flock of one hundred; 2) the woman 
who has ten silver coins and, after losing one, rejoices when she finds it; 3) the rich man whose manager is 
dishonest in his accounting after squandering his master’s wealth in order to secure friends who will look 
after him if he loses his job, yet the master commends him for shrewdly forgiving portions of debts in order 
to secure welcome for himself in the debtors’ homes; 4) the statement that even though the “good news of 
the gospel is proclaimed” the letter of the old law stands; 5) the statement against divorce that equates it 
with adultery; and 6) the story of the rich man who scorns the poor Lazarus in life, but in death laments his 
selfishness once he sees Lazarus lounge in the bosom of Abraham while he suffers for his earthly 
transgressions in Hades. Nearly all of these lessons bear on the ways in which Falstaff frames his own 
interpretive methods, yet Hal’s appropriation of the prodigal has dominated critical discourse that links this 
play to parable as allegory.   
In the prodigal story, a man has two sons. The younger son demands that his father give him his inheritance 
immediately rather than waiting to inherit his portion once his father dies, so the father divides his estate 
and gives his younger son what is coming to him. The son leaves town and wastes his inheritance on 
prostitutes. When he runs out of money, he takes a poorly paying job feeding pigs. He cannot afford to feed 
himself as well as the pigs are being fed, so he returns to his father to ask for a job as a hired hand because 
he has “sinned against heaven and before [his father]” and is “no longer worthy to be called [his] son.” But 
the father welcomes him warmly, gives him clothes and jewelry, and hosts a barbeque to celebrate his 
return. When the older son, who has not squandered the father’s wealth, complains about his brother’s 
treatment, the father proclaims that the older son has no cause to complain because the father’s wealth has 
always ever been shared with the older son and celebration is in order because “this brother of yours was 
dead and has come to life; he was lost and has been found” (Luke 15:32). 
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Shakespeare thus offers a rereading of the parable of the prodigal son that critics 
have obviously picked up on when they link Hal’s trajectory of loose living in Eastcheap 
and subsequent redemption to this first-century text. Critics who analyze Hal’s 
prodigality, however, tend to do so by reading it allegorically.44 If we map Hal onto this 
story when conceived as an allegory, then Shakespeare appears to tell a story we already 
know, or can be expected to approve: a story about how it is better not to waste 
opportunities in life, but even if we do, a transcendental figure (in both the parable and 
the play, represented by the father) will help us reemerge from the darkest places in our 
lives. But such a reading does not jibe with Hal’s appropriation of the parable, because he 
takes on the role of the wayward son precisely in order to redeem himself, not to be 
redeemed by his father.45 Part of his purpose for taking a leisurely sojourn in Eastcheap is 
to distance himself from his father who has lately usurped the throne of England.  
Though Falstaff perhaps only gestures toward Hal’s plan in the play extempore, 
he does so under the guise of scrutiny, implying that Hal’s speech warrants closer critical 
inspection. If we read Hal counterintuitively, in the manner suggested by Falstaff, we 
may get closer to articulating the vulnerability and outright fear associated with accepting 
the father’s gift of forgiveness – fear and vulnerability that Hal disavows in his move to 
																																																								
44 In Shakespeare’s Practical Jokes: An Introduction to the Comic in His Work, David Ellis proposes that 
Shakespeare had a hard time “making Hal both a prince and a madcap,” suggesting that the prodigal son 
model offers a way to organize Henry V’s rise to power after a wild and misspent youth (84).  
45 In “Hal as Self-Styled Redeemer: The Harrowing of Hell and Henry IV Part 1,” Beatrice Groves argues 
that, similarly to the two kings before him, “Hal stages his own redemption in Christian terms: a Lenten 
period of expectant, self-imposed exile is followed by a reconciliation between a father and son through a 
decisive single combat which is staged with a resonant allusion to the harrowing of hell” (236, emphasis 
mine). Though Groves offers a pro-Hal, anti-Falstaff reading that positions Falstaff as the Satan figure to 
Hal’s Christ, she also acknowledges that “the connections are not simple analogies” (236).  
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redeem himself.46 Falstaff’s prompting to undertake a play extempore as a rehearsal for 
Hal’s audience with his father is marked by Falstaff’s worry that Hal is (or ought to be) 
afraid. He says,  
But tell me, Hal, art not thou horrible afeard? Thou being heir apparent, 
could the world pick thee out three such enemies again as that fiend 
Douglas, that spirit Percy, and that devil Glendower? Art thou not horribly 
afraid? Doth not thy blood thrill at it? (2.4.354-58)  
 
Falstaff here is not articulating a fear that Hal ought to have of his father, but the subtext 
of this fear is clearly related to King Henry IV’s position. It is a fear Hal ought to have if 
he reconciles himself to his father and takes his place as king. Hal, as usual, refuses to 
acknowledge that he might be vulnerable. He will not admit to fear, “not a whit,” and he 
takes Falstaff’s naming of a potential vulnerability again as an opportunity to attack his 
friend by evoking his own prior criticism of Falstaff’s cowardice when he says, “I lack 
some of thy instinct” (2.4.359). In other words, Hal says “I am not afraid because I am 
not a coward like you.” Rather than acknowledge his own sites of weakness, Hal’s 
signature move, it seems, is to attack those who point them out.  
 Hal’s appropriation of the prodigal story bears out this interpretation of his 
strategy. He is most concerned about the ways in which others, especially his father and 
peers, interpret him, and he zeros in on ways to spin these interpretations to his advantage 
in his early soliloquy.47 Though David Ellis argues that this speech cannot possibly reveal 
anything about Hal’s character because to read it thus would inconveniently establish 
																																																								
46 Falstaff also comes closer to articulating a first-century method of interpreting parable in ways that 
original audiences might have understood this method of teaching. See Chapter III on parabolic readings.  
47 A.D. Nutall cites this speech as “the spoken equivalent to the programme note,” and David Ellis seizes 
upon this insight to declare that Hal’s speech has a choric function (145; 85). Parvini, I have already noted, 
suggests that Hal learns, though perhaps misapplies, this lesson in the importance of interpretive 
perspective from Falstaff.  
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“Hal as an odious hypocrite at the beginning of three plays clearly intended to celebrate 
his achievements,” I argue that this celebratory intention is not nearly so clear (Ellis 85). 
Indeed, Hal behaves as the Pharisees against whom Jesus speaks in the gospel of Luke 
rather than like the prodigal son because, like the Pharisees, Hal attempts to “justify 
[himself] in the sight of others” by “being wanted [that] he may be more wondered at,” 
by waiting until the time is opportune to “throw off” his “loose behavior,” so that, “like 
bright metal on a sullen ground,” his  
reformation, glitt’ring o’er [his] fault,  
Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes  
Than that which hath no foil to set it off. (Luke 16:15 and Henry IV, Part I 
1.2.201-3) 
 
The end of Hal’s speech is marked with the language of both value and forgiveness, 
relative to the judgment of others and spun to his own advantage. At the moment when he 
declares he will cease his “loose behavior,” his diction shifts from a moral register to an 
economic one with words like “pay” and “debt.” But the debt he will pay by “redeeming 
time” and, presumably, himself is one he “never promised” to pay.48 Furthermore, if his 
loose living is linked to money in this play, it is through his counter-theft at Gad’s Hill. 
Otherwise, his faults thematized here are more closely tied to dishonesty. This soliloquy 
articulates his plan to deceive his friends, his family, and his kingdom. The only other 
evidence that Hal is, indeed, a loose cannon comes not from textual evidence but from 
hearsay: reports of rumor from either his father or his rival, Harry Hotspur Percy.49 Hal’s 
purpose in taking on the role of the prodigal, then, is marked by a value system that is 
																																																								
48 Here, he is less like the prodigal son and more like the parabolic son who refuses to do the father’s 
bidding but then does it anyway (Matthew 21:28-32).  
49 See those instances in Part I (1.1.77-89, 1.3.229, 3.2.124-28, 4.1.94-95, 5.2.70-71) and in Richard II 
(5.3.1-22). 
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based not on material wealth but the value of popular and personal opinion, in a word, on 
honor.  
Honor is a system of value nonetheless, functioning under the same logical 
structure as the value system that the prodigal son parable thematizes in terms of material 
wealth. Thus, I turn to that first-century system in order to tease out a counterintuitive 
reading that takes seriously Falstaff’s fear associated with Hal’s rise to power, that the 
prince will stake his claim to authority on the shifting and ephemeral grounds of honor, 
which the dishonesty of his prodigal plan undermines. 
 The structures of power in both Hal’s plan and the prodigal parable function 
according to a logic that depends upon the act of giving that is thematized, in the 
outcomes of both texts, as redemption. The Prodigal Son, of course, is given his 
inheritance early, and he returns to his father because “no one gave him anything” after 
he squandered his inheritance and so must work—and hard—for his living (Luke 15:16, 
emphasis mine). He seems only to know how to function in relation to the giver. He 
returns to the father when he cannot tolerate a relationship of exchange: working for pay. 
Though he offers to hire himself out to his father, the father will not allow him to 
participate in this kind of reciprocal economy. Instead, the father keeps the son under his 
control through the logic of the gift: when he gives the son gifts—inheritance or 
forgiveness—he renders the son indebted to him.50 Hal tries to avoid this indebtedness by 
claiming that he will “pay the debt [he] never promised,” that he does not actually owe 
(1.2.197). Hal, though, is just as indebted to his father as the Prodigal Son is to his. He 
																																																								
50 See Berger’s Making Trifles of Terrors: Redistributing Complicities in Shakespeare for elucidation of 
Marcel Mauss’s gift theory through Berger’s explanation of the ethical discourse of the donor. 
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will assume the throne thanks first to his father’s usurpation and second to his father’s 
forgiveness. Both fathers keep their sons under their control by keeping them indebted.  
Both sons are depicted, then, for their value, not in terms of familial bond but in terms of 
their use. Hal is clearly useful to Henry IV as a path to legitimizing his own claim on the 
throne: Hal will inherit the kingdom through the legitimate path of primogeniture and 
lend his father legitimacy despite his usurpation. Harry Berger plots this circular 
trajectory of legitimacy in “What Did the King Know and When Did He Know It? 
Shakespearean Discourses and Psychoanalysis.” He writes that Henry IV “badly wants 
moral, and not merely political, legitimacy, which is a point generally missed by so-
called new-historicist and cultural-materialist readings (or un-readings) of the second 
tetralogy” (244). To legitimize his usurping reign, Henry needs his son to stand as 
legitimate King of England. In Berger’s words, “if Henry feels uneasy about usurpation 
and regicide he must be aware of how much he depends on his son retroactively to secure 
the legitimacy denied him so long as he lives” (245 emphasis mine).  
Henry, in effect, “gives the prince a function similar to that of the rebels in the 
economy of guilt management” (Berger 245). Henry creates in Hotspur and the other 
rebels “scourges to punish his misreadings, delegates Richard’s revenge to them, and at 
the same time sets them up for justified punishment” (245). He transfers onto his son his 
“buried fear” of Richard II by linking Hal’s distancing in Eastcheap to the prior King’s 
similar activities, which enables Henry to disavow—if not disown—his legitimate son in 
favor of a preferred—but also usurping—heir, Hotspur, which allows Hal to become “in 
effect Richard’s son,” unruly but now legitimate, and free to take the throne (246). 
Indeed, Hal must distance himself from his illegitimate father/king (Henry) in order to 
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endear himself  to his people and thereby “being wanted he may be more wondered at,” 
securing for himself the throne.  
In this complicated set of transfers, Henry punishes himself for usurping the 
throne, legitimizes his own son’s claim to rule, legitimizes his own claim in consequence, 
punishes those who would punish him for usurping, and renders illegitimate the prior 
King. Meanwhile, Hal figures himself as a prodigal son who is never quite redeemed, but 
always prodigal, always truant, and always making his own way in the world beyond the 
control of the father for whom he must play redeemer. The father figures in the 
Henriad—both Henry and Falstaff—disappear: neither one ultimately redeems the lost 
son Hal.  
Furthermore, if Hal remains truant in Eastcheap or carries his irresponsibility with 
him onto the throne, Henry IV’s reign becomes a hiccough in the history of England: a 
brief interruption in the legitimate line of English kings that is reestablished if the rebel 
factions succeed in his overthrow or else a return to the carelessness of Richard II. Henry 
needs his son to be redeemed and back under his control. The use value of the Prodigal 
Son in the parable becomes clearer if we consider the story in the context of the larger 
lesson that the book of Luke establishes. The clear problem that Luke acknowledges is 
that the Pharisees are “lovers of money” rather than gracious hosts to people (Luke 
16:14). The younger son is not so much the lost sheep or coin that is found, forgiven, and 
redeemed as he is simply returned to the control of the father again, because all of these 
found items that parallel the son are objects of value and use to an owner.51 The father 
																																																								
51 The older son provides insight on the level of control the father demands from his sons: the older son has 
lived in servitude, “working like a slave” for his father, but is neither paid nor rewarded. The father claims 
the older son he has access to everything of the father’s, but the son reveals that he has no authority over 
this access because he is not permitted to have a barbeque with his friends. Luke 15:29-30. 
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describes the younger son as dead when he left because he was out of his father’s control, 
and, like the missing sheep or coin, he became worthless, nothing.52 The father, then, is 
just as complicit as the son and the Pharisees for being driven by the power that material 
wealth offers. If Jesus is in fact using these lessons to criticize the Pharisees for 
privileging material wealth over human compassion, then it makes little sense to read this 
parable—or the other stories that take up the return of valuable lost items—as a 
celebration of the valuable item’s return. 
What is happening in this parable then? Western Christian exegesis of the 
passage—from Augustine to contemporary popular theology—turns the story into 
allegory.53 The younger brother is translated into either any repentant sinner or else 
followers of Jesus who are not Jewish and therefore not beholden to the Law of Moses. 
The older brother is often identified as either the pious keeper of the law or else the older, 
Jewish, children of god who are mad that Christians showed up and took what was not 
theirs to take, squandered it, and still are welcome home to an afterlife in the Kingdom of 
Heaven. The father, in either case, is allegorized as God. But reading this passage 
																																																								
52 Luke 15: 32. This son is also like Cordelia who also becomes nothing to her father when she is outside of 
his control in Lear.  
53 We allegorize the tale to suit our own self-interest, our own expectation that our trials will work out in 
our favor in the end, whether by providence or some other means. In either case, we will not have to work 
on our own behalf in order to pull ourselves out of misery. We need only ask those in charge to forget our 
transgressions and then be forgiven.  
Though Jill Robbins still reads the prodigal story in terms of the radical love of God/the father, thereby 
reading the parable explictly allegorically, in Prodigal Son / Elder Brother she aims to disrupt the 
allegorical readings of this particular parabolic structure that perpetuate the critical exclusion of Judaic 
models of interpretation, a critical exclusion which reads Judaic only as forerunners to Christian models 
that lay claim to “shedding light” on their Judaic predecessors. In other words, Robbins aims to reread a 
hermeneutical history of reading Judaic models as figures of the Christian ideals to come. She says that 
though Judaic models are included in these allegorical readings, they are nonetheless “eclipsed by being 
seen” or “excluded as included” (2, emphasis original). Robbins project, then, is of a piece with my 
claim—and Stephen Orgel’s, both articulated in Chapter I—that these kinds of figural interpretations 
foreclose the potential meanings of a text in favor of promoting a “common sense” reading. Robbins, also 
in accord with my project, calls for the necessity of reading a model “in its own terms” (2). 
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allegorically also does not make sense because in either case, the father gives the 
wayward son exactly the same thing he has already squandered, and then some. In other 
words, the father is just as unthrifty, just as wasteful, as the son who must be redeemed 
for being unthrifty and wasteful. If the son needs forgiveness for wastefulness, then so 
does the father. If Hal is this kind of prodigal son, then his dishonorable sojourn does not 
distance himself from his father but shows him to be exactly the same as his father. 
Henry IV needs to redeem Hal because he needs Hal to redeem him. Furthermore, the 
father offers forgiveness in order to recover the son to his control, just like all of the other 
lost items. The lesson is not—or not only—that we can rely on the transcendental 
figure—whether it is allegorically the deity or literally the parent—to swoop in and save 
the day. The lesson is, perhaps, that we should think twice about expecting salvation from 
our transgressions to come in a gift-wrapped package and without consequence.54 We 
miss this and no doubt more when we tuck the prodigal son story neatly away into 
allegory instead of pausing to notice its strangeness: when what is lost is found again and 
this is not necessarily a good thing.  
For scholars who are interested primarily in early modern literature and criticism 
and not in New Testament scholarship, my interpretation here is likely not a familiar one. 
That is precisely the point. A familiar or common sense reading of these parables might 
suggest that they are about the unending capacity of the father (or Father) to love, to seek 
the lost, and to forgive the sinner. Even if this infinite capacity—to love, to seek, and to 
																																																								
54 The older son is the only figure in this parable who seems to know that the gift of atonement is also a 
threat of servitude and dominance. The older son tells us he is a slave to the father and gets nothing for his 
servitude. He questions the priority of wealth and the seeming generosity of the father’s gift of forgiveness. 
The older son claims to have “worked like a slave” for years, yet the father dismisses his complaint, 
effectively silencing him (Luke 15:29). 
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forgive—is humanly unfathomable and therefore strange, to read this string of parables in 
terms of these capacities is nonetheless commonplace and personally comforting. As this 
project makes plain, the common-sense reading is neither the only reading nor 
necessarily the best one. It may blind the reader to the other possible meanings of a text 
that may be even more strange and (especially) that may be uncomfortable to 
acknowledge. The common-sense reading identified here is one that is comforting for 
both the redeemed figure in the text and, in consequence, for the reader. It is a reading 
that confirms the desires and preferences of a self-interested, first-person perspective, 
though it may be uncomfortable to think of this kind of redemption as available also to 
one’s enemies. It is, nonetheless, a reading that takes the responsibility off of the Prodigal 
Son and places it squarely in the hands of the transcendental figure (the father or the 
Father). In other words, the lesson from this interpretation based on love is one of license 
to do as one pleases, knowing that one will be redeemed in the end. Indeed, reading a text 
and feeling reassured by that reading suggests that a reader is most likely to be taking her 
own assumptions for granted rather than attending to the text, and, in the case of the 
Prodigal Son, the trajectory of the larger, textual context.55  
 This way of reading parable is useful for understanding the strange path to 
redemption that is the theme of Hal’s prodigal plan. In his early soliloquy, Hal suggests 
																																																								
55 The message of endless divine love is a powerful one and, indeed, a more appealing one than the sinners-
in-the-hands-of-an-angry-God version of divine-human relations. But it is not the only message of the New 
Testament, even though it sometimes appears to be.Its predominance, however, has tended to supersede or 
even silence the messages of personal responsibility, social justice, radical hospitality, ecological 
stewardship, and economic equality.These important counter-messages are commonly analyzed in 
contemporary theological investigations mounted by scholars who are not on the fringes of biblical exegeis 
but who are working out of traditions including main-line Protestantism, Catholicism, and even some 
strands of emergent Evangelicalism. See especially the work of Marcus Borg, John Dominic Crossan, 
Matthew Fox, Tony Jones, Brian McLaren, Elaine Pagels, Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, and N.T. Wright, among 
many more.  
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that he will redeem himself by “redeeming time when men think least [he] will,” thereby 
sidestepping the need for forgiveness and escaping the logic of the gift (1.2.205). If 
forgiveness evokes the economy of the gift, it is a temporally strange gift. For-giveness 
implies that it is a gift given in advance, but it is nonetheless given in retrospect to 
recuperate loss after a transgression.56 Forgiveness, in other words, gives license to future 
transgressions in advance by dismissing them after the fact.57 Hal will not just recover 
himself in this redemption, he will forgive himself and therefore occupy both positions: 
both giver and receiver, in effect, both father and son. If Hal is a kind of prodigal son, 
then his dishonorable sojourn does not distance himself from his father but shows him to 
be exactly the same as his father. Furthermore, if Hal redeems himself, he will also 
redeem his father by lending legitimacy backwards in time. In other words, Hal will 
forgive his father’s wrongdoing when he forgives his own. His plan requires that he be 
self-generating and self-reliant, which, as I have suggested, is the strange lesson available 
in the prodigal son parable. His task of “redeeming time” is often read as making up for 
time lost in Eastcheap, but is also a much stranger task that this interpretive resolution 
suggests. Hal does not need to recuperate the time he spends in Eastcheap: this time is not 
wasted or lost but part of his planned return to honor. He suggests he will become his 
own legitimate son by playing the part of his father’s prodigal son. Hal’s plan suggests 
																																																								
56 Though the Oxford English Dictionary does not make this sense of the prefix for- explicit, the American 
Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots identifies the word forgive as cognate with other words that 
contain per-, which means “forward,” “through,” “in front of,” “before,” “early,” “first,” “chief,” “toward,” 
“against,” “near,” “at,” and “around” (67). This etymological connection suggests the temperal strangeness 
here. In forgiving himself, Hal also pushes against—another available sense of the word forgive in this 
etymology—the gift of the father by repaying a debt he doesn’t owe, thereby usurping the role of giver for 
himself.   
57 The logic of forgiveness is literally preposterous: it puts the end before the beginning. Moreover, 
forgiveness arrests the consequences of transgression on a cosmic scale so that one may do what one will 
with the ability to fall back on divine intervention to save us from our own transgressions. 
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that he will reverse or reenact time to become, in effect, his own authorizing origin, his 
own father. But this kind of circling back, this “redeeming [of] time” reveals that the 
authorizing positions of the father and the giver are also vulnerable. Hal’s plan shows, 
then, that the gift is also a threat to the giver when debts that are “never promised” are 
paid in advance, that is, with for-giveness.58  
Hal cannot then escape the threat that this play thematizes in the authorizing 
voices of his father and his political rivals, who equate power with honor. Indeed, even as 
Hal pretends to not be indebted to his father, his entire project is driven by his 
indebtedness to honor itself. Honor is not something that one bestows upon oneself as 
Hal claims he will do in his soliloquy and in his audience with his father when he claims 
he will acquire Hotspur’s honor by besting him in battle.59 Honor depends upon the 
perceptions and reports of others.60 Thus, Hal alone cannot authorize himself; he cannot 
redeem himself without the perceptions of others. Honor, in other words, depends upon 
																																																								
58 In Lear, Shakespeare also revises this parable to have the prodigal children (Cordelia and Edgar) redeem 
the fathers (Lear and Gloucester), and that redemption is the very punishment these fathers need. In that 
play, Shakespeare rereads the prodigal son as a prodigal father who gives (or wastes) all, and consequently 
wastes away: in accommodation, in mind, and finally in body. Shakespeare shows in this play the violence 
of giving directed back toward the giver. But Cordelia is also a kind of prodigal who will not play the game 
of conventional familial bonds. Neither Cordelia nor Lear (nor Gloucester nor Edmund) will play by the 
rules of inheritance. And they all squander everything. Both fleeing children redeem the fathers who would 
have gladly taken the lost child back into custody and therefore back under control. But it is the children 
who (potentially) have lost everything who must take their fathers in hand. In Lear, then, Shakespeare turns 
the prodigal story to reveal the violence due to the giver when the gift is returned with for-giveness.  
59 See 3.2.132-52. 
60 Berger elucidates the function of honor through the ethical discourses of both the hero and the martyr in 
Making Trifles of Terrors.  
This concept of honor is an ancient one that began as a concept of eternal life for warriors eternally 
glorified in cultural memory through song. It may be observed in the Babylonian epic of Gilgamesh, in 
Homer’s Greek epics the Iliad and the Odyssey, in Virgil’s Roman epic the Aeneid, among other ancient 
texts. Despite the advent of a Christian concept of eternal life through salvation, this concept of honor 
based on cultural memory persists in the political and moral hierarchies of early modern English culture.   
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words. This, I suggest, is the source of the fear that Falstaff evokes and that Hal denies, 
and it is exactly the theme of Falstaff’s criticism of honor itself.  
Honor is one of the things on which Falstaff ruminates. Characteristically, as I 
have argued, resisting the play’s major discourse of power, Falstaff will show how honor 
forces him into a position of naked vulnerability by enacting overblown cowardice once 
again, by pretending to be dead in the battle of Shrewsbury.61 Falstaff is no coward; he 
simply resists the oppressive discourse of honor in unexpected ways.62   
At Shrewsbury, Falstaff fights no longer than he sees fit (as Poins, and therefore 
we, expect of him). Rather than literally resisting the force of the rebels, Falstaff pretends 
to be dead. When the coast is clear, he stages his own resurrection (also strange, also 
faintly Christ-like) and pontificates on honor recalling his prior catechism before the 
battle began. Here he explains why the discourse of honor should not dominate human 
interactions: because it is merely “a word,” “air,” “a mere scutcheon” or sign of one’s 
reputation.63 Honor for Falstaff is nothing.   
Standing over Hotspur, the play’s embodiment of militarized honor, Falstaff’s 
point becomes visceral. He exposes the lunacy of boys fighting with sticks to the death by 
counterfeiting his own death, rising again, and besting the dead Hotspur whose honor 
does not protect him from Falstaff’s posthumous wound, an insulting injury which further 
wounds the dead man’s honor by dishonoring his body. In hefting the dead rebel as his 
																																																								
61 My reading here is not far afield from Berger’s point in “The Prince’s Dog” that Falstaff reveals and 
comments on what he does—conscripting soldiers to become “food for powder” at Shrewsbury—in a way 
that exposes who makes him do it: King Henry IV (Berger 66).  
62 A.C. Bradley suggests that Falstaff is no coward but a respected military leader, present at the king’s tent 
at Shrewsbury, leading his band of ragamuffins to battle rather than sending them in, handily capturing 
Coleville in Part II (266-67).  
63 See 5.1.133-39.  
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war-prize, Falstaff renders absurd the rebels’ militarized resistance.64 He nonetheless 
cashes in on his prize with his strange story of fighting two hours by Shrewsbury clock. 
His story evokes the two hours’ progress of a play on the stage, highlighting the 
similarity between the staged play and the staged battle. If the play, like honor, is nothing 
but words, then the battle itself and the force of the resistance, embodied in the dead 
burden that Falstaff now hefts, are also nothing but air. When he stabs Hotspur, Falstaff 
lets the air out of the old windbag honor. Indeed, Hotspur is most notably marked as 
being the embodied representative of honor who is also a blow-hard windbag, a man of 
too many words, who even dies midsentence: “No, Percy, thou art dust, and food for—” 
(5.4.84-85). If the road to honor begins in the stabbing of another man, then Falstaff has 
fulfilled the requirements of honor and is as honorable as any man on the battlefield, 
which is not very honorable at all.  
It is nonetheless this scutcheon, this façade, this scarecrow called honor that 
drives Hal. As early as his soliloquy, Hal explains that he will become more honorable by 
being less so. In doing so, Hal directly counters Falstaff’s method that I am calling 
passive resistance. While Falstaff exaggerates weaknesses in order to confront the 
dominant forces in this play, Hal exaggerates a counterfeit weakness in order to become 
the most dominant force in the play. Hal’s intentional trying on of the prodigal parable 
only to cast it off when it no longer suits him is perhaps one of his most dishonorable 
moves and it renders him vulnerable, once again, at precisely the moment he plots his 
																																																								
64 Here, I reframe and extend Bradley’s point that Falstaff “had reduced the idea of honour ad absurdum, 
had scarcely any self-respect, and only a respect for reputation as a means of life, naturally he avoided 
death when he could do so without a ruinous loss of reputation, and (observe) with the satisfaction of 
playing a colossal practical joke” (268). Though Bradley goes on to say that Falstaff only appears vile and 
disgusting if we look at him through serious eyes, his reading is still vaguely critical of Falstaff’s 
dissolution of honor at Shrewsbury.  
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triumph.  Falstaff asks, “Art thou not horribly afraid? Doth not thy blood thrill at it?” or, 
in other words, Can’t you see that you are vulnerable (2.4.357-58)? But Hal refuses to 
consider that possibility. By taking on the role of the prodigal in a way that avoids these 
consequences and ignores the fear attached to the return to the father, Hal is not the 
parabolic prodigal son: he simply plays the role. Hal counterfeits the prodigal in order to 
gain a counterfeit honor.  
 The payoff of Falstaff’s insight is that honor is never present in this play but 
always deferred to the future or described in the past. For both Hal and Hotspur, honor is 
the antidote to its opposite: shame. Falstaff shows that the two terms are not opposed. 
Instead, he collapses the difference between honor and shame by showing both the 
pursuit of honor and honor itself to be shameful.65 Hal and Hotspur are Falstaff’s 
unwitting accomplices in staging this collapse.  
Though Hal promises to gild the strange stories of this strangest fellow, Falstaff’s 
didactic and interpretive role wanes from the Henriad after Part I. As his access and 
proximity to Hal recede, the final two plays of the Henriad shore up a defense of Hal’s 
triumphant return from truancy that protects Hal from Falstaff’s challenge to insubstantial 
honor. Part II embodies the empty hearsay of opinion in the choral voice of Rumour 
himself. In Henry V, the choral voice of the collective helps activate a cover of the 
emptiness of honor: reframing Hal not as a reformed prodigal but as “the mirror of all 
																																																								
65 Furthermore, Falstaff suggests that shame is itself the feeling of acknowledging the fact that one is 
vulnerable. 
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Christian kings.”66 Meanwhile, Falstaff’s position fades from view: he is absent from the 
stage, only rumored to be sick and dying in this final play.     
As Falstaff drifts into the oblivion of history, Hal’s perspective dominates as he 
fulfills his prodigal plan by “rejecting the unyoked humor” of his former friend Falstaff, 
ultimately failing to comprehend the counterintuitive lessons Falstaff reveals (1.2.184). 
Poins warned that Falstaff would lie but that his lies would not be understood. He calls 
Falstaff’s lies incomprehensible, which suggests that they are both boundless and 
disorderly, that they spiral out of control, that they cannot be contained. Yet Poins, Hal, 
and not a few critics use these very limitless and uncontainable lies to limit and contain 
Falstaff in vicious categories.   
Falstaff proffers a new rubric for interpretation that begins by unraveling the 
validity of eyewitness accounts and suggests a method of seeing—therefore, 
interpreting—differently.67 Falstaff acknowledges his power, though he self-aggrandizes 
by self-deprecating means. Behaving shamefully, he defies the demands of honor that 
drive Henry IV, Hotspur, and Hal. Thus, he continually draws attention to his own 
vulnerable position: as a washed-up, overweight, aging person in the world of the text 
and as a textual function that illuminates fears that Hal and other characters may wish 
would remain in the dark. Because he is shameless rather than honor-bound, Falstaff is at 
once the most vulnerable and the most invulnerable figure in the Henriad. He is the 
“strangest fellow” who tells the “strangest tale[s],” some of them incomprehensible to his 
																																																								
66 See in Part II the Induction spoken by Rumour and in Henry V the choral prologue and epilogue, and the 
intervening choral scenes before Acts 2-5.  
67 I diverge from Berger here. I agree with him that Falstaff knows he’s lying, but I suggest that his lying is 
helpful rather than vicious.  
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companions, some of them too pointedly comprehended to bear. Indeed, Falstaff’s tactic, 
I have suggested, has been to turn his own vulnerability into a powerful tool, and he 
wields it to transgress dialectical boundaries that frame the play by showing that 





WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE AND JOHN WEBSTER’S  
TEXTUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS  
 
 
The Duke there? A most perverse, and turbulent nature: what appears in him mirth, is 
merely outside—if he laugh heartily, it is to laugh all honesty out of fashion…He speaks 
with others’ tongues, and hears men’s suits with others’ ears; will seem to sleep o’th’ 
bench only to entrap offenders in their answers; dooms men to death by information, 
rewards by hearsay.  
 
Why do you make yourself so wild a tempest?  
 
—John Webster, The Duchess of Malfi (1.1.160-168 and 2.5.16-17) 
 
In this project, I have examined instances of textual affect, discoverable through a 
text’s formal habits related to ambivalence and ambiguity. I have advocated for textual 
analysis that takes seriously the provocation that texts have perspectives and considers 
what these perspectives may reveal about the cultural networks within which they are 
situated. I have argued that textual ambiguity may suggest an orientation of disgust 
toward networks of political and religious power. In this concluding chapter, I briefly 
attend to the habits of Shakespeare’s Tempest and Webster’s Duchess of Malfi to explore 
how a text may be oriented in relation to familial hierarchies and dramatic conventions, 
in order to suggest other possible routes of inquiry that may be engaged through a text’s 
affective orientations.   
Critics have long discussed the pervasive ambiguities in Tempest and Duchess. 
Brinda Charry (2014), for instance, suggests that the most enriching critical readings of 
The Tempest “are based on the play’s language and structure, and take into account the 
complexity and ambiguity of the play” (76). Maurice Hunt highlights the control of 
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ambiguity over the play through the oxymoronic phrase “still vexed” (299). Turning to 
the ambiguous positions of characters, Stephen Orgel sees Prospero as an ambiguous 
father/mother (“Prospero’s Wife”). Deborah Willis notes the ambivalent characterizations 
of Prospero and Caliban, arguing that the play directs sympathy and ridicule toward both 
(286). Taking a broader view of the cultural implications of ambiguity in the play, Jeffery 
A. Rufo exposes the ambiguity and complexity of political authority (145-46). Even the 
genre of the play has been ambiguous since the late nineteenth century, when Edward 
Dowden classified The Tempest as a romance rather than a comedy.  
Critics have been drawn to but often repulsed by ambiguity in The Duchess of 
Malfi. William Archer found the play’s ambiguity troubling, claiming that the play’s 
“fatal lack of clearness ruins everything” (141-42). More than twenty-five years later, Ian 
Jack argues “there are too many inconsistencies in Webster’s plays” that serve “no deeper 
purpose than to make our flesh creep, and we feel an inevitable resentment” (43). Jack’s 
focus on audience response persists in the threads of current criticism. Critics like Philip 
D. Collington and Leah Marcus have considered the ways in which Duchess has evoked 
reactions in various audiences, both early as well as late modern. Collington proposes 
that Duchess offers audiences “a remarkably ambivalent theatrical experience, in that as 
her plight becomes increasingly pathetic, she becomes more adamant that witnesses not 
pity her” (170).  Leah Marcus sees links between audiences’ reactions to the Duchess’s 
marriage to Antonio, the depiction of the corrupt and lecherous Cardinal, and Ferdinand’s 
lycanthropy as potential evidence of the audience’s anti-Catholic orientations (108-15). 
Yet Marcus also suggests that “even in its own time the play, like all great art, 
transcended the immediate milieu and ideology of its creation” (116). If not transcendent, 
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Duchess, according to Fran Dolan, is undecidable. She maintains that the play is 
ambivalent that audiences’ orientations to its content cannot be determined, “nor can the 
play itself prove anything about contemporary [early modern] attitudes” (125). The play, 
Dolan argues, invites characters and the reader alike to “surrender one’s self to not 
knowing” (133). While I agree with Dolan on both accounts, I extend her analysis to 
argue that a surrender to not knowing is a surrender to ambiguity. Furthermore, by 
focusing on affective textual orientations, we may not recover the ideologies of early 
modern audiences as representative of their cultural values, but we may recover ways in 
which these texts were oriented relative to their cultures through their ambiguous textual 
habits. Both plays thematize perspectives that are ambivalent: wavering between the 
extremes of vulnerability and defense, of attraction and repulsion, or, as this dissertation 
has suggested for a number of literary works, textual disgust. 
Both plays entangle affect with challenges to contemporary dramatic conventions 
and familial hierarchies in response to intra-familial transgressions that contaminate the 
respective families. These include, for instance, the usurpation of Prospero’s dukedom by 
his brother Antonio on the one hand, the assertive sexuality of the Duchess through 
which she defies her domineering brothers on the other. Both Tempest and Duchess 
thematize these transgressions as contagion. Prospero recreates his brother Antonio “most 
wicked sir,” because “to call [him] brother would even infect [Prospero’s] mouth” 
(Tempest 5.1.131-34, emphasis mine). The Duchess’s twin brother Ferdinand is plagued 
by his emotions that develop into “a very pestilent disease … [called] lycanthropia” and 
that lead to the murder of his sister (Duchess 2.5.17-18 and 5.2.5-6). These 
representations of bodily reactions to transgression suggest straightaway that the textual 
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crisis of each play is autoimmune, that is, a crisis that comes from within the represented 
family that catalyzes a revenge response that, in turn, threatens the family’s annihilation.  
These thematic contagions infect each play at the level of structure. Each text tries 
to reinstate the boundaries breached by the transgressions that ignite each plot. Each text 
tries to maintain order within the hierarchical structures of families and within the 
conventions of drama and even syntax by creating in these elements disorder and outright 
chaos. This chaos occurs formally, for instance, the disordered diction and syntax that 
surrounds Prospero’s attempt to explain his brother’s original transgression and 
Ferdinand’s tempestuous rage directed at his sister that leads his brother and his doctors 
to pronounce him mad. This chaos appears thematically in Prospero’s literal storm and 
Ferdinand’s mental tempests that find their origins in each character’s disgust at his 
sibling. I argue, then, that a disgust response is both thematic and structural in Tempest 
and Duchess, and that these texts manage revenge strategies according to this 
ambivalence that both attracts and repels, that adheres to and disrupts dramatic and 
hierarchical conventions, that shows both the vulnerability of individuals and their power 
to judge and influence their situations. Both Prospero and Ferdinand enact revenge 
thematically by disseminating disgust as they delegate the power of their bodies and 
minds to other characters, that is when Ariel and Bosola become the eyes and ears and 
extended wills of their masters. This dissemination is itself a kind of textual 
transgression, blurring the boundaries between discrete characters, and therefore not 
simply extending the reach of Prospero’s and Ferdinand’s agency through their respective 
texts. For instance, Prospero blurs his character with Ariel’s when he orders the spirit to 
take a shape invisible to every eye but his, and Ferdinand “speaks with others’ tongues, 
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and hears men’s suits with others’ ears,” primarily Bosola’s (Tempest 1.2.302-3 and 
Duchess 1.1.164-65). Their revenge is also a proliferation of contagious disgust by which 
both characters attempt to purge the prior transgressions of their siblings but succeed in 
destroying themselves.  
Prospero and Ferdinand’s textual functions as revengers are ambivalent: they are 
both politically or magically powerful and, at the same time, vulnerable to their siblings’ 
threatening acts of agency. In other words, they can enact top-down punishments and yet 
are subject to the machinations of powerful others. Prospero’s vulnerability to his brother 
occurs before the narrative time of the play when he is “thrust forth of Milan” by 
Antonio’s usurpation of his brother’s dukedom (Tempest 5.1.160). Yet throughout the 
Tempest, Prospero claims to control the outcomes of his revenge against Antonio, 
beginning with the tempest that causes his brother’s shipwreck and culminating with the 
terms under which they will return from the island, terms that are secured through 
Prospero’s own demise.  
Prospero’s extension of affect through Ariel remedies the contagion caused by his 
brother Antonio, maintaining the ambivalence typical of romance rather than giving in to 
the annihilation of tragedy. The Tempest unfolds as a revenger’s triumph over his 
antagonist, made explicit to his enemies in the strange banquet that Prospero orchestrates 
to drive mad his brother and the other “men of sin” who supported Antonio’s rise to 
power and confirmed by Prospero himself by the end of the play (3.3.53). Though 
Prospero enacts his revenge through this maddening scene and admonitions of Ariel as a 
“minister of fate” perhaps literally dressed as a harpy, he counterintuitively ensures his 
triumph not with might or magic but with his own tenuous and therefore vulnerable 
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position (3.3.61, 83). In the final scene, Prospero reveals that he has enacted revenge on 
both Antonio and Alonso who were “enem[ies] to [him] inveterate” and secured his 
perpetual gain through the loss of his daughter such that it does not matter that he 
relinquishes his powerful magic at the end of the play (1.2.121-22, 5.1.319-20). Prospero 
does “require [his] dukedom of thee [Antonio], which [he] knows [his brother] must 
restore” (5.1.132-33). Yet Antonio owes his control of Milan to Alonso and pays 
“homage and…tribute” to Naples in exchange for Alonso’s help in “extirpat[ing 
Prospero] out of the dukedom, and confer[ing] fair Milan, with all the honours, on 
[Prospero’s] brother” (1.2.124-27). Alonso, now indebted to Prospero for the return of his 
son Ferdinand, not only has the power to restore Prospero’s dukedom, but he must also 
submit to Prospero’s orchestrated marriage of Ferdinand and Miranda, which seals the 
alliance and ensures that Prospero’s “issue should become kings of Naples” and also 
protected dukes of Milan through their mother’s right (5.1.205-6). Losing his daughter to 
marriage, Prospero successfully executes a revenge that will persist after his own demise. 
He can retire to Milan and look forward to his death because Antonio will no longer have 
the support of Naples to perpetrate political machinations against Prospero or his heirs, 
thanks to the marriage alliance he has secured (5.1.310-11). Prospero’s greatest act of 
strength, then, manifests in his own loss.  
Though different from Prospero’s, Ferdinand’s position is also ambivalent. 
Ferdinand’s revenge on his sister seems conventional of tragedy, yet his function as 
revenger is uncertain because the play also suggests a clash between two revenge plots 
when the Duchess marries, thereby enacting her revenge on her brothers for attempting to 
control her choices.  Ferdinand directly states that he is the victim of a revenge when he 
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says “I do think it is some sin in us [himself and his brother the Cardinal] heaven doth 
revenge by her” (Duchess 2.5.66-67). Paired with his mental and emotional dissolution 
that unfolds throughout the play, Ferdinand identifies his own vulnerability despite his 
familial position as male authority and his political position as Duke of Calabria. Like a 
tragic revenger, Ferdinand destroys the continuity of the play’s community, a destruction 
which the play thematizes in the murders of nearly every character including himself. 
Interestingly, though madness is conventional for revengers, the dissolution of 
Ferdinand’s own mental integrity extends beyond his character’s function.  
The outward sign of Ferdinand’s madness, a lycanthropic transformation, infects 
the language of the text and extends the dissolution of the community to a kind of textual 
dissolution even before the culmination of his revenge. Ferdinand’s lycanthropic shape-
shifting infects the language of the text by introducing the hybridity thematized by by his 
mental transformation into a wolf-man, a hybridity that also suggests the nature of his 
orientation toward his sister’s impure bloodline. His disgust at “a sister damned… [who 
is] lose i’th hilts, [and] grown a notorious strumpet” manifests in in the text as his own 
hybrid transformation into a wolf in man’s clothing. This hybrid image captures his 
attraction and repulsion relative to his perspective on impure (and therefore hybrid) 
matches between people like the Duchess and her new husband Antonio who are not 
equal in respect to their economic, social, and familial positions. Whether his concern 
that his sister remain unmarried is driven by his hope for monetary or incestuous gain, 
Ferdinand would prefer to keep everything—her money and her bloodline—in the family 
and under his control. On the one hand, he claims that he hated her match with Antonio 
because he “had a hope, had she continued a widow, to have gained an infinite mass of 
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treasure by her death” (4.2.275-77). On the other hand, he laments the impurity of his 
own blood that once ran pure in her body, claiming that his pure blood “was worth more 
than that which though wouldst comfort, called a soul” (4.122-24). Ferdinand reveals a 
two-fold, and therefore hybrid, aversion to the hybridity that results from exogamy, a 
hybridity that inherently remains outside of his control. His uncontrolled hybridity infects 
the very language of the play.   
We see this textual infection not only in abundant references to wolves, hyenas, 
dogs, and the digging up mandrakes and bodies, but also in the ambiguous hybrid images 
peppered throughout the play. For example, Antonio attributes to the Cardinal the 
incongruity of oracles spoken by the devil, and even the Duchess accounts her brothers’ 
advice to avoid marriage “terrible good counsel,” which may be terrible counsel that 
inspires the terror of awe but more likely that inspires the terror of fear (1.1.175-77 and 
303). Furthermore, once the Duchess’s marriage to Antonio is discovered, Delio 
pronounces Antonio’s predicament an “unfortunate fortune” (2.4.80). Bosola reports the 
Duchess’s silence as expressive and labels his own deceitful, “painted honour” with 
images like sweating in ice and freezing in fire (4.1.9-10, 4.2.328-30). Furthermore, 
Ferdinand’s incoherent intentions infect his syntax when, for example, he tells the 
Duchess that he will “be—bespeak a husband” for her (3.1.39-40). Edited out of nearly 
all editions since the 1640 reprinting, this syntactical hiccough contradicts itself, 
replicating Ferdinand’s ambivalent connection to his sister.1 These syntactical gaps and 
incongruous images evoke the chaos of Ferdinand’s obsession with their sister that leads 
the Cardinal to ask “why do you make yourself so wild a tempest?” (2.5.16-17). In effect, 
																																																								
1 I am aware of only one edition that preserves this syntax from the first quarto of 1623: the Arden, edited 
by Leah Marcus in 2009.  
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when the language breaks down in undecidable, ambivalent turns of phrase, the play 
itself takes on characteristics similar to Ferdinand’s wild tempest, both unmoored to the 
legitimacy of syntactical or familial convention.  
Similarly disrupting his own legitimacy, Prospero’s syntax undermines his 
authority when he interrupts himself throughout the play, suggesting that he is anxious 
about his unstable position of power.2 In telling Miranda how they came to the island, he 
directs his ire toward her in repeated interjections that she mark him, attend to him, and 
hear him, despite her obvious rapt attention (1.2.67, 78, 87, 87, 106, 135). These 
structural disturbances formalize the ambivalence of the text’s depiction of Prospero as 
both political and familial authority. Even as he asserts his authority, his syntax 
compromises it by both bolstering and undercutting his right to deliver his perspective on 
his exile from Milan. His habit of interrupting himself to solicit the agreement or 
attention of his audience suggests that he is concerned with ensuring that his version of 
his and Miranda’s story is the official one. But the disruption also exposes his worry that 
it will not be. Similarly, his brother Antonio interrupts his plan for Sabastian to usurp 
Naples with phrases that evoke Prospero’s “mark me,” phrases like “Do you hear me 
speak?,” “if you heed me,” and “do you understand me?” (2.1.208, 18, 66). Like 
Prospero, Antonio repeatedly seeks confirmation when he speaks. When Antonio 
replicates Prospero’s habit, the play formally unites the play’s attitude toward the two 
brothers, a bond that Prospero works to polarize. For instance, with the exception of a 
brief encounter with Antonio under the duress of the shipwreck in the first scene, 
																																																								
2 Peter Hulme and Francis Barker make a similar point about Prospero’s anxiety at the moment when he 
interrupts the masque he stages to celebrate Miranda’s betrothal to Ferdinand. See their chapter “‘Nymphs 
and Reapers Heavily Vanish’—the Discusive Con-Texts of The Tempest,” appearing in Alternative 
Shakespeares.  
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Prospero has the privilege of shaping the interpretive perspective on his brother. He 
paints a grim picture of Antonio, identifying his brother as false, evil, and his inveterate 
enemy, by the end of the play a “most wicked sir” and a traitor while he draws sympathy 
for himself and Miranda (Tempest 1.2.92-93, 121-22, 5.1.128, 130).  
Though Antonio’s wickedness bears out in his conspiracy with Sebastian to usurp 
the throne of Naples, when Antonio discusses his plan to establish Sebastian as king and 
the nature of ambition, his language becomes ambiguous. For example, he says to 
Sebastian,  
O, out of that no hope [that Alonso’s son Ferdinand is undrowned], what 
great hope have you! No hope that way is another way so high a hope that 
even ambition cannot pierce a wink beyond, but doubt discovery there. 
(2.1.140-41).  
Sebastian’s hope to gain the throne is catachrestic: hope springs from nothing, from lack, 
from no hope. Furthermore, as Stephen Orgel notes, the line seems to say that there is no 
higher ambition than the hope of a crown, but the syntax suggests “the opposite of what 
the meaning requires.”3 Antonio, rather than saying that the height of ambition results in 
the crown, he says that ambition can only doubt that outcome. Orgel suggests that 
Antonio’s confused syntax evokes his own anxiety over his own usurpation of Milan, an 
anxiety that he inadvertently presses onto Sebastian even as he encourages him to 
similarly usurp Naples. This anxiety bears out for Antonio and once again ties him, and 
now Sebastian, directly to Prospero’s anxiety over his own power as when Antonio 
evokes Prospero’s habit of interrupting and undermining the authority of his own 
perspective. This unity, however, reveals an unarticulated, contagious anxiety toward 
their own positions of authority. The brothers’ shared rhetorical habit casts doubt on 
																																																								
3 See Orgel’s note on the lines in the Oxford edition of the play.  
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Prospero’s perceptions and explanations throughout the play because he deploys the same 
rhetorical habits as his duplicitous brother.4  
The ambivalence that results from these habits complicates the reliability of 
Prospero’s perspectives when he interprets the play’s other characters, including himself. 
Indeed, Prospero’s perspective orchestrates the characterizations of nearly every 
character in the play as he makes a habit of telling the other characters who or what they 
are. Miranda directly asks to be interpreted by her father—“tell me what I am (1.2.35). 
The play goes on to develop nearly all of the characters according to Prospero’s own 
disgust, thereby contaminating each character with his ambivalent interpretations. We 
learn through Prospero that, among other things, Ariel is a moody liar but also brave and 
graceful; that Sycorax is a “damned witch” even though Prospero himself is a kind of 
malevolent wizard who rivals Medea; that Caliban is a “poisonous” and “most lying 
slave,” a “thing of darkness” but also one Prospero acknowledges his own; that Ferdinand 
is “a goodly person” but also a spy and a traitor (1.2.244, 256, 263, 319, 344, 417, 457, 
461; 3.3.83-84; and 5.1.33-57, 275). Even Prospero’s self-interpretation is ambivalent, 
painting him as innocent and vulnerable, his brother Antonio as guilty and powerful, 
despite the obvious role reversal Prospero perpetrates on the island through the tempest 
that shipwrecks his enemies and leaves them at his mercy to exact physical and emotional 
revenge as he sees fit. Prospero nearly confesses to duplicity when he deflects his role as 
agent of revenge onto “some subtleties o’th’ isle,” which he blames for causing the 
shipwrecked men not to “believe things certain” when Prospero himself directed Ariel to 
																																																								
4 Similar to the Tempest’s critique of Prospero’s faulty perspective, Duchess both formally and thematically 
presents Ferdinand’s perspective as duplicitous. His sister’s new husband Antonio plants the idea that 
Ferdinand is untrustworthy (Duchess 1.1.160-168).  
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drive them mad (5.1.124-25). He goes on to say “at this time I will tell no tales,” meaning 
that he will not tattle on Sebastian and Antonio’s treacherous plot against Alonso, but 
also suggesting that he will at this time tell no lies but at other times he has.5  The text 
thus asserts that Prospero engages in misdirection, and that readers along with Miranda 
may be susceptible to contracting his infectious interpretive perspective. His disgust, 
then, articulated in response to his brother and other characters belies an orienting textual 
disgust directed to authorities like Prospero himself.  
The form of disgust in Tempest and Duchess appears in instances of contradiction, 
ambivalence, and dissolution, especially recognizable human forms transforming into the 
magical and the monstrous, into wizards and werewolves, but also through disorienting 
focal perspectives offered by Prospero and Ferdinand. One might call this formalization 
of disgust a kind of rhetorical gaslighting in which a text asserts as true that which is not, 
or as Feste would say to his own play’s Sebastian, “Nothing that is so, is so” (Twelfth 
Night 4.1.8).  
Eugenie Brinkema writes that disgust formalizes something abusive, something 
worse than the worst (141). As form, disgust is not a disgusting object to be pointed at, 
desired, or even rejected. It is not a disgusting scene of gruesome murder in a play that 
compels audiences to look and also to turn away, to read and also to close the book. It 
suggests, instead, something worse than the worst thing a particular text articulates or 
thematizes. Insofar as Prospero and Ferdinand tell their audiences, both fictional and real, 
who and what is disgusting in their respective texts, they both engage in a kind of magic, 
a sleight of hand, redirecting sympathies and judgments and interpretations away from 
																																																								
5 See the Oxford English Dictionary definitions under “tale, n.” 
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what they articulate as worse than the worst. Prospero and Ferdinand point to their 
siblings, but the texts’ formalization of their dispersed agency and affects suggest that 
Prospero and Ferdinand are even worse, and exponentially so. The question that opens 
this chapter then may be answered. Why do Prospero and Ferdinand make themselves so 
wild a tempest? Because the text formalizes their disgust as textual chaos, as their own 
undoing in which “every third thought shall be [the] grave” and “like diamonds [they are] 
cut with their own dust” (Tempest 5.1.311, Duchess 5.5.72). 
Throughout this project, I have argued that, when a text is ambiguous or obscure 
or inarticulate, these textual difficulties signal responses of a text that strike in two 
directions: first, as immune responses whereby a text deflects the interpretations of critics 
and second, as autoimmune responses whereby a text fails to protect itself from the 
meanings most difficult to entertain. In both cases, a text reveals its orientations to the 
networks of power with its culture of origin. In both cases, a text calls for readings that 
attempt to learn from what is unfamiliar, to approach what has been unknown and even 
unknowable, and to profit from that knowledge like Feste who profits from his enemies 





“ambivalent, adj.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, 
September 2015. Web. 20 Sep. 2015.  
“apprehension, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford U P, December 2015. 
Web. 11 February 2016. 
“ass, n.1.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, September 2015. 
Web. 23 January 2016. 
“can, v.1.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, September 2014. 
Web. 4 October 2014. 
“catachresis, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, September 
2015. Web. 2 September 2015. 
“conceive.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. September 2011. Oxford U P. 1 
November 2011. Web.  
“haggard, n.2.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, December 
2015. Web. 19 February 2015. 
“incomprehensible, adj. and n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University 
Press, Sep. 2015. Web. 1 Oct. 2015. 
“jealousy, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford U P, December 2015. Web. 11 
February 2016. 
“mitcher, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, December 
2014. Web. 22 Jan. 2015. 
“suspicion, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford U P, December 2015. Web. 11 
February 2016. 
“sympathy, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford U P, December 2015. Web. 11 
February 2016. 
“tale, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, June 2016. Web. 8 
June 2016. 
“usurp, v.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, September 2015. 
Web. 3 September 2015. 
“watchman.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. September 2011. Oxford U P. 1 
November 2011. Web.  
“παραβολή.” Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon. Logeion. Uof Chicago. Web. 
	 207 
Abrams, M. H. A Glossary of Literary Terms. 7th ed. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999. 
Print. 
Aers, David. “A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists; Or Reflections on Literary 
Critics Writing the ‘History of the Subject.’” Culture and History 1350-1600: 
Essays on English Communities, Identities and Writing. Ed. David Aers. Detroit: 
Wayne State U P, 1992, 177-202. Print. 
Ahmed, Sara. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Durham, NC: Duke 
U P, 2006. Print. 
---. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. New York: Routledge, 2004. Print  
Allinson, Mark. “Re-visioning the Death Wish: Donne and Suicide.” Mosaic: A Journal 
for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature 24.1 (1991): 31-46. Print.  
Anderson, Judith H. Reading the Allegorical Intertext: Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, 
Milton. New York: Fordham U P, 2008. Print.  
---. Translating Investments: Metaphor and the Dynamic of Cultural Change in Tudor-
Stuart England. New York: Fordham U P, 2005. Print.  
Anderson, N.J.C.  “Donne’s Devotions and the Psychology of Assent” Modern Philology 
62 (1965): 207-216. JSTOR. 6 Mar. 2014. Web.   
Archer, William. The Old Drama and the New: an Essay in Re-valuation. New York: B. 
Blom, 1972. Print.   
Auerbach, Erich. “Odysseus’ Scar.” Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western 
Literature. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton U P, 2013. Print.   
Augustine, Saint. On Christian Doctrine. Trans. D.W. Robertson, Jr. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1958. Print. 
---. The Confessions. Trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: 
Penguin, 1961. Print.  
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. Bloomington: 
Indiana U P, 1984. Print. 
Barber, C.L. Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy: A Study of Dramatic Form and Its Relation 
to Social Custom. Princeton: Princeton U P, 1959. Print.  
Barker, Francis and Peter Hulme. “‘Nymphs and Reapers Heavily Vanish’—the 
Discusive Con-Texts of The Tempest.” Alternative Shakespeares. Ed. John 
Drakakis. London: Routledge, 1985. 191-205. Print.  
	 208 
Barker, Jennifer Marilynn. “Chew on This: Disgust, Delay, and the Documentary Image 
in Food, Inc.” Film-Philosophy 15.2 (2011): 70-89. Web. 14 Mar. 2015. 
Bartel, Emily C. Spectacles of Strangeness: Imperialism, Alienation, and Marlowe. 
Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1993. Print.  
Barthes, Roland. “The Death of the Author.” Image—Music—Text. Trans. Stephen Heath. 
New York: Hill and Wang, 1977. 142-148. Rpt.in Falling into Theory: 
Conflicting Views on Reading Literature. Ed. David H. Richter. Boston: Bedford, 
1994. 222-225. Print.  
Bell, Robert H. “The Anatomy of Folly in Shakespeare’s Henriad.” Humor: International 
Journal of Humor Research 14.2 (2001): 181-201. Web. 31 Aug. 2015.  
Belsey, Catherine. The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance 
Drama. London: Methuen, 1985. Print.  
Berger, Harry. Figures of a Changing World: Metaphor and the Emergence of Modern 
Culture. New York: Fordham, 2015. Print. 
---. Making Trifles of Terrors: Redistributing Complicities in Shakespeare. Stanford: 
Stanford U P, 1997. Print.  
---. “The Prince’s Dog: Falstaff and the Perils of Speech-Prefixity.” Shakespeare 
Quarterly 49.1 (Spring 1998): 40-73. Web. 9 Feb. 2015.  
Bernal, Martin. Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Influence on Classical Civilization.  
Booth, Stephen, ed. Shakespeare’s Sonnets. New Haven: Yale U P, 1977. Print. 
Boyette, Purvis. “Wanton Humor and Wanton Poets: Homosexuality in Marlowe’s 
Edward II.” Tulane Studies in English 22 (1977): 33-50. Print.  
Bradley, A.C. Oxford Lectures on Poetry. London: Macmillan, 1909. Print.  
Braidotti, Rosi. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Cambridge: 
Polity Blackwell, 2002. Print.  
---. Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist 
Theory. New York: Columbia U P, 1994. Print.  
Bray, Alan. “Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friendship.” History Workshop 29 
(1990): 1-19. Print. 
---. Homosexuality in Renaissance England. New York: Columbia U P, 1982. Print.  
---. The Friend. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2003. 187. Print.  
	 209 
Bredbeck, Gregory W. Sodomy and Interpretation: Marlowe to Milton. Ithaca: Cornell U 
P, 1991. Print.  
Breitenberg, Mark. Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England. Cambridge: 
Cambridge U P, 1996. Print.  
Brennan, Teresa. The Transmission of Affect. Ithaca, NY: Cornell U P, 2004. Print.  
Brinkema, Eugenie. The Forms of the Affects. Durham, NC: Duke U P, 2014. Print.  
Bultman, Rudolph. History of The Synoptic Tradition. trans., John Marsh. Rev. ed. New 
York: Haper and Row, 1976. Print. 
Burckhardt, Jacob. The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. 2 vols. Trans. S.G.C. 
Middlemore. New York: Harper-Colophon, 1958. Print.  
Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power. Stanford, CA: Stanford U P, 1997. Print. 
---. Undoing Gender. New York: Routledge, 2004. Print.  
Campana, Joseph. The Pain of Reformation: Spenser, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of 
Masculinity. New York: Fordham U P, 2012. Print.  
Cardullo, Bert. “One Dramatic Character, Two Artistic Media: Shakespeare’s Falstaff in 
Drama and Film.” Lamar Journal of the Humanities 31.2 (2006): 43-68.  
Catty, Jocelyn. Writing Rape, Writing Women in Early Modern England: Unbridled 
Speech. New York: St. Martins, 1999. Print. 
Charnes, Linda. Notorious Identity: Materializing the Subject in Shakespeare. Cabridge, 
MA: Harvard U P, 1993. Print.  
Charry, Brinda. “Recent Perspectives on The Tempest.” The Tempest: A Critical Reader. 
Ed. Alden T. and Virginia Mason Vaugn. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. 61-92. 
Print.  
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Ad C. Herennium. Ed. and trans. Harry Caplan. 1954. Rpt. 
London: Heinemann, 1981. Print.  
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Oratore. Ed. G.P. Goold. Trans. E.W. Sutton. 2 vols. 1942. 
Rpt. London: Heinemann, 1988. Print.  
Clare, Janet. “Marlowe’s ‘theatre of cruelty.’” Constructing Christopher Marlowe. Eds. 
J.A. Downie and J.T. Parnell. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2000. 74-87. Print.  
Cohen, Derek. “The Rites of Violence in 1 Henry IV” (1985). Searching Shakespeare: 
Studies in Culture and Authority. Toronto: Toronto U P, 2003. Print.   
	 210 
Cohen, Ed. A Body Worth Defending: Immunity, Biopolitics, and the Apotheosis of the 
Modern Body. Durham: Duke U P, 2009. Print.  
Cohen, Stephen, ed. Shakespeare and Historical Formalism. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 
Print.   
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. “Statesman’s Manual.” The Complete Works of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge: with an Introductory Essay upon his Philosophical and 
Theological Opinions. 7 vols. Ed. W.G.T Shedd. New York: Harper, 1884. Print. 
vol. 1. 417-454.  
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. “The Statesman’s Manual.” 1816. The Political Tracts of 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Shelley. Ed. R.J. White. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 
1955. Print.  
Colie, Rosalie L. Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox. 
Princeton: Princeton U P, 1966. Print.  
Collington, Philip D. “Pent-up Emotions: Pity and the Imprisonment of Women in 
Renaissance Drama.” Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England 16 (2003): 
162-91. Print.   
Correll, Barbara.  “Symbolic Economies and Zero-Sum Erotics: Donne's ‘Sapho to 
Philaenis.’” EHL 62.3(Fall 1995):487-507. JSTOR. 7 Jun. 2013. Web 
Davidson, Donald. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. 
Print.  
Davies, Michael. “Falstaff’s Lateness: Calvinism and the Protestant Hero in Henry IV.” 
Review of English Studies 56 (2005): 351-78. Web. 15 Aug. 2015.  
Deleuze, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. 
Print.  
Derrida, Jacques. “Des Tours de Babel.” Trans. Joseph Graham.  Psyche: Inventions of 
the Other. Vol. I. Stanford, CA: Stanford U P, 2007. Print.   
---. “The White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy.” Margins of 
Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982. 207-272. Print.  
Desmet, Christy. Reading Shakespeare’s Characters: Rhetorics, Ethics and Identity. 
Amherst, MA: U of Massachusetts P, 1992. Print. 
DiGangi, Mario. The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 
1997. Print.  
	 211 
Divine, Jay Dean. “Compass and Circle in Donne’s ‘A Valediction Forbidding 
Mourning.’” Papers on Language and Literature 9.1 (Winter 1973): 78-80. Print.  
Dixon, Thomas. From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological 
Category. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2003. Print.   
Dodd, C. H. The Parables of the Kingdom. Rev. ed. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1961. Print.  
Dollimore, Jonathan. “A Reply to Neema Parvini.” Textual Practice 27.4 (2013): 733-35. 
Web. 24 Jul. 2014. 
---. “Sexual Disgust.” Oxford Literary Review 20.1-2 (1998): 47-78. Print.  
---. “Subjectivity, Sexuality, and Transgression: The Jacobean Connection.” Renaissance 
Drama 17 (1986): 53-81. Print.  
---. “The Cultural Politics of Perversion: Augustine, Shakespeare, Freud, Foucault.” 
Textual Practice 4.2 (Summer 1990): 179-196. Print.  
---. “The Legacy of Cultural Materialism.” Textual Practice 27.4 (2013): 715-24. Web. 
24 Jul. 2014. 
Donne, John. Devotions upon Emergent Occasions and Death’s Duel. New York: 
Random House, 1999. Print.  
---. Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions: And, Death's Duel. Ed. Izaak Walton. New 
York: Vintage, 1999. Print. 
---. Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions. Ed. A. Raspa. New York: Oxford U P, 1987. 
Print.  
---. Devotions upon Emergent Occasions. Ed. Anthony Raspa. Oxford: Oxford U P, 1975. 
Print.  
---. Letters to Severall Persons of Honour (1651). Delmar, N.Y: Scholars' Facsimiles & 
Reprints, 1977. Print. 
---. Major Works. Ed. John Carey. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2000. Print.  
---. Poems, by J.D. VVith elegies on the authors death. London : Printed by M[iles] 
F[lesher] for Iohn Marriot, and are to be sold at his shop in St Dunstans Church-
yard in Fleet-street, 1633. EEBO. 11 Nov. 2011. Web.  
---. Selected Prose. Ed. Helen Gardner and Timothy Healy. Oxford: Clarendon, 1967. 
Print.  
---. Sermons. Eds. Evelyn Simpson and George Potter. Berkeley: U of California P, 1953. 
Print. 
	 212 
---. The Complete English Poems. Ed. A.J. Smith. London: Penguin, 1996. Print. 
---. The Complete English Poems. Ed. C.A. Patrides. London: Everyman, 1994. Print. 
---. The Poems of John Donne. Ed. Herbert Grierson. London: Clarendon, 1912. Print.  
---. The Variorum Edition of the Poetry of John Donne. Ed. Gary A. Stringer. 
Bloomington: Indiana U P, 2005. Print.  
Donovan, Timothy, A. Samuel Kimball, and Jillian Smith. “The Fog of War: What Yet 
Remains” Postmodern Culture 16.1 (September 2004). Project Muse. 3 Mar 
2006. Web.  
Dubrow, Heather. Foreward. New Formalisms and Literary Theory. Eds. Verena Theile 
and Linda Tredennick. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. vii-xviii. Print. 
Elias, Norbert. The History of Manners. New York: Urizen, 1978. Print.  
Ellis, David. Shakespeare’s Practical Jokes: An Introduction to the Comic in His Work. 
Lewisburg: Bucknell U P, 2007. Print. 
Empson, William. Essays on Shakespeare. Ed. David B. Pirie. Cambridge, Cambridge U 
P, 1986. Print.  
---. Seven Types of Ambiguity. London: Chatto and Windus, 1947. Print. 
Enterline, Lynn. “Embodied Voices: Petrarch Reading (Himself Reading) Ovid.” Desire 
in the Renaissance: Psychoanalysis and Literature. Eds. Valeria Finucci and 
Regina Schwartz. Princeton: Princeton U P, 1994.  
---. The Rhetoric of the Body from Ovid to Shakespeare. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2000. Print. 
---. The Tears of Narcissus: Melancholia and Masculinity in Early Modern Writing. 
Stanford: Stanford U P, 1995. Print. 
Erasmus, Desiderius. On Copia of Words and Ideas (De Utraque Verborum ac Rerum 
Copia). Trans. Donald B. King and H. David Rix. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette U 
P, 1963. Print. 
Erne, Lukas. “Biography, Mythography, and Criticism: The Life and Works of 
Christopher Marlowe.” Modern Philology 103, 1 (August 2005): 28-50.  
Evans, Donald. The Logic of Self-Involvement: A Philosophical Study of Everyday 
Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use of Language about God as 
Creator. New York: Herder and Herder, 1969. Print.  
	 213 
Felman, Shoshana. “Turing the Screw of Interpretation.” Literature and Psychoanalysis – 
The Question of Reading: Otherwise. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 1982. Print. 
Fenner, Dudley. The artes of logike and rethorike, The logic of Peter Ramus and rhetoric 
by O. Talon. D. Fenner, translator and adapter (1584). Four Tudor Books on 
Education. Ed. Robert D. Pepper. Gainesville, FL: Scholars' Facsimiles & 
Reprints. 1966. Print. 
---. The Artes of Logike and Rhetorike. Middleburg: R. Schilders, 1584. Early English 
Books Online. Web. 12 May 2015. 
Fish, Stanley. “Biography and Intention.” Contesting the Subject: Essays in The 
Postmodern Theory and Practice of Biography and Biographical Criticism. Ed. 
William H. Epstein. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue U P, 1991. 9-16. Print.  
---. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in 
Literary and Legal Studies. Durham, NC: Duke U P, 1989. Print.   
---. “Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive 
Interpretation in Law.” Cardozo Law Review 29.3 (2008): 1109-1146. Web. 2 
Nov. 2015. 
---. Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P, 1980. Print.    
---. Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth Century Literature. 
Berkely: U of California P, 1972. Print. 
---. Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U P, 
1967. Print. 
---. “There is No Textual Position.” San Diego Law Review 42.1 (2005): 1-22. Web. 2 
Nov. 2015. 
Floyd-Wilson, Mary and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr, eds. Environment and Embodiment in 
Early Modern England. New York: Palgrave, 2007. Print.  
Forker, Charles R. “The State of the Soul and the Soul of the State: Reconciliation in the 
Two Parts of Shakespeare’s Henry IV.” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance 
History 4 (2007): 289-313. Print.  
Foucault, Michel. “A Preface to Transgression.” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: 
Selected Essays and Interviews. Ed. & Trans. Donald F. Bouchard. Ithaca: Cornell 
U P, 1977. 29-52. Print.  
---. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995. Print.  
	 214 
---. The Archaeology of Knowledge; And, the Discourse on Language. Trans. A.M. 
Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972. Print.  
---. The Order of Things: Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Routledge, 1997. 
Print. 
Freinkel, Lisa. Reading Shakespeare's Will: The Theology of Figure from Augustine to 
the Sonnets. New York: Columbia U P, 2002. Print. 
---. “The Use of Fetish.” Shakespeare Studies 33 (2005): 115-22. Web. 10 Mar. 2015. 
Frost, Kate Gartner. Holy Delight: Typology, Numerology, and Autobiography in 
Donne’s Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions. New Jersey: Princeton U P, 1990. 
Print. 
Funk, Robert. Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God. New York: Harper and Row, 
1966. Print.  
Gibbs, Joanna. “Marlowe’s Politic Women.” Constructing Christopher Marlowe. Eds. 
J.A. Downie and J.T. Parnell. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2000. 164-176. Print.  
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. The Maxims and Reflections of Goethe. Trans. Bailey 
Saunders. New York: Macmillian, 1893. Print.  
Goldberg, Jonathan. “Not Unto Death: The Devotions of John Donne” (PhD Dissertation, 
Columbia University 1971.)  
---. Introduction. Queering the Renaissance. Ed. Jonathan Goldberg. Durham: Duke U P, 
1994. 1-14. Print. 
---. Sodometries: Renaissance Texts, Modern Sexualities. Fordam U P, 2010. Print. 
Grady, Hugh. “Donne's First Anniversary as Baroque Allegory: Fragmentation, 
Idealization, and the Resistance to Unity” John Donne Journal: Studies in the Age 
of Donne 32 (2013): 107-129. Print.   
Graham, David. A. “Rumsfeld's Knowns and Unknowns: The Intellectual History of a 
Quip.” The Atlantic Online, 27 Mar. 2014. Web. 6 Apr. 2015. 
Greenblatt, Stephen. “Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and its Subversion, Henry 
IV and Henry V.” Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism. 
Eds. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield. Ithaca: Cornell U P, 1985. 18-47. 
Print. 
---. Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture. New York: Routledge, 1990. 
Print.  
	 215 
---. “Marlowe and Renaissance Self-fashioning.” Two Renaissance Mythmakers: 
Christopher Marlowe and Ben Jonson. Ed. Alvin Kernan. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins U P, 1977. 52. Print. 
---. Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare. Chicago: U Chicago P, 
1980. Print. 
---. Representing the English Renaissance. Berkeley: U of California P, 1988. Print. 
---. Will in the World. New York: Norton, 2004. Print.  
Greene, Thomas M. Poetry, Signs, and Magic. Newark: U of Delaware P, 2005. Print.   
---. The Light in Troy: Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry. New Haven: Yale 
U P, 1982. Print. 
Gregg, Melissa & Gregory Seigworth eds. Affect Theory Reader. Durham: Duke UP, 
2011. Print.  
Gross, Daniel. The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” to Modern 
Brain Science. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2006. Print.  
Grosz, Elizabeth. Space, Time, and Perversion. New York: Routledge, 1995. Print.  
Groves, Beatrice. “Hal as Self-Styled Redeemer: The Harrowing of Hell and Henry IV 
Part I.” Shakespeare Survey 57 (2004): 236-48. Print.  
Guffey, Robert. “Parabolic Logic in Donne’s Sermons.” John Donne Journal 26 (2007): 
103-125. Print. 
Hawkes, David. “Recent Studies in the English Renaissance” SEL 53.1 (Winter 2013): 
197-253. Web. 24. May 2013.   
Hayes, Douglas. Rhetorical Subversion in Early English Drama. New York: Lang, 2004. 
Print.  
Hemmings, Claire. “Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn,” 
Cultural Studies 19. 5 (2005): 548-67. Web.  
Heywoood, Thomas .An Apology for Actors containing Three Briefe Treatises. 1 Their 
Antiquity. 2 Their Ancient Dignity. 3 The True Vse of Their Quality. London: 
Nicholas Oakes, 1612. Early English Books Online. University of Oregon. 7 Aug 
2014. Web 
Holderness, Graham. Shakespeare Recycled: The Making of Historical Drama. Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992. Print.  
 
	 216 
Holinshed, Raphael. The Third Volume of Chronicles, Beginning at Duke William the 
Norman, Commanlie Called the Conquerer, and Descending by Degrees of 
Yeeres to All the Kings and Queenes of England in Their Orderlie Successions. 
London: Henry Denham, 1586. 341, lines 53-62. Early English Books Online. 
University of Oregon. 1 July 2014. Web. 
Horn, Mathew. “John Donne, Godly Inscription, and Permanency of Self in Devotions 
upon Emergent Occasions.” Renaissance Studies 24.3 (2009): 365-380.  
Hunt, Maurice. “Shakespeare’s ‘Still Vexed’ Tempest.” Style 39.3 (Fall 2005): 299-314. 
JSTOR. 20 Jun 2016. Web.  
Hunter, Robert. “Shakespeare, Pattern of Excelling Nature” (1978). Henry the Fourth 
Parts I and II: Critical Essays. Ed. David Bevington. New York: Garland, 1986. 
349-58. Print.  
Huntley, Frank Livingstone. “Sir Thomas Browne and the Metaphor of the Circle.” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 14.3(1953): 353-364. JSTOR. 7 Jul. 2013. Web. 
Hutson, Lorna, ed. Special Forum: Fifty Years of The King’s Two Bodies. 
Representations 106 (Spring 2009): 63-142. Print.  
Jack, Ian. “The Case of John Webster.” Scrutiny 16 (1949): 38-43. Print.  
Jakobson, Roman. “On Lingusitic Aspects of Translation.” (1959). The Translation 
Studies Reader. Ed. Lawrence Venuti. New York: Routledge, 2000. 113-118. 
Print. 
Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: 
Duke U P, 1991. Print. 
Jensen, Phebe. Religion and Revelry in Shakespeare’s Festive World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge U P, 2008. Print.  
Johnson, Samuel. “The Plays of William Shakespeare” (1765). Henry the Fourth Parts I 
and II: Critical Essays. Ed. David Bevington. New York: Garland, 1986. 7-8. 
Print.  
Jonson, Ben. The Complete Play of Ben Jonson. 4 vols. Ed. G.A. Wilkes. New York: 
Oxford U P, 1981. Print.  
Kantorowicz, Ernst. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. 
Princeton: Princeton U P, 1957. Print.  
Kendall, Tina. “Introduction: Tarrying with Disgust.” Film-Philosophy 15.2 (2011): 1-10. 
Web. 14 Mar. 2015. 
Kermode, Frank. The Classic. London : Faber & Faber, 1975. Print. 
	 217 
Kerrigan, William. “What Was Donne Doing?” South Central Review 4.2 (Summer 
1987) 2-15. JSTOR. 19 Mar. 2014. Web. 
King Lear. By William Shakespeare. Dir. Bill Rauch. Thomas Theater. Oregon 
Shakespeare Festival, Ashland, OR. 27 Apr. 2013.  
Kristeva, Julia.  Revolution in Poetic Language. Trans. Margaret Waller. New York: 
Columbia U P, 1984. Print.  
---. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Trans. Margaret Waller. New York: 
Columbia U P, 1982. Print.   
Kuchar, Gary. “Representation and Embodiment in John Donne’s Devotions upon 
Emergent Occasions.” Divine Subjection: The Rhetoric of Sacramental Devotion 
in Early Modern England. Pittsburgh: Duquesne U P, 2005. 151-179. Print. 
Kuzner, James. Open Subjects: English Renaissance Republicans, Modern Selfhoods, 
and the Virtue of Vulnerability. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U P, 2011. Print.   
Lacan, Jacques. Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English. Eds. Héloïse Fink, and 
Bruce Fink. New York: Norton, 2006. Print.  
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: Chicago U P, 1980. 
Print.  
---. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge in Western Thought. 
New York: Basic Books, 1999. Print.  
Lakoff, George and Mark Turner. More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic 
Metaphor. Chicago: Chicago U P, 1989. Print.   
Lander, Clara. “A Dangerous Sickness which Turned to a Spotted Fever.” SEL 11.1 
(Winter 1971): 89-108. JSTOR. 30 Mar. 2015. Web.  
Lanham, Richard A. A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms: A Guide for Students of English 
Literature. Berkeley: U of California P, 1968. Print.  
Laroque, Francois. “Shakespeare’s ‘Battle of Carnival and Lent’: The Falstaff Scenes 
Reconsidered (1 and 2 Henry IV).” Shakespeare and Carnival: After Bakhtin. Ed. 
Ronald Knowles. New York: St. Martins, 1998. 83-96. Print.  
Leys, Ruth. “The Turn to Affect: A Critique.” Critical Inquiry 37. 3 (Spring 2011): 434-
472. Web. 18 Mar 2015.  
Liddell, Henry George and Robert Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon, 
1940. Perseus. Web. 3 Jun 2015.  
	 218 
Linton, Joan. “The Passing of Falstaff: Rethinking History, Refiguring the Sacred.” 
Shakespeare and Religion: Early Modern and Postmodern Perspectives. Eds. Ken 
Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti. Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame P, 2011. 205-
27. Print.   
Lobsien, Verena O. “Squaring the Circle: Neoplatonic Versions of the Self in Early 
Modern Poetry.” Symbolism: An International Journal of Critical Aesthetics 9 
(2009): 13-38. Print.  
Luft, Joseph. Group Processes: An Introduction to Group Dynamics. 3rd. ed. Palo Alto, 
CA: Mayfield, 1984. Print.   
Machosky, Brenda. Thinking Allegory Otherwise. Stanford, CA: Stanford U P, 2010. 
Print. 
Magnusson, Lynne. “Danger and Discourse.” The Oxford Handbook of John Donne. Eds. 
Jeanne Shami, Dennis Flynn, and M. Thomas Hester. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2011. 
743-755. Print. 
Marlowe, Christopher. Edward II. A Select Collection of Old Plays in Twelve Volumes. 
Vol. II. New Edition. Eds. Gurney, Isaac Read, and Octavius Gilcrest. London: 
Septimus Prowett. 1825. 314-404. Print.    
---. Edward the Second. Ed. Charles R. Forker. New York: St. Martins, 1994. Print.  
---. Edward the Second. ed. Havelock Ellis. London: T.F. Unwin; New York: C. 
Scribner's Sons. 1887. Print.  
---. Edward the Second. The Complete Plays. Ed. Frank Romany and Robert Lindsey. 
New York: Penguin, 2003. 397-506. Print.  
---. The troublesome raigne and lamentable death of Edward the second, King of 
England with the tragicall fall of proud Mortimer: as it was sundrie times 
publiquely acted in the honourable citie of London, by the right honourable the 
Earle of Pembrooke his seruants. London: R. Robinson, 1594. Early English 
Books Online. University of Oregon. 1 Sept. 2014. Web. 
---. The troublesome raigne and lamentable death of Edvvard the second, King of 
England with the tragicall fall of proud Mortimer. And also the life and death of 
Peirs Gauestone, the great Earle of Cornewall, and mighty fauorite of King 
Edward the second. As it was publikely acted by the late Queenes Maiesties 
Seruants at the Red Bull in S. Iohns streete. London: Eliot's Court Press, 1622. 




---. The troublesome raigne and lamentable death of Edward the second, King of 
England with the tragicall fall of proud Mortimer: and also the life and death of 
Peirs Gaueston, the great Earle of Cornewall, and mighty fauorite of king 
Edward the second, as it was publiquely acted by the right honorable the Earle of 
Pembrooke his seruantes. London: Richard Bradocke, 1598. Early English Books 
Online. University of Oregon. 1 Sept. 2014. Web. 
---. The troublesome raigne and lamentable death of Edward the second, King of 
England with the tragicall fall of proud Mortimer. And also the life and death of 
Peirs Gaueston, the great Earle of Cornewall, and mighty fauorite of King 
Edward the second, as it was publiquely acted by the right honorable the Earle of 
Pembrooke his seruants. London: William Jaggard, 1612. Early English Books 
Online. University of Oregon. 1 Sept. 2014. Web. 
Marsalek, Karen. “Marvels and Counterfeits: False Resurrection in the Chester Antichrist 
and 1 Henry IV.” Shakespeare and the Middle Ages. Ed. Curtis Perry and John 
Watkins. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2009. 217-40. Print.  
Marshall, Cynthia. The Shattering of the Self: Violence, Subjectivity, and Early Modern 
Texts. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 2002. Print. 
Massumi, Brian. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham, NC: 
Duke U P, 2002. Print.  
---. Translator’s Forward: Pleasures of Philosophy. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. Print.    
Mazzio, Carla. The Inarticulate Renaissance: Language Trouble in an Age of Eloquence. 
Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2009. Print.   
McDonough, Christopher M. “‘A mere scutcheon’: Falstaff as Rhipsaspis.” Notes and 
Queries 55 (2008): 181-83. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “Indirect Language and the Voice of Silence.” Signs. Trans. 
Richard McCleary. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern U P, 1967. 39-83. Print.  
---. “On the Phenomenology of Language.” Signs. Trans. Richard McCleary. Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern U P, 1967. 84-97. Print.  
---. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
Print.  
---. “Science and the Experience of Expression.” The Prose of the World. Ed. Claude 
Lefort. Trans. John O’Neill. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern U P, 1973. 9-46. 
Print 
	 220 
Merrill, Thomas F. Merrill. Epic God-Talk: “Paradise Lost” and the Grammar of 
Religious Language. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1986. Print.  
Miller, William Ian. The Anatomy of Disgust. Cabridge, MA: Harvard U P, 1997. Print 
Milton, John. “Eikonoklastes.” The Works of John Milton. 18 vols. Ed. Frank Allen 
Patterson. New York: Columbia U P, 1931-38. Vol. 5. Print.  
Morgann, Maurice. “An Essay on the Dramatic Character of Sir John Falstaff” (1777). 
Henry the Fourth Parts I and II: Critical Essays. Ed. David Bevington. New 
York: Garland, 1986. 15-40. Print.  
Morillo, Marvin. “Donne’s Compasses: Circles and Right Lines.” English Language 
Notes (March 1966): 173-176. Print.  
Morris, Errol. “The Certainty of Donald Rumsfeld (Part 1).” The New York Times Online, 
25 Mar 2014. Web. 14 Mar. 2015. 
Mueller, Janel. “The Exegesis of Experience: Dean Donne's Devotions upon Emergent 
Occasions” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology 67 (1968): 1-19. 
Print. 
Muller, William. John Donne: Preacher. Princeton, NJ : Princeton U P, 1962. Print. 
Narverson, Kate. “The Devotion.” The Oxford Handbook of John Donne. Eds. Jeanne 
Shami, Dennis Flynn, and M. Thomas Hester. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2011. 308-
317. Print.  
Ngai, Sianne. Ugly Feelings. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U P, 2004. Print.  
Norton, David. The King James Bible: A Short History from Tyndale to Today. 
Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2011. Print.  
Nussbaum, Martha. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge: 
Cambridge U P, 2001. Print. 
Nutall, A.D. A New Mimesis: Shakespeare and the Representation of Reality. London: 
Methuen, 1983. Print.  
Ong, Walter J. Orality and Literacy: Technologizing of the Word. London: Methuen, 
1982. Print.  
Orgel, Stephen. Impersonations: The Performance of Gender in Shakespeare’s England. 
Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1996. 47. Print.  
---. “Nobody’s Perfect: Or Why Did the English Stage Take Boys for Women?” The 
South Atlantic Quarterly 88.1 (Winter 1989): 8-29. Print.  
---. “Prospero’s Wife.” Representations 8 (1984): 1-13. Print.  
	 221 
---. “The Poetics of Incomprehensibility.” Shakespeare Quarterly 42.4 (Winter 1991): 
431-437. Web. 4 Apr. 2014.   
Papoulias, Constantina and Felicity Callard. “Biology’s Gift: Interrogating the Turn to 
Affect,” Body and Society 16. 1 (2010): 29-53. Web. 18 Mar. 2015.  
Parker, Patricia. “Metaphor and Catachresis.” The Ends of Rhetoric: History, Theory, 
Practice. Ed. John Bender and David E. Wellbery. Stanford: Stanford U P, 1990. 
60-73. Print.  
Parnell, J.T. “Introduction.” Constructing Christopher Marlowe. Eds. J.A. Downie and 
J.T. Parnell. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2000. 1-12. Print.  
Parvini, Neema. “A Reply to Jonathan Dollimore.” Textual Practice 27.4 (2013): 724-33. 
Web. 24 Jul. 2014. 
---. Shakespeare and Contemporary Theory: New Historicism and Cultural Materialism. 
London: Bloomsbury, 2012. Print.  
---. Shakespeare’s History Plays: Rethinking Historicism. Edinbugh: Edinburgh  U P, 
2012. Print.   
Paster, Gail K, Katherine Rowe, Mary Floyd-Wilson eds. Reading the Early Modern 
Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion. Philadelphia: U of Penn P, 
2004. Print.  
Paster, Gail K. Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage. Chicago: U 
of Chicago P, 2004. Print. 
---. The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern 
England. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell U P, 1993. Print. 
Patterson, Anabel. “A Man is to Himself a Dioclesian: Donne’s Rectified Litany.” John 
Donne Journal 21(2002). Print. 
---. “Intention.” Critical Terms for Literary Study. Eds. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas 
McLaughlin. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995. 135-147 Print.  
Peacham, Henry. The Garden of Eloquence conteyning the figures of grammer and 
rhetorick, from whence maye bee gathered all manner of flowers, coulors, 
ornaments, exornations, formes and fashions of speech, very profitable for all 
those that be studious of eloquence, and that reade most eloquent poets and 
orators, and also helpeth much for the better vnderstanding of the holy Scriptures. 
London: H. Jackson, 1577. Early English Books Online. Web. 12 May 2015. 
Perry, Curtis. Literature and Favoritism in Early Modern England. Cambridge: 
Cambridge U P, 2006. Print. 
	 222 
Plowden, Edmund. The commentaries, or reports of Edmund Plowden, of the Middle-
Temple, Esq; and apprentice of the common law, Containing divers cases upon 
matters of law, argued and adjudged in the several reigns of King Edward VI. 
Queen Mary, King and Queen Philip and Mary, and Queen Elizabeth. Originally 
written in French, and now faithfully translated into English, and considerably 
improved by many marginal notes and references to all the books of the common 
law both ancient and modern. To which are added, the Quæries of Mr. Plowden, 
now first rendered into English at large with references, and many useful 
observations. In two parts. With two new tables, more compleat than any yet 
published; the one, of the names of the cases, the other of principal 
matters. London, 1779. 217. Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online. Gale. University Of Oregon. 14 Oct. 2014. Web.   
Pope, Maurice. “Shakespeare’s Falconry.” Shakespeare Survey: An Annual Survey of 
Shakespearian Study & Production. Ed. Stanley Wells. 44 (1992). 131-43. Print. 
Prendergast, Maria Teresa Micaela. Renaissance Fantasies: The Gendering of Aesthetics 
in Early Modern Fiction. Kent, OH: Kent State U P, 1999. Print. 
Puttenham, George. The Arte of English Poesie Contriued into three bookes: the first of 
poets and poesie, the second of proportion, the third of ornament. London: 
Richard Field, 1589. Early English Books Online. Web. 12 May 2015. 
---. The Arte of English Poesie. Alice Walker, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1970. 
Print. 
Quinn, Dennis. “Donne’s Christian Eloquence” ELH 27.4 (December 1960): 276-297. 
JSTOR. Web  
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria. Trans. H. E. Butler. Cabridge, MA: Harvard U P, 1959. 
Print.  
Ramsey, Ian. Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases. New 
York: Macmillan, 1957. Print.  
Rasmussen, Mark David, ed. Renaissance Literature and Its Formal Engagements. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Print  
Ratcliffe, Matthew. “The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life.” The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford U 
P, 2010. 349-372. Print.  
Richardson, Catherine. “Tragedy, Family and Household.” Eds. Emma Smith and Garrett 
A. Sullivan Jr. The Cambridge Companion to English Renaissance Tragedy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2010. Print  
Ricks, Christopher. The Force of Poetry. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. Print. 
	 223 
Ricoeur, Paul. Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination. Trans. David 
Pellauer. Ed. Mark I. Wallace. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995. Print.  
Rivers, Isabel. Classical and Christian Ideas in English Renaissance Poetry. London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1979. Print. 
Robbins, Jill. Prodigal Son / Elder Brother: Interpretation and Alterity in Augustine, 
Petrarch, Kafka, Levinas. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991. Print.  
Robinson, Benedict. “Disgust c. 1600.” ELH (Summer 2014): 553-583. Web. 10 Mar. 
2015. 
Romany, Frank and Robert Lindsey. Notes. The Complete Plays. By Christopher 
Marlowe. Ed. Frank Romany and Robert Lindsey. New York: Penguin, 2003. 
563-675. Print. 
Rorty, Amelie. “A Plea for Ambivalence.” The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2010. 425-444. Print.  
Rotman, Brian. Signifying Nothing: The Semiotics of Zero. New York: St. Martins, 1987. 
Print.  
Rowe, George. Thomas Middleton and the New Comedy Tradition. Lincoln, NE: U of 
Nebraska P, 1979. Print.  
Rudolph Bultman’s History of The Synoptic Tradition. Revised edition. Trans. John 
Marsh. New York: Haper and Row, 1976. Print 
Rudolph Bultman’s History of The Synoptic Tradition. Revised edition. Trans. John 
Marsh. New York: Haper and Row, 1976. Print 
Rufo, Jeffrey A. “‘He needs will be Absolute Milan’: The Political Thought of The 
Tempest.” The Tempest: A Critical Reader. Ed. Alden T. and Virginia Mason 
Vaugn. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. 137-164. Print.  
Salenius, Maria. “The Circle and the Line: Two Metaphors of God and His Works in 
John Donne’s Devotions upon Emergent Occasions,” Neuphiliogrische 
Mitteilungen 102.2 (2001): 201-210. JSTOR. 3 Mar. 2014. Web.  
Saunders, Ben. Desiring Donne: Poetry, Sexuality, Interpretation. Cambridge: Harvard U 
P, 2006. Print. 
Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. Eds. Charles Bally, Albert 
Sechehaye and Albert Riedlinger. Trans. Roy Harris. Chicago: Open Court, 2007. 
Print.  
Sawday, Jonathan. The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in 
Renaissance Culture. London: Routledge, 1995. Print. 
	 224 
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. New York: 
Oxford U P, 1985. Print.  
Schoenfeldt, Michael C. Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology & 
Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton. Cambridge: 
Cambridge U P, 1999. Print.  
Sedgwick, Eve K, and Adam Frank. Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity. 
Durham: Duke U P, 2003. Print.  
Sedgwick, Eve K. Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire. New 
York: Columbia U P, 1985. Print.  
Seelig, Sharon. “In Sickness and in Health: Donne’s Devotions Upon Emergent 
Occasions.” John Donne Journal 8 (1989): 103-13. Print.   
Shakespeare, William. Hamlet. Ed. G. R. Hibbard. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2008. Print. 
---. Henry IV, Part I. Ed. David Bevington. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2008. Print.  
---. Henry V. The Norton Shakespeare. Vol. 1. Ed. Stephen Grenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean 
E. Howard, and Katharine Eisaman Maus. New York: Norton, 2008. Print.  
---. King Henry IV, Part I. The Arden Shakespeare. Ed. David Scott Kastan. London: 
Arden, 2003. Print.  
---. King Richard II. Ed. Charles R. Forker. London: Arden Shakespeare, 2002. Print. 
---. The History of King Lear. Ed. Stanley Wells. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2008. Print. 
---. The Norton Shakespeare. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean Howard, 
Katharine Maus, and Andrew Gurr. New York: Norton, 2008. Print. 
---. The Tempest. Ed. Stephen Orgel. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2008. Print. 
---. The Winter’s Tale. Ed. Stephen Orgel. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2008. Print. 
---. Twelfth Night, or What You Will. Roger Warren and Stanley Wells, eds. Oxford: 
Oxford U P, 2008. Print.  
Sherry, Richard. A Treatise of the Figures of Grammar and Rhetorike. London: Richard 
Tottel,  Schilders, 1555. Early English Books Online. Web. 12 May 2015. 
Shouse, Eric. “Feeling, Emotion, Affect.” Media-Culture 8.6 (Dec. 2005). Web. 31 Mar. 
2015. 
Sidney, Philip. Sidney's 'the Defence of Poesy' and Selected Renaissance Literary 
Criticism. Ed. Gavin Alexander. London: Penguin, 2004. Print. 
	 225 
Smith, Bruce R. Homosexual Desire in Shakespeare’s England: A Cultural Poetics. 
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991. Print.  
---. “Rethinking Cuts in an Age of Distraction.” Presentation at the 43rd annual meeting 
of the Shakespeare Association of America, Vancouver, BC, April 2-6, 2015. 
---. Shakespeare and Masculinity. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2000. Print. 
Smith, Paul. Discerning the Subject. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988. Print.  
Spenko, James L. “Circular Form in Two Donne Lyrics.” English Language Notes 
(December 1975): 103-107. Print.  
Spolsky, Ellen. Satisfying Skepticism: Embodied Knowledge in the Early Modern World. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001. Print.  
Stallybrass, Peter and Allon White. The Politics and Poetics of Transgression. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell U P, 1986. Print.  
Stern, David. Midrash and Theory: Ancient Jewish Exegesis and Contemporary Literary 
Studies. Evanston, IL: Northwestern U P, 1996, Print.  
Stewart, Alan. Shakespeare’s Letters. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2008. Print.  
Strier, Richard. Resistant Structures: Particularity, Radicalism, and Renaissance Texts. 
Berkeley: U of California P, 1995. Print. 
---. The Unrepentant Renaissance: from Petrarch to Shakespeare to Milton. Chicago: U 
of Chicago P, 2011. Print.  
Targoff, Ramie. “Facing Death.” The Cambridge Companion to John Donne. Ed. 
Aschsah Guibbory. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2006. 217-231. Print.  
Terada, Rei. Feeling in Theory: Emotion After the “Death of the Subject”. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard U P, 2001. Print.  
The Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version with the Apocrypha. 3rd Ed. 
Ed. Michael D. Coogan. Oxford, Oxford U P, 2001.Print.  
Theile, Verena and Linda Tredennick, eds. New Formalisms and Literary Theory. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Print. 
Thomas F. Merrill’s Epic God-Talk: “Paradise Lost” and the Grammar of Religious 
Language. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1986. Print.  
Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology. vol. 1. London: James Nisbet, 1953. Print.  
Traub, Valerie. “Prince Hal’s Falstaff: Positioning Psychoanalysis and the Female 
Reproductive Body.” Shakespeare Quarterly 40 (1989): 456-74.    
	 226 
---. Desire and Anxiety: Circulations of Sexuality in Shakespearean Drama. London: 
Routledge, 1992. Print. 
Traversi, Derek. Shakespeare: From Richard II to Henry V. Stanford: Stanford U P, 
1957. Print. 
Turner, Mark. The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language. Oxford: 
Oxford U P, 1996. Print.  
Tylus, Jane. Writing and Vulnerability in the Late Renaissance. Stanford, CA: Stanford U 
P, 1993. Print.  
Vendler, Helen. The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets. Cambridge: Harvard U P, 1997. Print. 
Vickers, Nancy. “Diana Described: Scattered Women and Scattered Rhyme.” Critical 
Inquiry 8.2 (Winter 1981): 265-279.   
Watkins, Calvert, ed. The American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots. 3rd ed. 
New York: Houghton Milfflin Harcourt, 2011. Print.  
Watson, Robert N. The Rest Is Silence: Death as Annihilation in the Early Renaissance. 
Berkley: U of California P, 1994. Print.  
Webber, Joan. Contrary Music: The Prose Style of John Donne. Madison: U of  
Webster, John. The Duchess of Malfi. Ed. Leah S. Marcus. London: Bloomsbury, 2009. 
Print.   
---. The Duchess of Malfi. Ed. René Weis. Oxford: Oxford U P, 2009. Print. 
---. Three Plays: The White Devil, the Duchess of Malfi, the Devil's Law-Case. Ed. D C. 
Gunby. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972. Print. 
---. The Dutchess of Malfey: a tragedy· As it is now acteed at the Dukes Theater. London 
: printed for D[orman]. N[ewman]. and T[homas]. C[ollins]. and are to be sold by 
Simon Neale at the Three Pidgeons in Bedford-street in Covent-Garden, 1678. 
---. The Dutchesse of Malfy. A tragedy. As it was approvedly well acted at the Black-
Friers, by his Majesties Servants. The perfect and exact copy, with divers things 
printed, that the length of the play would not beare in the presentment. London : 
printed by I. Raworth, for I. Benson, to be sold in St. Dunstans Churchyard in 
Fleetstreet, 1640. 
---. The tragedy of the Dutchesse of Malfy. As it was presented priuatly, at the Black-
Friers; and publiquely at the Globe, by the Kings Maiesties Seruants. The perfect 
and exact coppy, with diuerse things printed, that the length of the play would not 
beare in the presentment. London : printed by Nicholas Okes, for Iohn Waterson, 
and are to be sold at the signe of the Crowne, in Paules Church-yard, 1623. 
	 227 
Weil, Herbert and Judith Weil, eds. The First Part of King Henry IV. Cambridge: 
Cambridge U P, 1997. Print.  
Weil, Herbert. “Montaigne and Falstaff.” Shakespeare Newsletter 58 (2008): 49. Web. 1 
Sep. 2015.  
White, Helen. Tudor Books of Private Devotion. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1951. Print.   
Wilcox, Helen. “Squaring the Circle: Metaphors of the Divine in the Work of Donne and 
His Contemporaries.” John Donne Journal 13.1-2 (1994): 61-79. Print.  
---. ““Was I not made to thinke?”: Teaching the Devotions and Donne’s Literary 
Practice” John Donne Journal 26 (2007): 387-399. Print.  
Willbern, David. Poetic Will: Shakespeare and the Play of Language. Philadelphia, PA: 
U of Pennsylvania P, 1997. Print.  
Williams, Joseph M. Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace.8th ed. New York: Pearson 
Longman, 2005. Print.  
Williamson, George. The Proper Wit of Poetry. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1962. Print.    
Willis, Deborah. “Shakespeare and the Discourse of Colonialism.” Studies in English 
Literature 29.2 (1989): 277-89 
Wilson, John Dover. The Fortunes of Falstaff. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1943. Print.   
Wilson, Thomas. Arte of Rhetorique 1553. London: Richardus Graftonus. Early English 
Books Online. Web. 9 May 2015.  
Wilson, Thomas. Arte of Rhetorique 1560. Ed. G.H. Mair. Oxford: Clarendon, 1909. 
Print. 
Wimsatt, and Beardsley. “The Affective Fallacy.” The Sewanee Review 57:1 (Winter, 
1949): 31-55. JSTOR. 20 Nov. 2011. Web.  
---. “The Intentional Fallacy.” The Sewanee Review 54.3 (1946): 468-488. JSTOR. 20 
Nov. 2011. Web. 
Wink, Walter. The Powers that Be: Theology for a New Millennium. New York: 
Doubleday, 1998. Print. 
 
 
